Essays on Leadership Selection and Public Goods Provision in Self-Help Organizations by Grossman, Guy
Essays on Leadership Selection and Public Goods
Provision in Self-Help Organizations
Guy Grossman
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy







Essays on Leadership Selection and Public Goods
Provision in Self-Help Organizations
Guy Grossman
This dissertation examines the relationship between leadership selection and public goods provi-
sion in self-help organizations. Leadership selection is defined as the rules for selecting leaders,
as well as the factors that determine the quality of the leadership class. Self-help organizations are
defined as relatively small-size voluntary groups that are created to provide goods and services to
members and that select their leader via democratic procedures. Examples include micro-lending
and micro-insurance groups, common-pool resource groups, women and artisan cooperatives and
farmer associations.
The dissertation focuses on Ugandas recent largest development project: the Agriculture Pro-
ductivity Enhancement Project (APEP). USAID funded, APEPs stated goal is to expand rural eco-
nomic opportunities by supporting the transition of smallholder producers into commercial farm-
ing. During the projects lifespan (2005-2009), APEP helped about 60,000 small-scale producers to
organize into over 200 farmer associations (i.e. cooperatives). Importantly, the success of these
farmer associations in overcoming social dilemmas and in providing goods and services to their
members, varied tremendously. Why are some groups more successful than others in overcoming the
social dilemmas inherent in public goods production? To explain this variation, the dissertation uses
a range of disciplinary perspectives — drawn mainly from political science, economics, social
psychology and sociology — as well as a diverse set of methodological tools.
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Overview
3 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1 Motivation
State withdrawal and increasing democratization of public life in many developing countries have
encouraged the rapid proliferation of local, self-help groups — autonomous, voluntary-based,
grassroots organizations, which are created to provide collective goods and services to their mem-
bers. Empirical evidence supports this claim: in Senegal 10% of sampled villages reported having
at least one self-help group in 1982; by 2002 this figure was 65%. In Burkina Faso the figures were
22% for 1982 and 91% in 2002 (Bernard et al., 2008). The rise of these groups — which include
farmer associations, artisan cooperatives, common-pool resource groups, saving and micro-credit
groups and micro-insurance — is also driven by the active support of the aid community. In the
past decade the World Bank, bilateral donor governments and INGOs have increasingly funded
development interventions that promote self-help groups, as part of a paradigm that stresses the
positive effects of participatory, community-driven development.
However, the evidence at hand suggests that the effectiveness of self-help organizations in alle-
viating poverty has been very mixed (Easterly, 2001, Hellin, Lundy and Meijer, 2009). To provide
their members with high value goods and services, self-help groups must overcome classic collec-
tive action problems (Olson, 1965)1. Why are some groups more successful than others in overcoming
the social dilemmas inherent in public goods production2?
1.2 Theoretical Framework
This dissertation addresses this question by drawing on three, distinct literatures: (i) the socio-
logical and economics research on the effectiveness of self-help groups, (ii) the political economy
literature on political selection, and (iii) the political science and political economy work on public
1In this study I focus exclusively on existing self-help groups, which have already solved the collective action prob-
lem inherent in group formation. This focus allows me to view those groups as small communities, while sidelining
free-riding tensions between members and non-members. The social dilemmas addressed in this study are therefore
part of a broader class of obstacles to cooperation between group members in the production of club goods and services.
2The term social dilemma refers to situations in which group and individual incentives are at odds (Heckathorn,
1996). Throughout the dissertation I use the terms social dilemma and collective action problem interchangeably.
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goods provision. In doing so, I seek to provide new insights into an organizational form — self-
help groups — that is playing an increasingly important role in shaping welfare outcomes in poor
areas. But I also seek to do so in a way that contributes to each of these three larger theoretical
literatures. The subsections that follow briefly summarize the dissertations contributions to each
of these literatures.
Literature on the Effectiveness of Self-help Groups
The study of voluntary self-help organizations performance, with few exceptions, has been dom-
inated by sociologists and development economists. The sociological approach generally em-
phasizes the strength of social ties between group members, through the social capital paradigm
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) or via social network analysis (Simmons and Birchall, 2008). Here,
the strength of informal relations has been shown to influence the spontaneous creation of protec-
tion systems (Krishna, 2002), facilitate the diffusion of information (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001)
and of innovation adoption (Isham, 2002), increase the success of microcredit programs (Cassar,
Crowley and Wydick, 2007, Karlan, 2007), and foster civic engagement conducive to cooperation
(Gittell and Vidal, 1998). The economic approach, by contrast, commonly focuses on factors such
as group attributes (e.g., group size (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001); income, religious or ethnic hetero-
geneity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000)), peer sanctioning (Ostrom, 1990), and various factors external
to the group (e.g., terrain, rainfall, soil quality, or market conditions (Berdegue´, 2001)).
Though this body of work has contributed much to our current understanding of voluntary
self-help groups, it suffers from a fundamental limitation: it tends to treat self-help groups as
non-hierarchical organizations, ignoring the key role that social differentiation processes play in
solving social dilemmas3. Specifically, this literature overlooks the importance of leaders in in-
ducing cooperation in small group settings. Integrating a political science perspective — one that
takes power relations and hierarchies as its starting point — into the study of self-help groups’
effectiveness, is the first theoretical contribution of this study.
3Social differentiation denotes the tendency of groups and communities to develop hierarchies, in which social roles
are defined as a set of rights and duties members are expected to fulfill (Eguı´luz et al., 2005).
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The Political Selection Literature
In contrast, the political economy literature on political selection (Besley, 2005, Kotakorpi and
Poutvaara, 2010), the second body of work that informs this study, does assume an hierarchical
world. I build on the key insight of this literature — throughout the dissertation but most directly
in Chapter 3 — that the profile (e.g., quality) of the political class has welfare and distributional
implications (Bianco and Bates, 1990, Caselli and Morelli, 2004). However, as far as my knowl-
edge goes, the political selection literature has yet to explore its implications beyond the selection
of professional career politicians (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). The second major theoretical con-
tribution of this study is to expand the scope of this literature by offering, in Chapter 3, a formal
model adapted specifically to the small group setting.
Public Goods Provision Literature
Finally, the dissertation builds on the political science and political economy literatures on the
relation between governance institutions and public goods provision (Funk and Gathmann, 2009,
Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). Specifically, I apply a ‘new institutionalist’ perspective in
exploring how institutional design matters for self-help organizations. There are, however, several
limitations to the public goods literature, which this project seeks to address.
First, with few exceptions, this body of work focuses almost exclusively on the distributive
roles of local (Besley and Case, 2003) and national governments (Persson and Tabellini, 2003),
overlooking the importance of self-help groups in public goods provision. As a result, the current
political science literature is quiet about the possibility that institutional design matters in intimate
and information rich environments (cf. Olken (2010)). The third theoretical contributions of this
research project is, therefore, testing whether institutional rules ‘have a bite’ in small-group settings. I
explore this question directly in chapter 2 and chapter 4.
Second, following a ‘new institutionalist’ approach, the political science work on public goods
provision begins from the assumption that individuals’ expectations and behavior are shaped by
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incentives embedded within formal and informal rules (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). Yet with the
exception of a small literature on legitimacy (Levi, Sacks and Tyler, 2009), this literature does not
consider the possibility that individuals’ behavior is also a function of the process by which insti-
tutions were put into place. Another theoretical contribution of this research project is to examine
this possibility directly: I ask, do the procedural rules for selecting leaders impact individuals’ behavior
in ways that cannot be reduced to some incentives scheme?
The third limitation of the public goods provision literature lies in its difficulty to demonstrate
its causal claims. This limitation stems from the fact that (i) national political institutions have
many elements that are bundled together and that likely change at the same time (Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005), (ii) the adoption of governance institutions tends to be a function of highly endoge-
nous factors (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), and (iii) empirical analysis face the serious
problem of not having a valid micro foundation, because the theory’s predictions are commonly
tested with aggregated national data. This final limitation is important: new institutionalism is
ultimately a micro foundational theory: individuals’ behavior is explained as a function of incen-
tives embedded within institutional arrangements (North, 1990). I seek to address these problems
through the dissertation’s research design.
1.3 Research Design and Methodology
In contrast to national and state-level institutions, establishing causal effects of political institu-
tions and tracing micro-foundational behaviors can be more feasible at the local level. In this
section, I briefly introduce the Ugandan farmer associations that are the focus of the empirical
parts of the study. I then describe the collective action problem that hinders their performance.
Finally, I turn to review the methodology I use for studying the impact of leadership selection on
public goods production4.
4More accurately, most of the goods that self-help groups produce should be classified as ‘club goods’, a subtype of
public goods that are excludable but non-rivalrous. I prefer the use of the term public goods, in order to relate this study
more easily to existing literatures.
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A Very Short History of Farmer Associations in Africa
Farmer associations’ raison d’e´tre is to improve the performance of their members’ farms as eco-
nomic units engaged in market transactions. Among self-help groups, farmer associations occupy
a central role in developing countries’ poverty alleviation strategies (Narayan-Parker, 2002a). In
poor countries such as Uganda, the majority of citizens derive their lion share of income from
agriculture. For example, according to the 2002 census (UBOS, 2002), over 88% of Ugandans live
in areas that are regarded rural. Most of those living in rural areas are smallholder producers
that do not participate actively in the monetized economy. For this reason, policies for integrat-
ing smallholder, subsistence farmers into markets have been among the most salient issues for
both colonial and post-colonial governments (Bates and Lofchie, 1980). Yet despite numerous ef-
forts in recent decades to collectivize production, and later crop marketing, many initiatives have
failed, not least because in many developing countries, colonial and national governments sought
to control and exploit farmer organizations (Bates, 1981, Lele, 1981).
In the early 1990s, as a result of structural adjustment liberalization policies, almost all govern-
ment controlled farmer cooperatives had become insolvent (Ponte, 2002). This process triggered
an immediate renewal in the interest of the development community in supporting farmer groups
(Hussi et al., 1993). In recent years, development agencies have been increasing their support
for farmer organizations, which are still believed to be the most efficient means for integrating
small-scale producers into markets (Birchall, 2003). Here too, however, studies assessing the con-
tribution of aid-supported farmer groups to raising income and farm output report very mixed
results (Ashraf, Gine and Karlan, 2009, Berdegue´, 2001).
The Research Site: APEP Groups
All of the farmer associations surveyed for this project were created as part of one of Uganda’s
largest recent development projects: the Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP)5.
5APEP was funded by USAID, and implemented by Chemonics International, an International Development con-
sulting firm based in Washington DC.
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APEP’s goal was to support small-holder farmers’ transition into commercial farming. Between
2004 and 2008, it helped organize about 60,000 small producers into more than 2,500 village-level
groups, known as producer organizations (POs), which were further organized into more than
200 farmer associations across Uganda, known as Depot Committees (DCs). Serving, on average,
200 members from ten neighboring village-level groups, the farmer associations were designed to
exploit economies of scale and to bargain for better prices based on quality and volume6.
Social Dilemmas in Farmer Associations: A Running Example
Consider the social dilemma that hinders the effectiveness of farmer associations in providing
the most important service to their members: securing higher output prices through collective
marketing. This social dilemma will serve as our running example throughout this dissertation.
Because of the high costs of transportation and market information in many developing coun-
tries, dispersed small-holder farmers are restricted to sell their crops through local middlemen.
These agents often exploit asymmetries in information and bargaining powers, offering dispersed
farmers below-market prices. By contrast, organized farmers can avoid operating through these
agents. Instead, they can sell their crops via their association in bulk and obtain higher prices—
their size increases their bargaining power and reduces buyers’ transaction costs (Staatz, 1987).
Yet, once a farmer group is founded, middlemen raise their prices offered to individual farm-
ers to remain competitive. Since middlemen, unlike most farmer groups, collect the crops at the
farm-gate and pay cash-on-delivery, members have a private interest in selling their produce to
middlemen. The private gain of selling to middlemen (‘defecting’), however, is conditional on a
sufficient number of other members selling via the group (‘cooperating’). This is because the price
offered by middlemen depends on the price that the farmer group secures, which depends cru-
cially on volume. If too many members defect, collective marketing collapses and all individuals
typically receive a profit lower than they would, had they cooperated with the group. As Figure
1.1 makes clear, some groups manage to overcome this tension between private and group inter-
6For a discussion of reasons for choosing to focus on the APEP groups, see Appendix A.1.
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ests. Many others fail7. Explaining this variation in the effectiveness of self-help groups is the
central goal of this study.
Figure 1.1: Variation in performance. Figure displays the distribution of the proportion of members in each of the 50
sampled Ugandan farmer association who sold their coffee via the group, at least once, in the past season.
Methodological Approach
As mentioned above, research at the local level can apply a wide set of methodological tools that
are not typically available for national-level research. In this section, I briefly discuss the method-
ological approach I take for testing the study’s hypotheses regarding the impact of leader selection
rules on public goods production.
First, the empirical analysis is informed by a year of fieldwork in Uganda, in which I applied
ethnographic methods. These include conducting, in person, dozens of semi-structured inter-
views with APEP staff and with members and leaders of the APEP groups, as well as reviewing a
large number of documents and reports produced by the project administrators. The ethnographic
work proved invaluable. For one, it provided the basis for constructing the survey instruments.
Secondly, it allowed me to develop the intuition I use for introducing a theoretical model on the
7In Chapter 3 I demonstrate that farmer groups that are able to overcome this social dilemma contribute significantly
to their members’ welfare (Grossman, 2011a).
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determinants of leader quality in self-help groups in chapter 3. Third, the familiarity I gained with
the administrative apparatus of APEP allowed me to identify natural conditions that resulted in
(plausibly) exogenous variation in leader selection rules. This is the basis for the encouragement
research design (Angrist and Krueger, 2001) I use for studying the impact of leader selection rules
on leader accountability in chapter 4.
Second, I base the study’s identification strategy on taking a large set of behavioral experi-
ments typically conducted in a laboratory environment to a field setting, following (Habyarimana
et al., 2009) . These experiments, which I adapted specifically to address the issues at hand, allow
me to further uncover causal relations between leader selection rules and public goods provision
[Chapters 2 and 4]8.
Why not conduct the experiments in a laboratory at Columbia University in New York City?
First, recent evidence suggests that students’ behavior in behavioral experiments might not be
representative of the larger society (Jones, 2010). Secondly, there is growing evidence suggesting
that in the context of behavioral experiments that measure social-preferences, subjects from devel-
oping countries behave differently than their counterparts in the developed world (Cardenas and
Carpenter, 2008). Third, the dissertation’s strategy for increasing the external validity is based
on conducting experiments with, and collected observational data on, members of pre-existing
groups that face collective action problems on a regular basis.
For this purpose I conducted more than 3,100 individual-level surveys with a random sample
of members of those groups. In addition, I collected unique social network data in each of the
50 sampled farmer associations studied herein. These original data allow me to corroborate the
experimental results, contributing to the external validity of the study’s key findings. One of the
major contributions of this study is, therefore, methodological: combining original survey data,
social network analysis, formal modeling, behavioral games and a encouragement research design
within the framework of a single study.
8See (Habyarimana et al., 2009, pp. 13–19) for a comprehensive exposition of the advantages of conducting behav-
ioral experiments in a field-setting.
11 CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.4 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2: Internal Centralized-Sanctioning and Cooperation in Self-Help Groups
This chapter contributes to a debate on the role sanctioning plays in fostering cooperation in social
dilemmas. Sanctioning is widely considered to be a viable solution to the collective action problem
inherent in public goods production (see Sigmund (2007) for a review). Scholars have generally
focused on two forms of sanctioning solutions. In the first solution, centralized authorities that are
external to the group — such as the state (Scholz and Gray, 1997) — are the locus of coordination
and enforcement of cooperative efforts. Most recent empirical and theoretical work has focused,
instead, on a second solution, in which cooperation emerges from diffused and decentralized
punishment (Boyd et al., 2003, Gintis et al., 2005)
However, scholars have recently begun questioning the ability of spontaneous, decentralized
and uncoordinated peer-punishment actions to sustain cooperation in complex organizational struc-
tures (Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010, O’Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt, 2009), concluding that
“the step from peer punishment to the establishment of sanctioning institutions deserve closer
future investigations” (Sigmund, 2007, p. 598-9). Peer-sanctioning, I argue, is only effective under
very restrictive conditions: namely, it can only sustain cooperation in small-size groups, where the
cost of punishment is likely to be recuperated. In such groups, self-interested contributors may
choose to punish defectors at a personal cost, as long as they have reasons to believe that pun-
ishment will increase future contributions. When groups become large and interactions between
members infrequent, bilateral punishment is unlikely to sustain cooperation because future gains
from punishment cannot be internalized.
To overcome this problem, groups commonly develop forms of self-regulation, in which the
power to sanction defectors is transferred to a centralized authority, internal to the group (Greif,
Milgrom and Weingast, 1994). Internal centralized sanctioning institutions are likely to be more
efficient than peer-punishment (Guth et al., 2007), since they are better positioned to overcome
coordination failures (O’Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt, 2009). To incorporate these ideas into
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theories of public goods provision, I study how group members behave in a context in which
a centralized monitor is given a monopoly over sanctioning decisions. I ask, will groups reach
high levels of contribution, even if their members do not have the power to decide who should be
sanctioned? One of the contributions of this paper is testing and documenting the effectiveness of
centralized authorities, internal to the group, in fostering cooperation9.
The chapter addresses an additional open question: whether the political process through which
internal centralized authorities obtain their sanctioning powers is consequential for cooperation.
Differently from peer-sanctioning systems, in which the right to punish defectors comes hand-in-
hand with group membership, in a centralized-sanctioning regime it is important to distinguish
between the impact of sanctioning and the impact of the way in which sanctioning powers are
granted. Specifically, I test whether elections have a positive impact on group members’ contri-
butions to public goods production. When analyzing the causal mechanisms that possibly tie
elections and leader’s effectiveness in fostering cooperation, I test the hypothesis that elections
increase cooperation through a “legitimacy effect”. Namely, it examines whether individuals are
more likely to commit to a leader’s authority if they participate in her selection.
To investigate these hypotheses, I combine “lab-in-the-field” behavioral experiments with ob-
servational data on 1,543 producers from a sample of 50 Ugandan farmer associations. I developed
a novel adaptation of the public goods game, which is the conventional behavioral experiment
used to study the conditions under which groups can overcome individual incentives to defect
(Camerer, 2003). The experimental setup allows me to attest the impact of centralized-sanctioning
institutions on cooperative behavior as well as to demonstrate that the size of this effect depends
on the process by which these institutions are established. To assess the external validity of those
findings, I relate the farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in the farmer
organization and show that farmers’ deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts co-
operative behavior in their natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.
9See also Frye (2000) that examines the conditions under which private groups govern themselves without turning
to an outside agent for enforcement.
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Chapter 3: A Theory of Leadership Selection in ‘Small’ Self-Help Groups
This chapter continues my examination of the factors affecting leaders’ effectiveness in public
goods production, by focusing on the determinants of the quality of internal centralized authori-
ties. Leader quality is thought of, here, as a combination of the leader’s ability and the amount of
effort that the leader exerts while working for the group.
While many factors may affect the quality of leadership obtained by a small group, this chap-
ter focuses specifically on two. First is the ability of a group to monitor its leader in order to
incentivize effort, which depends on the monitoring institutions available to the group. Second
is the availability of private income opportunities outside of the group, which depends on local
economic conditions. While both of these factors are likely to evolve over time, neither can be
changed rapidly from one election cycle to the next10. The main goal of this chapter is to present
and test a model that uncovers the conditions under which monitoring institutions can worsen the
quality of the candidacy pool.
The model I develop is applicable to groups in which leaders, who play a decisive role in pro-
ducing a group public good, are chosen endogenously from the set of members through demo-
cratic procedures. This is a feature shared by many small groups, including the farmer associa-
tions studied herein. The starting point for the model is, therefore, a citizen-candidate framework
(Besley and Coate, 1997), which a number of recent studies have used to investigate issues of
leadership quality (Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2010, Messner and Polborn, 2004).
This chapter departs from existing theories in that it reflects the particular features of self-help
groups, which differ from larger political units in a number of ways. First, unlike large political
units, in small groups members generally know each other well. This means that incomplete
information plays a smaller role in determining outcomes in small group settings. It also means
that small groups have an advantage over large political units in offering ‘high-powered’ incentive
10From a group’s perspective, there are good reasons to ensure relative ‘stickiness’ of monitoring institutions. One
reason is to protect against attempts by incumbents to alter monitoring institutions to increase incumbency advantage.
I thus treat monitoring as a fixed parameter for any given elections and consider the quality of leadership that a group
obtains, given the monitoring institutions and local private income opportunities present at any specific time.
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schemes that condition remuneration on effort or outcome. Second, small groups are often formed
with a specific purpose in mind, so that members’ goals are generally more closely aligned than
in larger political units. Third, participating in small groups, even as the leader, is generally a
part-time affair. Rarely do small groups have the resources to employ full-time leaders, as is
common in larger political units. The result is that leaders must choose how to allocate their time
between producing the group public good and generating private income. Fourth, the leader
receives significant benefits from the public good that she produces. This has an important effect
on members’ incentives to seek leadership positions.
The model’s principal theoretical argument is that groups may face a trade-off between the
ability of the elected leader and the amount of effort that the leader exerts. This trade-off is driven
by two effects. First, an increase in monitoring of the leader will incentivize the leader to exert
more effort. However, a higher level of monitoring may also cause high ability members to self-
select out of the candidate pool, resulting in leaders with lower ability being elected. When both of
these effects are operating, the result is a rough inverted U-shaped relationship between the level
of monitoring and the value of the public good produced. At low levels of monitoring, high ability
leaders are elected, but the exert little effort, leading to a low public good value. An increase in the
level of monitoring causes the leader to exert more effort, increasing the value of the public good.
However, if the level of monitoring continues to increase eventually high ability members will
start to self-select out of the candidate pool, reducing the value of the public good. Importantly,
this trade-off exists only when private income opportunities are sufficiently high. If private income
opportunities are low, then high ability members have little reason to opt-out of candidacy. Thus,
when there are few private income opportunities outside of the group activities, groups will be
able to obtain high ability leaders who also exert a relatively high level of effort.
The model’s predictions are tested using the original data I gathered from an extensive survey
of Ugandan farmer associations. The data support the predictions of the model, while also pro-
viding evidence for one of the central arguments of this dissertation: that the quality of leadership
in small groups affects the value of the public good produced and, thereby, members’ welfare.
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Chapter 4: Do Leader Selection Rules Impact Accountability?
In chapter 2, I use a set of behavioral experiments to study the impact of elections on cooperation.
In that chapter, the main focus of the analysis was the cooperative behavior of group members in a so-
cial dilemma, under different experimentally-induced political institutions. In chapter 4, I return
to explore the impact of leader selection rules. In this chapter, however, my identification strategy
is based on natural conditions that resulted in exogenous variation in the rules for selecting the
senior managers of the APEP associations. Specifically, I examine the causal impact of moving
from an appointment-based rule to popular direct elections on leader accountability11.
A survey of the literature on the impact of the rules for selecting officials – such as judges,
public regulators, school board members and the CEOs of traded companies – suggests that the
debate over the relative virtues of elections and appointments is far from settled. On the one hand,
there are good theoretical reasons to assume that different leadership selection methods will have
varying effects on political and economic outcomes of interest. The empirical findings, however,
are ambiguous, not least because the adoption of governance institutions tends to be a function
of other group-specific factors, which makes the identification of causal impact nearly impossible
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001).
This chapter addresses the identification problem by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation
in the rules for selecting the senior managers (henceforth leaders) of the APEP groups. The paper’s
identification strategy — explored in length in Section 4.4 — rests upon the fact that (i) APEP
field-facilitators played a foundational role in establishing the farmer associations, (ii) almost all
groups adopted the field facilitator recommendation when choosing between an election and an
appointment rule for selecting their manager (iii) the idiosyncratic preferences of individual field-
facilitators that informed their recommendations are plausibly orthogonal to other characteristics
of the groups they were hired to work with, and (iv) the deployment of field facilitators to districts
was orthogonal to the characteristics of the groups.
11Appointment denotes a rule by which the association’s board of directors, in which the farmer groups that make-ep
the association are equally represented, select the DC manager. Direct denotes a rule by all registered members from
each of the village-level group that make up the association can cast their vote.
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Using the facilitators’ recommendation as an instrumental variable, I test the impact of mov-
ing from appointments by board directors to direct elections along two dimensions12. First, I
examine the impact of leader selection rules on the extent to which leaders are monitored by, and
accountable to, group members. I find that direct-voting results in leaders who are significantly
more accountable to group members. Compared to appointment-based groups, farmer associa-
tions that use direct, popular elections are more likely to employ internal and external auditors,
to hold selection procedures on a more regular basis, and to ensure that members receive receipts
when selling crops through the association.
To explore possible causal mechanisms, I use a set of behavioral experiments, such as dicta-
tor and third-party-punishment games. The experimental findings suggest that elections trigger
a stronger sense of commitment by local leaders, reciprocating their election by the members of
the group. This sort of reciprocity likely operates independently of reelection considerations. In
addition, analysis of social network data suggests evidence of an ‘affinity effect,’ whereby appoint-
ment corresponds to affinity between appointees and appointed officials inimical to monitoring
and accountability
Secondly, I examine the impact of leader selection rules on the profile of the chosen leaders.
Here, I test the hypothesis that appointments yield more competent and/or trustworthy leaders,
as compared to popularly elected leaders. The intuition here, developed more extensively in Sec-
tion 4.3, is that, compared to average group members, boards of directors are more informed about
candidates and the current ‘state of the world’, have longer time-horizons, and are more likely to
base their vote on the welfare of the group rather than narrow self-interest. I do not find evidence
to support this argument. Selection methods do not appear to impact the profiles of leaders with
respect to (i) ability (i.e. marketable skills) or other socio-demographic attributes, (ii) centrality of
network position, or (iii) other-regarding preferences.
12See Appendix A, Fig. A.2 for a chart of the organizational structure of the APEP associations.
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1.5 Lessons Learned
Leader Selection Processes Matter. In the past two decades, economists, political scientists and
political economists working within a ‘new institutionalist’ framework, have focused on demon-
strating how individuals’ behavior is shaped by incentives embedded within institutions. Impor-
tantly, the various expansions of North’s basic approach — which include distinguishing between
formal and informal, weak and strong, or exogenous vs. endogenous institutions — all continue
to place incentives at the center of the theory’s micro-foundation. This dissertation complements
and enriches the ‘new-institutionalist’ framework by pointing to the causal impact of the process
by which institutions were put into place. In this study I limit my focus to leader selection rules. For
example, in chapter 2, I demonstrate that when leaders acquire their regulatory and sanctioning
powers through elections, they are able to exercise their sanctioning and monitoring roles more ef-
fectively. In chapter 4, I demonstrate that compared to appointed leaders, elected leaders are more
accountable and responsive to their constituents. Future work should test the extent to which
these findings apply to other institutional settings.
Pecuniary Considerations. The second key lesson learned from this research project is that pro-
cess matters independently from pecuniary considerations. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that the proce-
dure for selecting internal centralized authorities impact cooperative behavior independently from
the threat of sanctioning, i.e. independently from monetary considerations. Instead, I provide evi-
dence supporting the idea that elections legitimate the use of power: individuals are more likely to
confer authority to leaders whom they have directly elected. These findings have implications that
far exceed the study of small self-help groups. Past research has demonstrated that generalized
trust and norms of reciprocity (Henrich et al., 2004) can “trump” monetary incentives, challeng-
ing some of the basic tenets of economics. This dissertation adds to this body of literature by
demonstrating how leader selection procedures can impact behavior in ways that trump income
maximization strategies.
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Power Considerations. The third lesson is that process matters independently from power consid-
erations. In chapter 4, I demonstrate not merely that office holders’ responsiveness to their con-
stituents is a function of leader selection processes, but also that the mechanism that ties elections
to leaders’ responsiveness is based on reciprocal expectations, which cannot be reduced to reelection
considerations. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom in political science that tends to
explain the behavior of politicians instrumentally, as a function of power calculations (i.e. winning
elections) or of rent extraction opportunities.
Leader Quality Matters The forth lesson is that leader quality matters. In chapter 3, I demon-
strate that the ability of leaders and, especially, the effort they exert while working for the group
have a positive and significant impact on public goods production and, thereby, members’ wel-
fare. This finding sheds new light on the effectiveness of voluntary self-help organizations since
prior work, as I have argued, tends to overlook the importance of hierarchical structures.
Analysis of Punishment in Public Goods Games. In chapter 2 I introduce a new method for
analyzing sanctioning behavior in public goods games, where the experimenter does not control
the contributions to the public goods that monitors face. The method — matching on distributions
of contributions — improves on the current practice that analyzes punishment behavior in public
goods games as if it was experimentally induced. This contribution should extend beyond the
boundaries of our discipline.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Internal
Centralized-Sanctioning in Public Goods
Provision in Self Help Groups
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2.1 Introduction
Self-help groups are small to medium size organizations that provide members with valuable pub-
lic goods. Such groups come in many varieties, from farmer associations in Uganda and micro-
credit groups in Bangladesh to common-pool resource communities in Japan (Ostrom, 1990). As
these few examples suggest, self-help groups are present in many facets of political and social life,
and in countries of all income levels. The importance of these groups, especially in developing
countries, has grown in recent years, as larger political units have sought to democratize, decen-
tralize and liberalize their economies1. The ubiquity of those groups, together with their potential
to affect their members’ welfare, calls for a better understanding of the factors that determine their
effectiveness in public goods provision.
To provide their members with public goods, self-help groups must overcome collective ac-
tion problems (Olson, 1965). Consider the social dilemma that hinders the effectiveness of many
Ugandan farmer associations – the group considered herein2. Farmer associations exist to pro-
vide members with group public goods, the most important of which is securing higher output
prices through collective marketing3. Because of the high costs of transportation and of market
information in many developing countries, dispersed small-holder farmers are restricted to sell
their crops through local agents. These agents, or middlemen, likely exploit asymmetries in infor-
mation and in bargaining powers, offering dispersed farmers below-market prices. By contrast,
organized farmers who sell via their association (in bulk), can obtain higher prices by increasing
their bargaining powers and by reducing buyers’ transaction costs (Staatz, 1987).
Yet, collective marketing is subject to a social dilemma: once a farmer association is in place,
middlemen tend to raise their prices to remain competitive. Since middlemen, unlike most farmer
groups, collect the crops at the farmers’ gate and pay cash-on-delivery, group members have a pri-
1For example, in Senegal 10% of sampled villages reported to have, at least, one self-help group in 1982; by 2002 this
figure was 65%. In Burkina Faso the figures were 22% for 1982 and 91% in 2002 (Bernard et al., 2008).
2The term social dilemma refers to situations in which group and individual incentives are at odds (Heckathorn,
1996). In the following I use the terms social dilemma and collective action problem interchangeably.
3The literature on the potential of farmer organizations as engines of growth is large. This literature suggests that
farmer associations can play an important role in generating development and reducing poverty, especially in the
context of the developing world. See, among others, Narayan-Parker (2002a) and (Bosc et al., 2002).
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vate interest in selling their produce to middlemen. The private gain of side-selling to middlemen
(‘defecting’), however, is conditional on a sufficient number of other members selling their crops
via the farmer group (‘cooperating’). This is because the price offered by middlemen depends on
the price that the farmer group secures (‘yardstick effect’), which depends crucially on volume. If
too many members defect, collective marketing collapses. Some groups manage to overcome this
tension between private and group interests. Many others fail4.
Sanctioning plays a key role in fostering cooperation in social dilemmas (Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002). In the farmer associations I study, more than 70% of the sampled members acknowledged,
when surveyed, that side-selling to middleman is forbidden and punishable, and more than a
quarter of those have reported having received warnings or punishment for being caught side-
selling. A full 75% of the group leaders I surveyed claimed to invest efforts in discovering whether
members side-sell, and more than 50% claimed that they had been approached by members re-
porting on other members’ defection. In these associations, the enforcement of the norm of coop-
eration (i.e., ‘thy shall not sell to middlemen’) involves peer monitoring, but crucially depends on
the coordination and centralization of sanctioning powers in the hands of a few group leaders.
Most generally, scholars have identified two forms of sanctioning solutions to public goods
provision. In the first solution, central authorities that are external to the group are the locus of co-
ordination and enforcement of cooperative efforts. Examples of these solutions include theories
of the state (Scholz and Gray, 1997). In the second solution, cooperation emerges from uncoor-
dinated and decentralized punishment efforts that are internal to the group. Examples of these
solutions include peer-sanctioning regimes (Ostrom, 1990)5.
These two solutions, however, do not account for all relevant situations, as our example of the
Ugandan farmer associations demonstrates. In fact, even small-size groups and communities are
characterized by some level of social differentiation and hierarchy from which internal centralized
4In chapter 3 I show that farmer groups that are able to overcome this social dilemma make a significant contribution
to their members’ welfare (Grossman, 2011a).
5This literature begins from the premise that cooperation can be sustained only if, at minimum, some uncoordinated
group members are willing to bear the cost of punishing defectors (Gintis et al., 2005). Decentralized peer punishment
actions include (i) social sanctioning such as shaming and gossiping, (ii) monetary punishment such as severing of
commercial ties, and (iii) applying force or physical constraint.
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authorities emerge (King, Johnson and Van Vugt, 2009)6. To adjudicate disputes, villagers in tradi-
tional societies turn to their chiefs (Gibson and Marks, 1995), and merchants in Medieval Europe
created guilds (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994). Similarly, union leaders punish workers who
cross the picket line (Atleson, 1969), and school committees sanction parents who fail to contribute
to local public goods (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). The first contribution of this paper is to docu-
ment the effectiveness of internal centralized-sanctioning institutions in fostering cooperation7.
In the past two decades, formal and experimental research have focused almost exclusively on
peer-sanctioning institutions. Within this framework, scholars have demonstrated that the threat
of sanctioning induces greater cooperation by changing individuals payoff functions (Boyd et al.,
2003, Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002, Gintis et al., 2005)8. If we consider, however, centralized-sanctioning
institutions (Guth et al., 2007), their effectiveness may not rely only on the threat of punishment,
but also on the extent to which they are perceived as legitimate (Dickson, Gordon and Huber, 2009,
Eckel, Fatas and Wilson, 2010). Legitimacy induces greater cooperation by eliciting a stronger
(moral) obligation to centralized authorities (Greif, 2006, Levi, 1989). Legitimacy, understood here
as the popular acceptance of an authority’s right to govern (Rawls, 1971), can be derived from
different sources of authority, such as charismatic, traditional, or rational-legal authority (Weber,
1922). Focusing on the latter, the second contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the
political process by which an authority originally acquires its sanctioning powers is consequential
for cooperation.
Studying the causal effect of punishment institutions on behavior, in a natural setting, is con-
strained by several methodological challanges. First is the problem of reverse causality: punish-
ment affects cooperative behavior, yet at the same time, levels of cooperation affect the use of
punishment. Secondly, there is endogeneity between the type of sanctioning regime (i.e., peer vs.
centralized sanctioning) and the nature of the group under consideration. Similar problems con-
6Social differentiation denotes the tendency of groups and communities to develop hierarchies, in which social roles
are defined as a set of rights and duties members are expected to fulfill (Eguı´luz et al., 2005).
7See also Frye (2000) that examines the conditions under which private groups govern themselves without turning
to an outside agent for enforcement.
8The main focus of this strand of literature is in identifying conditions for overcoming the second-order collective
action problem inherent in costly decentralized punishment.
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strain the study of the impact of different selection mechanisms for leaders (Grossman, 2011c). In
most natural settings, the factors that determine the institutions or processes for selecting lead-
ers endowed with sanctioning powers are endogenous (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001).
These identification challenges have impeded the study of the causal effects of institutional change
on cooperative behavior (Dal Bo, Foster and Putterman, 2010).
To investigate these aspects while overcoming the identification problems, I adopt a method-
ological framework that combines “lab-in-the-field” behavioral experiments with observational
data on 1,543 producers from 50 Ugandan farmer associations. I developed a novel adaptation
of the public goods game (PGG), which is the conventional behavioral experiment used to study
the conditions under which groups can overcome individual incentives to defect (Camerer, 2003).
The experimental setup allows me to attest the positive impact of centralized-sanctioning institu-
tions on cooperative behavior as well as to demonstrate that the size of this effect depends on the
process by which these institutions are established. To assess the external validity of my findings,
I then relate subjects’ behavior in the PGG to their behavior in the natural setting, in which they
face a similar social dilemma9.
The paper unfolds as follows. After discussing the theoretical framework and stating my hy-
potheses, I describe the research design and provide some background information on the Ugan-
dan associations that are the subject of my study. Following a description of the experimental
manipulation, I present a first set of results. To study the impact of a centralized-sanctioning au-
thority, I compare the cooperative behavior of subjects that do not face a threat of punishment with
the behavior of subjects in a context in which sanctioning powers are given to a single monitor. I
find that the introduction of a centralized-sanctioning authority has a strong positive impact on
cooperation. To study whether the political process through which leaders acquire their powers
is consequential, I compare the cooperative behavior of subjects who elected their monitor with
the behavior of subjects who were assigned a monitor selected at random. I find that the way
in which centralized authorities obtain their sanctioning powers is consequential for cooperation
9A similar strategy has been taken in the context of gift exchange experiments (List, 2006) and donation experiments
(Benz and Meier, 2008). Whether individuals pro-social behavior in experiments correlates with their behavior in
natural settings is largely an open question.
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above and beyond the threat of punishment: participants are more responsive to the authority of
an elected rather than randomly chosen monitor.
Following a brief summary of the observational data and empirical measures of legitimacy, I
present a second set of results showing that the relationship found in the controlled experiment
also exists in the participants’ natural setting. First, I find a strong association between the per-
ceived legitimacy of the managers of the farmer associations and their members’ level of coopera-
tion. Second, I show a positive relationship between farmers’ behavior in the PGGs and their level
of cooperation in the farmer associations. I conclude that the experimental setting captures insti-
tutional conditions and group dynamics that are relevant for determining levels of cooperation in
the subjects’ natural setting.
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Experimental evidence shows that peer sanctioning is a successful strategy for increasing coopera-
tion. In PGGs, subjects anonymously decide how to split an endowment between private and pub-
lic accounts. What subjects put in the private account remains theirs, while what is contributed to
the public account is doubled (or otherwise multiplied) and redistributed evenly among all group
members regardless of their level of contribution. The most profitable outcome for the group oc-
curs when all subjects contribute their entire endowment. Nonetheless, regardless of what others
contribute, the most profitable strategy for the individual is to keep the entire endowment and
benefit from what everyone else contributes to the public account. Designed to induce a social
dilemma, PGGs capture how individuals balance self-interest and the well-being of the group.
In PGGs, participants initially contribute, on average, between 40 and 60% of their endow-
ment. However, in repeated games, conditional cooperators who wish to avoid being exploited
by free riders gradually refrain from cooperation, thus leading to a drop in contributions in subse-
quent rounds (Fischbacher, Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2001, Ostrom, 2000). By contrast, when participants
are allowed to punish other subjects, conditional cooperators can discipline defectors, thus lead-
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ing to greater overall levels of contribution (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). Peer punishment provides
a possibility of targeted interaction, thus fostering cooperation through mechanisms of direct and
indirect reciprocity (Lubell and Scholz, 2001, Rand et al., 2009).
Peer sanctioning, however, is only effective under very restrictive conditions (Sigmund, 2007,
Taylor, 1982). It can only sustain cooperation in small-size groups, where the cost of punishment
is likely to be recuperated (Olson, 1965). In such groups, self-interested contributors may choose
to punish defectors at a personal cost, as long as they have reasons to believe that punishment
will increase the future contributions of the ”targets.” This, in turn, depends on the frequency
of interaction between members (Boyd, Gintis and Bowles, 2010). As the number of members
increases and interactions become infrequent, bilateral punishment becomes unlikely to sustain
cooperation because future gains from punishment cannot be internalized (Greif, 1993).
The limited scope of peer sanctioning induces groups, organizations and communities to del-
egate sanctioning powers to internal centralized authorities. These institutions are likely to be
more efficient than peer punishment (Guth et al., 2007, O’Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt, 2009),
since they are better positioned to overcome coordination failures and free-riding problems (Lake,
2009), although they might experience flaws in information, thus leading to enforcement errors
(Dickson, Gordon and Huber, 2009). The centralization of sanctioning is the likely outcome of
an endogenous process of social differentiation: virtually all social groups, even those character-
ized by low levels of complexity, experience elementary forms of division of labor that lead to
the emergence of hierarchical structures and leadership roles. Sanctioning, of course, is only one
way in which leaders impact cooperative behavior. Other means include persuasion (Henrich and
Gil-White, 2001), coordination (Wilson and Rhodes, 1997), provision of information (Dewan and
Myatt, 2008), and leading by example (Levati, Sutter and van der Heijden, 2007). To incorporate
these intuitions into theories of public goods provision, I study how group members behave when
a single individual is given a monopoly over sanctioning. Specifically I test the following:
Hypothesis 1 Internal centralized authorities that are given a monopoly over sanctioning decisions will
punish defectors at a personal cost.
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Hypothesis 2 Centralized-sanctioning induces greater contribution toward public goods production,
even if participants do not have any control over sanctioning decisions.
My second research question is whether and how the political process through which internal
centralized authorities obtain their sanctioning powers is consequential for cooperation10. Differ-
ently from peer-sanctioning systems, in which the right to punish defectors comes hand-in-hand
with group membership, in a centralized-sanctioning regime it is important to distinguish be-
tween the effect of sanctioning and the effect of the way in which sanctioning powers are granted.
Internal centralized authorities might derive their legitimacy from different sources: tradition
(e.g., village chiefs and the pope), charisma, (e.g. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.), or rational-
legal procedures (Weber, 1922). In this paper I focus on the latter source of legitimacy and am
interested in testing whether elections have a positive impact on subjects’ contributions to public
goods production. Importantly, my focus on the method for selecting leaders addresses a major
gap in the current literature on the impact of leaders on cooperation: the tendency to treat the
emergence of leadership institutions as wholly exogenous (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011)11.
There are several plausible complementary mechanisms through which the participation of
group members in the selection of a sanctioning authority would induce greater cooperation. In
this paper I focus on testing whether the procedure of elections can increase subjects’ cooperation
toward public goods provision via its impact on the legitimacy of the centralized authority (Tyler,
2005). Defining legitimacy as the extent to which people feel morally obliged to follow an authority
(Greif, 2006) and accept its right to govern (Rawls, 1971), I test whether subjects are more likely to
defer to a leader and accept her punishment decisions, if allowed to participate in her selection.
There are several reasons why legitimacy should mediate the relation between elections and
subjects’ cooperative behavior. First, elections may have a ritualistic or symbolic value that confers
10Similarly, Hibbing and Alford (2004) show that peoples’ acceptance of binding decisions depends on the procedure
through which decisions were made and Dal Bo, Foster and Putterman (2010) show that the effect of a policy on the
level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects rather than being exogenously imposed.
11Past studies allowed participants (Casari and Luini, 2009) and external monitors (Dickson, Gordon and Huber,
2009) to endogenously select some features of the punishment institution. The monitors in those studies, however,
were exogenously determined. This paper expands the small experimental literature on endogenous institutions by
allowing participants to endogenously select the identity of their monitor.
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on leaders greater authority. According to Beetham (1991, p. 69), the exercise of coercive power
is justified only if it is based upon a “common framework of belief between the dominant and
the subordinate in any power relationship.” In many groups, communities, and societies, explicit
consent via elections provides such a “common framework”12. Second, elections can contribute to
the legitimacy of centralized authorities through a “peer effect” (Zelditch, 2001). In short, people
are influenced by what others think about authorities. Election results signal to subjects the wor-
thiness of the chosen authority, affecting the way subjects encode information from leaders, and
the importance they give to their messages. Finally, a core argument of a large political science
and social psychology literature is that the fairness of the procedure through which authorities
gain power and/or exercise power shapes the willingness of subjects to defer to their authority13.
This claim is widespread in legal (Gibson, 1989), political (Levi and Sacks, 2009), and managerial
settings (Hoffmann, 2005).
There are two other notable mechanisms that might explain the relationship between elections
and cooperative behavior: a leadership selection effect and accountability. First, direct elections
may enable group members to select “better” leaders, namely, leaders whose socio-demographic
profile, status, or characteristics make them more effective in triggering cooperation (Eckel, Fatas and
Wilson, 2010, Grossman, 2011a). Second, periodic elections may induce centralized authorities to
enforce cooperation more stringently to increase the likelihood of reelection (Gordon and Huber,
2002), thereby increasing cooperative behavior. Since these mechanisms may confound the effect
of legitimacy, I designed the experiments such that leader selection effects are minimized and
controlled for in the analysis, while accountability effects are eliminated14.
To sum, by legitimizing their use of coercive powers, elections are expected to increase the
effectiveness of leaders, thereby affecting public goods provision. Building on this framework, the
experiment was designed to test the following hypotheses:
12The idea that consent is needed to legitimize authority is usually accredited to Locke (1990).
13The evaluation of the fairness of a political process may vary over time, space and contextual conditions.
14Accountability effects are eliminated by having the monitor selected ‘once and for all’ subsequent rounds. Leaders’
selection effects were minimized by randomly sampling the experimental subjects from six different villages and from
a pool of members that did not hold any leadership roles in their associations. I return to these points in the research
design and analysis sections.
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Hypothesis 3 Outcome: the process by which a centralized authority acquires its sanctioning power
is consequential for cooperation: contribution levels to public goods provision are higher
when authorities are elected rather than selected at random.
Hypothesis 4 Mechanism: elections increase cooperation through a “legitimacy effect”: individuals are
more likely to commit to a leader’s authority if they participate in his/her selection.
My third research question concerns the external validity of my results. Extant empirical evi-
dence has documented the positive relationship between the perceived legitimacy of an authority
and citizens’ compliance (Hechter, 2009). Although there have been some valuable attempts to
determine the causal relationship between leadership legitimacy and collective outcomes using
panel data and cross-country comparisons (Levi and Sacks, 2009, Murphy, 2005, Tyler, 1997), it
is often quite difficult to draw definitive and general conclusions relying exclusively on observa-
tional data. In contrast, the experimental condition allows me to assess the existence of a causal
relationship between centralized authority and cooperation in PGGs. To attest the external valid-
ity of my findings, I relate group members’ performance in the PGGs to their behavior in a natural
setting in which they face similar collective action dilemmas. I, therefore, test the following hy-
potheses:
Hypothesis 5 The relationship between leaders’ legitimacy and levels of cooperation observed in the
experimental setting also exists in the natural setting.
Hypothesis 6 Group members’ cooperation in the experimental settings would resemble their level of
cooperation in the natural setting, especially when the experimental conditions reproduce
key features of the natural setting.
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2.3 Research Site, Sampling, and Experimental Design
To study these hypotheses I took a behavioral experiment with well-established properties, typi-
cally conducted in a laboratory environment, to rural Uganda. Behavioral experiments need not
be preoccupied with attempts to mirror naturalistic conditions – a task that such experiments
are ill-suited for (Berkowitz and Donnerstein, 1982, p.247–8). Instead, to increase the confidence
that the experiment captures decision-making in similar real-world situations, I conducted the ex-
periment with, and collected observational data on, members of pre-existing groups that face an
analogous collective action problem on a regular basis. I conducted our experiment with members
of farmer associations, since they repeatedly face in their natural setting – as explained above – a
similar social dilemma to the one studied by PGGs. Comparing the cooperative behavior of the
Ugandan farmers in their real-world setting to their behavior in the controlled ‘lab-in the field’
environment, is among the most important methodological contributions of this study15.
From an external validity perspective, there are several other benefits in studying farmers
from Uganda, which is among the world’s least developed countries. PGGs are assumed to cap-
ture individuals’ behavior in real-world social dilemmas. Yet, the universal applicability of these
experiments has been limited by the fact that almost all past studies have relied on students from
western universities16. Here my research design offers an advantage over existing studies. First,
recent evidence suggests that students’ behavior in PGGs might not be representative of the larger
society (Jones, 2010). Secondly, there is growing evidence suggesting that in the context of be-
havioral experiments that measure social-preferences, subjects from developing countries behave
differently than their counterparts in the developed world (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).
That the study’s subjects are members of pre-existing groups also contributes to its external
validity. It has been argued that laboratories are a poor setting for testing how subjects balance
the tension inherent in social dilemmas (Burnham and Johnson, 2005). On one hand, on the basis
15A similar strategy has been taken in the context of gift exchange experiments (List, 2006) and donation experiments
(Benz and Meier, 2008). Previous work suggests that whether individuals pro-social behavior in experiments correlates
with their pro-social behavior in the field is still largely open.
16The Dictator and Ultimatum games have been widely used in field settings (Henrich et al., 2004). By contrast, PGGs
in field settings are rare; cf. Habyarimana et al. (2007) and Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009).
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of PGGs that took place in laboratories and that use ad-hoc groups, researchers have argued that
group selection affects cooperation through its impact on pro-social preferences (Boyd et al., 2003).
On the other hand, laboratories strip individuals from context, and are limited in their ability to
replicate the mutual trust, past experience, shared norms and group identity which are central for
balancing tension between private and public interests (de Rooij, Green and Gerber, 2009, Henrich
et al., 2004, Levitt and List, 2007). This consideration has led researchers to argue that pre-existing
groups are the most natural setting to test theories about the emergence of cooperative behavior
(Herrmann, Tho´ni and Ga¨chter, 2008, Nowak, 2006, Rand et al., 2009).
The Research Site: APEP Farmer Groups
The farmer associations I surveyed were created as part of one of Uganda’s largest recent rural
development interventions: the Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP)17. APEP’s
goal was to support subsistence farmers’ transition into commercial farming. Between 2004 and
2008 it helped organize over 60,000 small-holder farmers into about 2,500 village-level groups
(known as producer organizations, or POs), which were further organized into more than 200
farmer associations. Serving, on average, 200 members from ten neighboring village-level groups,
the farmer associations (known as Depot Committees, or DCs) were designed to exploit economies
of scale and to bargain for better prices based on quality and volume.
Studying the APEP groups presents many advantages. First, the project’s scope and size al-
low me to conduct a large-scale quantitative study within the boundaries of a single nation, thus
securing the homogeneity of the political and legal environments, as well as many project-related
factors. Moreover, the process of group formation occurred under the lead of a few project field-
trainers. As a consequence, APEP groups have similar governance structures and leadership po-
sitions whose roles and functions are comparable across sites. Each farmer association has an
executive committee – responsible for making key decisions at the association level – comprised
of a manager, chairperson, secretary, and treasurer. Operationally, the manager is the leader of the
17APEP was funded by USAID, and implemented by Chemonics, a Washington D.C. Consultancy.
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association. His most important responsibilities include organizing crop collection, searching for
buyers, and negotiating output and input prices. Additionally, managers are involved in coordi-
nating training activities, facilitating the diffusion of information, and sanctioning members who
do not follow the association’s rules and bylaws.
The Sample
I used a stratified, random, multistage cluster design to select my sample18. The use of random
samples is not common in behavioral experiments. This is because the main goal of behavioral ex-
periments is testing the accuracy of general causal statements (Berkowitz and Donnerstein, 1982),
and not to determine the probability that a certain event will occur in a particular population.
Drawing a representative sample from the population of APEP members, nonetheless, had two
benefits. First, it helped subjects to form consistent beliefs about the behaviors of the individu-
als with whom they were playing (Habyarimana et al., 2007, p.712). Second, it allowed me to
make inferences from the behavior of my sample to the groups from which our subjects were
drawn. Representative samples are especially valued when researchers wish to use experiments
as a measurement device that allows them make inferences about groups, and not only individual
behavior (Levitt and List, 2007).
From each of the 50 sampled association, different types of data were collected. I interviewed
the DC executives and the members of the DC board to gather information at the cooperative
level. Data on the DCs’ economic activities were also assembled from the associations’ books and
records. In each association, I sampled six producer organizations (or POs), for a total of 28719.
An interview with the leaders of the sampled POs allowed to collect additional data at that level.
I also collected individual-level data. From each sampled PO, I further sampled, in average, six
members for a total of 36 members per association. Sampled members were surveyed in person
by trained interviewers in the respondents’ language, for a total of 1,781 surveys20.
18An elaborate description of the sampling scheme can be found in the Supplementary Appendix A
19When a farmer association had fewer than seven POs, I selected all its village-level groups.
20Though I surveyed 1,781 out of 1,800 sampled members, only 1,543 of those participated in the experiments. This
gap is due to the fact that the experiment were conducted in a central location. To reduce attrition, interviewers returned
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Though the empirical analysis uses data from the individual and group-level surveys, the
construction of those instruments and the meanings I derived from them, relied heavily on more
than a year of field work, during which I conducted dozens of interviews and meetings with group
members and leaders, APEP-staff and Chemonics staff in Uganda and Washington D.C.
Experimental Design
To test hypotheses 1 through 4, I designed an adaptation of the PGG. In each round of the ex-
periment, subjects received an endowment of 10 coins of 100 USH – 10 monetary units (MUs) –
which is the equivalent of about half a daily wage in rural Uganda. Subjects then had to decide,
anonymously, how to split this endowment between a private and a public account. What subjects
put in the private account remained theirs, while what was contributed to the public account was
doubled and redistributed evenly among all group members.
I played three variants of the PGG: baseline, random monitor, and elected monitor. Sub-
jects assigned to the baseline participated in six rounds of a PGG without sanctioning. In the
two monitoring treatments, I introduced a centralized-sanctioning institution. Differently from
peer-sanctioning settings, in which subjects may punish each other, I gave sanctioning powers to
a single authority. Namely, after two preliminary rounds of play, one of the subjects was assigned
the role of a monitor. Monitors’ – whose identity was public knowledge – received the same en-
dowment as the other subjects, but could not contribute to the PGG, nor receive part of the public
account. Instead, monitors were able to spend 1 MU to take away 3 MUs from subjects whose
contribution level they disapproved21. Monitors’ payoff did not depend on the group’s level of
cooperation, but only on their sanctioning decisions. A monitor’s payoff in round t is, therefore,
10 (MUs) minus the number of subjects sanctioned in that round. Subjects’ payoff is calculated
as piit = (10 − xit) + 2
P
xit
n − Pit × 3, where xit ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} is the contribution to the public
account, and P ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether player i was punished at round t.
to sampled villages several times to locate sampled members who did not show up on that day, for whatever reason.
21This study follows the convention in PGGs, according to which the threat of punishment is credible and substantial:
sanctioned subjects have no option but to comply with their punishment.
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The two sanctioning treatments differed only in the procedure for selecting the monitor. In
the random-monitor treatment (T1), the monitor was selected through a lottery. Comparing the
baseline with the random-monitor treatment allows for an assessment of the causal effect of insti-
tuting a centralized-sanctioning regime. In the elected-monitor treatment (T2), participants elected
their monitor using a secret ballot22. A comparison of the random and elected-monitor treatments
allows an estimate of the independent effect of the process by which the monitor has obtained her
sanctioning powers. I played all three variants in each of the 50 sampled associations. Participants
were randomly assigned to only one variant23. Table 2.1 summarizes the experimental design.
Game Centralized Elections Sessions Avg subjects per Rounds per
Variant Sanctioning Session Session
Baseline 50 10 6
Random Monitor X 48 10 2 prelim + 4
Elected Monitor X X 49 10 2 prelim + 4
Table 2.1: Experimental Design
22The voting procedure guaranteed anonymity: each player wrote on a piece of paper the ID number of the player
she would like to select as a monitor. Subjects could see each other, but were not allowed to talk and were not given any
information about the other subjects. For more details on the selection process, see the game scripts in the Appendix.
23The number of subjects per session ranged from 8 to 12. This is higher than in most PGGs (2 to 4), and was required
in order to protect our subjects’ anonymity.
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• Stage 1: Contribution to the PG. Players decide anonymously how to divide 10 MUs be-
tween a private and a public account. To ensure anonymity, players made their allocation
decisions behind 3-sided cardboard screens.
• Stage 2: Contributions become common knowledge. RAs display publicly all the contri-
butions to the public account (in USH), from the lowest contribution to the highest. Players
are unable to match between contributions and players’ identity.
• Stage 3: Payoffs. RAs calculate publicly the mean contribution to the public account and
the size of the social return. Using this information, RAs display the actual payoff (private
+ social returns) for each of the contributions displayed on the board.
• In the control group, play repeats for six rounds without threat of punishment. In T1 and
T2, monitors are selected after preliminary round 2: Round 3 is, thus, the first round in
which players are subjected to sanctioning. Stages 4 and 5 are only played in T1 and T2, the
two sanctioning treatments.
• Stage 4: Punishment decisions. Monitors, whose identity is known to all players, de-
cide whether to assign ‘reduction points’. Because it is not possible to infer the identity
of players from contributions, monitors sanction contribution levels, not individual players.
Because monitors made their sanctioning decisions publicly, players knew what levels of
contribution were punished, but could not match between punishments to the identity of
the sanctioned players.
• Stage 5: Payoffs recalculated. Following the monitors’ sanctioning decision, RAs reduce
the payoffs of sanctioned contributions by 3 MUs (300 USH). Play repeats for four rounds
under a sanctioning regime.
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2.4 Experimental Findings
Figure 2.1 summarizes the main results of the lab-in-the-field experiment (see also Appendix,
Table 2.5). First, corroborating hypothesis 2, in the presence of a centralized-sanctioning authority
subjects significantly increased their contribution to the public good24. In the random-monitor
condition (T1), subjects contributed 15.0% more, on average, than in the baseline (P = 0.00)25.
In the elected-monitor condition (T2), subjects contributed 25.4% more than in the baseline (P =
0.00)26. Moreover participants acted under the expectation that monitors would punish defectors:
significant differences in contributions between baseline, on the one hand, and both T1 and T2, on
the other hand, are already visible in round 3, thus before observing monitors’ behavior. In round 3,
subjects in T1 contributed to the public account 16.6% (P = 0.00) and in T2 24.4% more (P = 0.00)
than subjects in the baseline treatment.
Second, confirming hypothesis 3, the (political) process through which monitors obtain their
sanctioning power is consequential. Subjects in T2 contributed to the public account, on average,
9% more than subjects in T1 (P = 0.005). The experiment, thus, provides evidence that elections
have a positive impact on subjects’ level of cooperation (see also Appendix, Table 2.6). I now turn
to explore the mechanisms that might be responsible for such a positive effect.
According to hypothesis 4, we expect greater contributions in the elected monitor to be due
to a “legitimacy effect”: subjects should express greater deference to monitors whose legitimacy
has been certified through elections. I have defined legitimacy as the extent to which subjects feel
obliged to follow an authority and accept its right to govern and measure it as follows. First, I con-
sider subjects’ expectations, by looking at changes in contributions from the second preliminary
round to round 3, before monitors’ decisions over sanctioning take place. While in the preliminary
rounds average contributions to the public account in T1 and T2 are similar, in round 3 subjects
24This finding is equivalent to other lab-in-the-field PGGs, where peer sanctioning increased cooperation relative to
the baseline (see Barr (2001) and Carpenter (2004)).
25Two-sided Mann–Whitney test. The dependent variable is the mean contribution in rounds 3 through 6.
26The modest decline in baseline is consistent with findings from PGG studies in non-western settings. Whereas
cooperation declines significantly with college-aged participants in the United States, cooperation rates remain higher
and are sustained longer with African and Asian subjects (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008, p. 313).









































Figure 2.1: Average contribution to the public good by treatment. For rounds 3 and 6, the graph reports the
percentage increase in contributions comparing random with baseline condition, and elected with random (e.g., in
round 3, subjects in the random monitor contributed 16.6% more than in the baseline condition).
in T2 contributed significantly more (+8.8%) than subjects in T1 (P = 0.022). Regression models
that control for monitors’ characteristics confirm the significance of these results (Appendix, Table
2.7)27. Figure 2.2.A shows the marginal estimated effect of the type of monitor on a representative
subject: the introduction of a centralized-sanctioning institution in round 3 induced a net increase
in contributions of 0.37 MUs in T1, and 0.76 MUs in T2.
Second, I consider players reactions to punishment as further evidence of the greater deference
to elected monitors. Parameter estimates come from a multilevel regression, in which I model the
change in player i’s contribution from t − 1 to t as a function of whether player i has been sanc-
tioned at t − 1 as well as the type of monitor, controlling for the monitor’s socio-demographic
characteristics, the monitor’s sanctioning behavior at time t− 1, and player i’s preliminary contri-
butions. On average, having been punished at time t− 1 increases subjects’ contribution at time t
by 0.57 MUs in T1, and by almost 1 MU in T2 (see Figure 2.2.B and Appendix, Table 2.8).
27Results from other model specifications produce similar results, and can be provided upon request.



















































































Figure 2.2: Predicted change in contribution in the two sanctioning treatments. Plot of the estimated variation
in contributions from t − 1 to t (A) for all subjects in round 3; (B) for sanctioned player in rounds 3 to 6; and (C)
for sanctioned subjects in rounds 3 to 6 distinguishing between monitors with a dominant (male, wealthiest quintile,
highest level of education, born in the village) or non-dominant profile. Continuous variables are held at their mean
values, while categorical variables at their median values.
Having found evidence for the “legitimacy effect” hypothesis, I now turn to rule out the pos-
sibility of a confounding impact due to leadership selection. Namely, it is possible that higher
levels of cooperation are due to the characteristics of the elected monitors. I find, on one hand,
that subjects elected monitors with socially dominant profiles – elected monitors were more likely
to be male, wealthier, more educated, and more likely to have been born in the village, compared
to the pool of eligible monitors (Appendix, Fig. 2.5). On the other hand, knowing a monitor’s pro-
file – namely his gender, education, age, wealth, place of birth, and church attendance – does not
improve our capacity to predict subjects’ contributions: when regressing subjects’ contribution on
monitors’ profile in T1, the characteristics of monitors, whether tested separately or jointly, do not
have a significant effect on contributions (Appendix, Table 5).
In addition, the socio-demographic profile of monitors does not affect subjects’ change in con-
tributions from preliminary round 2 to round 3 (Appendix, Table 2.7), nor their reaction to sanc-
tioning (Appendix, Table 2.8). Figure 2.2.C demonstrates that monitors with a socially dominant
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profile have the same impact on sanctioned subjects’ subsequent contributions as monitors with a
non-dominant profile.
These findings, cumulatively, weaken the possibility of a leadership selection effect28. It is
possible, however, that elected monitors have certain attributes that induce cooperation, which are
unobserved to the research team but visible to the experimental subjects. Though the possibility
of unobserved heterogeneity cannot be ruled out, it does not seem to play a decisive role in this
experiment. For one, elected monitors are not more public-spirited than random monitors, at least
as this is reflected in their contributions to the public good in the preliminary rounds29. Second, as
I demonstrate below, I do not find much evidence suggesting that elected monitors were enforcing
cooperation more ardently than random monitors. Third, elected monitors’ religiosity is not higher
than random monitors, at least as this is reflected in church attendance30. Finally, recall that the
experimental subjects were drawn from six neighboring villages, none held leadership positions
in the farmer association, and that they were not allowed to talk through the entire course of
the experiment. These design features further reduce the possibility that participants had private
knowledge of how well other subjects would perform as monitors.
In sum, the experiment’s findings support the hypothesis that subjects’ greater deference to
elected monitors is due to a “legitimacy effect”: elections impact cooperation by conferring greater
authority to leaders. In the next section I analyze monitors’ sanctioning behavior and test whether
the different criteria for monitor selection may have affected monitor’s sanctioning strategies, and
thus, indirectly, cooperation.
28These results do not question the role that leaders’ qualities play in solving collective action problems (Grossman,
2011a). Rather, they confirm that leaders’ selection effects are not likely to play a role in the context of this experiment.
29In preliminary round 1, random monitors contributed to the public account, on average, 5.61 MUs whereas elected
monitors contributed 5.02. In preliminary round 2, random monitors contributed 4.98 MUs and elected monitors 3.54.
Contributions were made anonymously, before monitors were selected.
30In Uganda, religiosity is considered an important attribute for those seeking public office.
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2.5 Monitors’ Sanctioning Behavior
Table 2.2 compares the sanctioning behavior of the two monitors by round of play. Though elected
and random monitors sanctioned, on average, the same number of players per round (from an aver-
age of about 2.5 players sanctioned in round 3, to about 1.5 players in round 6), they varied in the
amount of contribution sanctioned. In round 3, the first round under a sanctioning regime, random
and elected monitors punished similar levels of contribution. In subsequent rounds, the average
maximum contribution sanctioned by random monitors gradually declined, while it increased for
elected monitors. By round 6, random monitors did not punish, on average, subjects who con-
tributed more than 24.6% of their endowment. By contrast, elected monitors kept punishing, on
average, players that contributed up to 37.1% of their endowment (P = 0.022). Similarly, whereas
random monitors, on average, allowed players who contributed more that 31.4% of their endow-
ment to go unpunished, elected monitors did not allow players who contributed less than 38.5%
of their endowment to go unpunished (see bottom panel, Table 2.2).
Frequency of Punishment (No. players punished in round t)
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
Random Monitor 2.47 1.86 1.78 1.49
(2.05) (1.55) (1.39) (1.68)
Elected Monitor 2.40 2.08 1.71 1.58
(1.95) (1.60) (1.13) (1.35)
Maximum Punishment (in coins / Monetary Units)
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
Random Monitor 3.09 2.67 2.76 2.46
(2.76) (2.75) (3.00) (2.93)
Elected Monitor 3.20 3.60 3.29 3.71
(2.63) (2.88) (2.92) (3.05)
Minimum Contribution Not Punished (in coins / Monetary Units)
Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
Random Monitor 2.96 2.98 3.14 3.10
(1.80) (1.73) (1.94) (1.96)
Elected Monitor 3.96 3.79 3.85 3.50
(1.91) (1.93) (2.27) (2.59)
Table 2.2: Frequency, Max Punishment and Min Contribution Not Punished in the Random (T1) and Elected (T2)
monitor conditions. N=97 (49 Random and 48 Elected monitors). Standard deviation in parentheses.
These findings seem to indicate that elected monitors used punishment to enforce cooperation
more ardently. However, because both types of monitors faced, in all rounds, different distribu-
tions of contributions (reported in Table 2.5 in the Appendix) the data is also consistent with an
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alternative explanation: both monitors may have followed a similar strategy of sanctioning a few
contributors at the bottom of the distribution31.
To overcome this problem, I used the Kullback–Leibler (K–L) divergence measure to match
each of the distributions of contributions to the public pot that an elected monitor faced with the
closest distribution of contributions that a random monitor faced32. Using the matched pairs, I was
then able to test the extent to which elected and random monitors, facing similar distributions of
contributions, acted in a similar manner33. Previewing the results, I find no evidence that elected
monitors punished more frequently, and only weak evidence suggesting that elected monitors
used a higher threshold to signal an accepted level of cooperation.
In Table 2.3 and in Figure 2.8 in the Appendix, I demonstrate the improvement in the di-
vergence between distributions of contributions achieved by matching. On average, matching
reduced the (K–L) distance between the distributions that the different monitors faced, by a factor
of about 4.
Matched Pairs All T2–T1 Pairs
Mean sd Min Max N Pairs Mean N pairs
Round 3 0.091 0.050 0.027 0.228 48 0.328 2,352
Round 4 0.079 0.032 0.030 0.182 48 0.306 2,352
Round 5 0.088 0.041 0.025 0.178 48 0.336 2,352
Round 6 0.074 0.044 0.010 0.183 48 0.310 2,352
Table 2.3: K–L Divergence Measure for both Matched Pairs and for all possible T2–T1 pairs, by round.
I use three measures to test whether elected monitors enforce norms of cooperation more ardently
than random monitors facing similar contributions: (i) the number of players being punished in
round t, (ii) maximum contribution being punished in round t, and (iii) minimum contribution
not punished in round t. Results are presented graphically in the Appendix. Figure 2.10 graphs
the number of players punished by elected monitors, as a function of the number of players pun-
31The difference in distributions that the two types of monitors faced is a product of the experimental design: contri-
butions levels were selected by the players endogenously and were not under the control of the research team.
32A detailed description of the Kullback–Leibler (K–L) divergence measure is provided in the Appendix 2.C.
33Within blocks defined by rounds, I used a nearest neighbor with replacement matching algorithm.
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ished by random monitors, for all matched pairs. Jittered dots that are above (below) the 45% line
are matched pairs in which the elected monitor has punished more (less) players than the matched
random monitor. Similarly, Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 in the Appendix, graph the maximum con-
tribution punished and the minimum contribution not punished in round t by elected monitors,
as a function of the behavior of random monitors, for all matched pairs.
Differences in mean behavior of the matched pairs, including p-values derived from a Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test, are provided in Table 2.4. Starting with the frequency of punish-
ment, elected monitor punished slightly more players in rounds 4-6 than random monitors facing
a similar distribution of contributions, however, those differences are not significant. Turning to
the maximum contribution sanctioned, using matched pairs (Table 2.4) instead of the entire sample
(Table 2.2), the difference between the two types of monitors is now smaller and non-signifcant. Fi-
nally, there is some evidence that the minimum contribution not punished under elected monitors
is higher than under random monitors, at least in rounds 3-534.
N Punish Max Punish Min Not Punish
T2 T1 P-value T2 T1 P-value T2 T1 P-value
Round 3 2.396 2.417 0.955 3.205 2.891 0.669 3.958 2.896 0.010
(1.954) (2.030) (2.629) (2.759) (1.913) (2.106)
Round 4 2.083 1.688 0.129 3.600 4.250 0.670 3.792 3.062 0.041
(1.596) (1.355) (2.879) (3.992) (1.935) (1.827)
Round 5 1.708 1.583 0.124 3.289 3.255 0.460 3.854 3.312 0.065
(1.129) (1.200) (2.920) (3.590) (2.269) (1.870)
Round 6 1.583 1.396 0.097 3.711 3.378 0.355 3.500 3.438 0.807
(1.350) (1.807) (3.048) (3.752) (2.593) (2.072)
N pairs 48 48 48
Table 2.4: Table compares the behavior of the matched pairs of elected and random monitors along three dimesnions:
Number of players punished, maximum contribution punished and minimum contribution not punsihed, in round
t. Columns 5-6 and 8-9 report results in Monetary Units (coins). Columns 4, 7, 10 report p-values from a Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
34Note that averaging the maximum contribution punished is not optimal for comparing the behavior of the two
monitors. First, it ignores the fact that punishing very high contributions (7 coins and above), may actually suppress
contributions in subsequent rounds. Second, the measure fails to incorporate cases where no players was sanctioned
(missing value in the dataset). For these reasons, minimum contribution not punished seems as a more reliable measure.
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Matching the distributions that the two types of monitors faced, I find only weak evidence
that elected monitors are enforcing norms of cooperation more forcefully. These findings further
weaken Hypothesis 4 and the likelihood of unobserved heterogeneity in monitors’ profiles. More
so, the findings of this exercise – together with the fact that there is no discernible relation be-
tween the frequency of punishment in round t and the average group contribution in that round
– suggests that both types of monitors were using a heuristic rule of generally punishing the low-
est contributors. Put differently, monitors do not seem to punish according to some predefined
acceptable level of contribution, but rather they consider players’ contribution relative to the con-
tribution of others in the group. Monitors’ motivation aside, I find that the number of players
sanctioned and the maximum amount sanctioned do not affect changes in players’ contributions
(see Table 2.8). The commutative evidence thus suggests that monitors’ major impact on contribu-
tions is derived from the response to sanctioning that they elicit.
In recent years a large number of studies have demonstrated experimentally that subjecting
individuals to a threat of sanctioning increases contribution to public goods production. The
above experiment builds on that intuition, but expands the literature in two directions. First,
consistent with Hypothesis 2, the experiment demonstrates that local centralized sanctioning au-
thorities have a positive impact on cooperation. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both elected and
random monitors punished defectors, even though they did not derive monetary benefits from the
resulting increase in contribution and even though punishment was costly. Interestingly enough,
players in both T1 and T2 anticipated this, thereby increasing their contributions immediately
after the selection process, even before observing the monitors’ punishment behavior.
Secondly, the experiment further expands the literature by suggesting that beyond the mere
threat of punishment, individual’s cooperation is also conditional on the process by which leaders
acquire their authority (Hypothesis 3). Players who participated in electing a centralized author-
ity contributed, on average, more towards a public good than players who were not granted such
a right. Analyzing possible mechanisms to explain these results, I do not find much evidence
supporting a leader-selection effect (Hypothesis 4). By contrast, I find relatively strong evidence
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that elections impacted cooperation via a legitimation process. Consistent with hypothesis 5, sub-
jects were more likely to confer authority to, and justify punishment from, monitors whom they
have directly elected. These findings call for a closer examination of the roles that leaders’ selec-
tion rules and legitimacy play in local public goods provision. In the following section I turn to
addressing issues related to the experiment’s external validity.
2.6 Analysis of Observational Data
The experimental findings point to the relevance of the procedure through which the leadership is
selected as the base for the legitimacy of the centralized authority35. In other words, it has demon-
strated that legitimacy likely mediates the causal relation between a certain (selection) procedure
and members’ cooperation. In this section, I analyze observational data to attest the external va-
lidity of the experimental findings. I do so by relating group members’ cooperative behavior in
the PGGs to their cooperative behavior in the farmer associations, a natural setting in which they
face a similar social dilemma.
In the attempt at relating experimental findings to the ordinary life of farmer associations, I
focus the empirical analysis on a set of measures of procedural legitimacy. In general, measuring
legitimacy is a difficult task. Following previous scholarship, I rely on a variety of survey ques-
tions that capture different aspects that might affect the respondent’s perception of the legitimacy
of the group leader. I consider a total of six proxy measures of legitimacy. Two are attitudinal and
rather abstract: they are members’ assessment of (a) whether the DC manager is monitored; and
(b) whether the DC manager is accountable. Three other indicators are more specific; they report:
(c) how often does a member receive receipts when selling through the association; (d) whether
the member knows the name of the manager; and (e) whether the member knows the method
for electing the DC manager. Finally, using principal component analysis, I also combined these
responses into (f) an index of “perceived legitimacy.”
35See Rothstein (2009) for a fruitful discussion on the distinction between ‘procedural’ and ‘performance’-based le-
gitimacy.
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The key outcome variable is members’ level of participation in public goods production. Col-
lective marketing is the major activity of farmer associations, and, as explained before, it is the
major collective action problem that farmer groups must overcome. I therefore measure coopera-
tion by looking at the marketing decisions of group members. A high level of cooperation exists
when members sell a large fraction of their crops via their farmer group36.
Two self-reported measures of members marketing decisions are used to measure cooperation:
(i) a dichotomous variable capturing whether a member sold his crops via the association, at least
once, in the past season; and (ii) the proportion of a member’s total seasonal coffee yield that was
sold via the farmer group in the past season. Moreover, to further check the robustness of the
self-reported measures of collective marketing, I gathered similar information from other sources.
First, the leaders of each of the 287 sampled village-level POs were asked to provide information
about their group members, including whether members sold their coffee via the group in the
past season. Members’ self-report and the PO leaders’ report were consistent for over 70% of the
sample. Finally, I used information provided by the DC executives to construct a variable captur-
ing the proportion of members selling in bulk in the past season. Results are similar using either
measure of cooperation. Here, I report results using self-reports and relying on the dichotomous
measure of cooperation.
According to hypothesis 4, we expect farmer associations in which the manager’s perceived
legitimacy is higher also to have higher levels of collective marketing. I test this hypothesis by
running a separate multilevel random-intercept logit model, in which a member’s marketing deci-
sion is modeled as a function of one of the six measures of procedural legitimacy listed before. I
use a regression equation of the form:
logit{Pr(yij |Xij , ζj)} = β0 + β1Lij +XijΓ1 + FjΓ2 + ζj (2.1)
with ζj |Xij ∼ N(0, ψ) and ζj independent across groups j. The dependent variable yij is an
36This measure is superior than alternative measures of public goods production such as price. For one, it directly
measures members’ cooperative behavior. Second, price may be affected by a host of factors outside the control of the
association, such as altitude, rainfall, etc.
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indicator that takes the value of one if individual i in group j sold coffee via her farmer group, at
least once, in the past season. Our variable of interest is Lij , which measures individual i′s percep-
tion of the manager’s legitimacy. Xij is a vector of individual-level controls, including variables
such as gender, age, education, log seasonal yield, years since joining the farmer groups, the rat-
ing of the local middleman’s honesty, richness of associational life, and frequency of attendance to
religious services. Fj is a vector of group-level controls, including variables such as the age of the
association, membership size, and manager’s effort level. To relax the assumption of conditional
independence among members of the same farmer group, we include a farmer association-specific
random intercept ζj in the linear predictor37.
In Figure 2.3, I report the predicted change on the probability that an ‘average’ member will
cooperate, as a function of each legitimacy measure38. For example, controlling for individual-
and group-level variables, knowing how the manager has been elected increases the likelihood
of cooperation by 12.4% (5.7–19.2%, 95% CI). Similarly, receiving a receipt from the DC manager
when selling through the group increases the likelihood of cooperating by more than 13% (4.6–
21.4%), compared to those who do not get a receipt. In sum, across a wide range of legitimacy
proxy measures, the change in the estimated probability of cooperation is positive and substantial.
Comparing Behavior ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’ the Lab
In the last part of the analysis, I turn to compare the subjects’ cooperative behavior in the con-
trolled experiment directly with their behavior in their natural environment, as members of farmer
groups. To my knowledge, this is the first study to make such comparison in the context of PGGs39.
37I also tested model specifications that (1) nested farmer associations with strata (three-level model), and (2) that
allowed the key independent variable (legitimacy) to vary across groups (random-intercept model). A likelihood ra-
tio test rejected those specifications in favor of the two-level random intercept model, which is more parsimonious.
Regression results can be found in Table 2.12 in the Appendix, while summary statistics of the variables used in this
analysis are presented in Table 2.11 in the Appendix.
38Predicted estimates are calculated by setting continuous control variables to their mean values and categorical
variables to median values. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. For the legitimacy index, predicted
change is calculated as one standard deviatio‘n change from the grand mean.
39Laury and Taylor (2008) compare behavior in a PGG to behavior in “a naturally occurring public good.” However,
in that study, cooperation in the ‘natural’ setting was measured as the amount subjects were willing to donate from
their experiment’s earnings to a local NGO. Since this behavior is not part of the subjects’ natural activity, their results
should be treated with some care.
CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL CENTRALIZED-SANCTIONING AND COOPERATION 46
No (710)
Yes (711)
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4






-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4






-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4





-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4





-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Change in Est. Probability
of Cooperation
E: Know Election Method
Grand Mean
+1SD
-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Change in Est. Probability
of Cooperation
F: Legitimacy Index
Legitimacy and Cooperation: Natural Setting
Figure 2.3: Relation between legitimate authority and the likelihood of cooperating to public goods provision.
Estimates are calculated by setting continuous control variables at their mean levels and categorical variables at their
medians. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
In particular, I expect that cooperative behavior in the elected-monitor treatment, which I interpret
as capturing individuals’ deference to legitimate authority, will predict behavior in the farmers’
natural setting, where I have shown a positive relation between procedural legitimacy and coop-
eration. While this would not be a direct proof of the causal impact of a leader’s legitimacy on
cooperation in the natural settings, a positive correlation can be considered as an indirect valida-
tion of such a causal statement. In other words, what works under the “Petri dish” of a controlled
experiment might be at work in the natural setting as well.
To test these hypotheses, I run the following Generalized Linear Model (GLM) for each of the
three treatment conditions:40
40Since the contribution to the public account is a proportion of an initial endowment, i.e., bounded between 0 and 1,
I implemented the GLM estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The results I present are robust to other
specifications: e.g., running the GLM with and without controls; running equivalent OLS regressions, treating mean
contribution to the public account as a continuous variable; and using other specifications of cooperation in the natural
setting.
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Y¯ij = β0 + β1Cij + ΓXij + ij (2.2)
where Y¯ij is the mean contribution to the group account in rounds 3 to 6 of member i from group
j, Cij is an indicator of whether that subject cooperated with the farmer group by participating in
collective marketing and Xij is a vector of individual-level controls, such as sex, age, education,
associational life, and contribution in the preliminary rounds. To account for dependence between
members of the same group, I cluster standard errors at the farmer association level41.
Regression results are presented in Figure 2.4 (see also Appendix, Table 2.13). For each treat-
ment, I graph the expected values of the mean contribution to the public account (Y¯ij), for both co-
operators (i.e., those participants who sold their crops via the group) and defectors (i.e., those who
sold only to middlemen), including 95% confidence intervals. I find that in the elected-monitor
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Figure 2.4: Relation between subjects’ cooperative behavior in the PGG and as natural setting. The plot describes
the expected value of a member’s contribution to the public account, averaged across the sanctioning rounds (3 through
6), as a function of her participation in collective marketing. Caps represent 95% confidence intervals.
41The proportion of cooperators in the natural setting was equally balanced across the three treatments.
42Similar results are obtained with group-level data and with different measures of cooperation in the farmer group.
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I interpret these findings to reflect the fact that the elected-monitor treatment approximates the
process of legitimation of centralized authorities that occurs in farmer groups. Farmers who
elected their monitor were able to draw on their past experiences and group norms. As a con-
sequence, their game behavior reflects real-life patterns of behavior in a manner that is not visible
in the other treatment conditions. These findings are consistent with a conventional premise in so-
cial psychology: individuals generalize their experiences from one situation to the other, making
the same causal attributions in seemingly disparate settings (Dweck, Goetz and Strauss, 1980).
That people bring their experience and social norms into a laboratory environment has been
demonstrated in past studies. For example, Henrich et al. (2004) report a large variation in co-
operative behavior across communities, differences that they attribute to interactional patterns of
everyday life and the social norms operating in those communities. Similarly, Goette, Huffman
and Meier (2006) show that individuals’ willingness to cooperate and enforce norms, in an exper-
iment, is a function of their ‘natural’ group affiliations. It is important to recall that such values,
norms, and experiences are brought into the lab by the subjects, and are not experimentally in-
duced. As such, they constitute key information that people use in their decision-making (Levitt
and List, 2007).
My findings suggest that the legitimacy of the centralized authority is an important factor in
determining the success of farmer groups, and likely of other similar organizations. These find-
ings underscore the merit of behavioral experiments, insofar as results suggest that the PGGs used
in the current study were able to isolate causal mechanisms that are likely to be at work in both
the experimental and real-world settings: in this case, a mechanism that increases cooperation in
a social dilemma, in a context where subjects are habituated to elections. The correlation between
the behavior in the lab-in-the-field setting (when exposed to the legitimacy stimulus/cue) and in
the natural environment (where the stimulus is experienced and reported by the subjects) guaran-
tees that there is some continuity between the two contexts. This, indirectly, provides support to
the idea that the mechanism I tested in the lab might be at work in the real world.
49 CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL CENTRALIZED-SANCTIONING AND COOPERATION
2.7 Conclusion
This study makes contributions to several distinct literatures. In experimental and formal research,
peer punishment has been largely considered as the only alternative to the coercive power of an
external agency (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992). However, complex societies are not sustain-
able on the basis of peer punishment alone. Using a novel modification of the PGG, this paper
incorporates the idea of internal centralized authorities into theories of public goods provision. In
doing so, it contributes to the study of the role sanctioning plays in inducing cooperation in social
dilemmas.
Centralized-sanctioning systems, however, cannot rely exclusively on coercive punishment.
Indeed, institutions that are perceived as legitimate only rarely turn to brute force to enforce group
norms. To minimize the use of brute force, which is costly, centralized authorities need to be
recognized as legitimate by the ruled (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011). I conceive of legitimacy as the
capacity of a centralized power to exercise authority, and measure it as the extent to which subjects
comply with its directives. The fact that sanctioned subjects who elected their monitor increased
their contribution in subsequent rounds by more than double the sanctioned subjects who faced
an arbitrary authority is indicative of the role legitimacy plays in sustaining cooperation.
Demonstrating how legitimacy mediates the relationship between political processes and the
effectiveness of leaders is the second contribution of this paper. I have shown that beyond the
mere threat of punishment, the political process through which leaders acquire their authority is
consequential. When leaders acquire their regulatory and sanctioning powers through elections,
they are able to exercise their sanctioning and monitoring roles more effectively. These findings
are consistent with recent evidence of a positive impact that democratic elections at the village
level in rural China have on public goods provision (Martinez-Bravo et al., 2010). As such, my
findings have important implications to our understanding of the development of local forms of
democratic rule. This study, therefore, calls for a closer examination of the role that leader selection
rules and procedural legitimacy play in public goods production (see also (Grossman, 2011c).
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The paper also contributes to the study of legitimacy, which is a central concept in normative
theory and applied research (Hechter, 2009). Until the late 1980s only little attention was paid
to empirical investigation of legitimacy (McEwen and Maiman, 1986). In recent years, however,
scholars have increasingly sought to document the political and social effects of legitimacy. For
example, Lieberman (2007) uses legitimacy to explain compliance with health regulations during
an epidemic, Levi (1997) used it to explain people’s support of war efforts, and Linz and Stepan
(1996) to explain democratic transitions. Similarly, Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2005), who focus
on courts, and Murphy (2005), who focuses on tax agencies, find that political institutions can
gain acceptance for unpopular decisions and policies, when legitimate. As these few examples
suggest, past research focused almost exclusively on whether legitimacy encourages deference to
laws and norms. This study expands this literature by examining the role of legitimacy in securing
cooperation in public goods provision.
Turning our attention to the role of internal centralized authorities opens up a new set of ques-
tions for future research. I have found that in the presence of a centralized-sanctioning authority,
groups can reach higher levels of cooperation and that monitors, at least in a situation in which
their reputation is at stake, are willing to bear the cost of punishing in order to increase cooper-
ation43. These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using peer-punishment institu-
tions, with the possible advantage that a centralized system of monitoring will be more efficient
than a decentralized one. Future studies should investigate the relative efficiency of decentral-
ized (i.e., peer) vs. centralized-sanctioning regimes. In addition, more work is needed in order to
understand the motivation behind the observed behavior of both regular subjects and monitors
and explore the relative effectiveness of different legitimation processes, for example democratic
legitimacy vs. more traditional forms of authority.
Finally, the paper makes a contribution to the debate regarding the utility of using behavioral
experiments in the social sciences44. Behavioral experiments are traditionally used to identify
43In the experiment, monitors did not gain from higher levels of cooperation and had a monetary disincentive to
sanction. Since their identity was known to the game participants, when analyzing their sanctioning decisions, we
cannot decouple altruistic considerations from reputation considerations.
44For a recent review of the debate concerning the external validity of behavioral experiments see Levitt and List
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general patterns in human behavior. In our research design, which combines a lab-in-the-field
experiment and observational data, behavioral games also have been deployed to reveal differ-
ences between individuals and groups. Namely, I study the impact of centralized authority on
public goods provision using a behavioral experiment and then relate subjects’ performance in
the experiment to their real-life outcomes.
The study offers three core findings: (i) in an experimental setting, individuals are responsive
to legitimacy cues: participants contributed more to public goods production when their monitor
obtained its sanctioning powers through elections; (ii) the relation between legitimate authority
and cooperation exists also in the participants’ natural environment; and (iii) greater cooperation
in participants’ natural environment translates into a greater response to the legitimacy cue: group
members who participate in collective marketing contribute more, on average, in the elected-
monitor condition than ‘defectors’ who sell their coffee to local middlemen. Taken together, my
findings suggest that the legitimacy of internal centralized authorities is an important factor in de-
termining the success of farmer associations, and likely of other similar organizations. Combining
a lab-in-the-field experiment with corresponding observational data, I am able to isolate one of
the elements that makes group members cooperate in real life.
(2007). See also Ahlquist and Levi (2011) for a recent critique of lab experiments in political science for their inadequate
attention to external validity considerations.
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A Analysis of contributions
Table 2.5 reports the average contribution to the public good in the baseline, random monitor, and
elected monitor conditions; it complements Figure 1 in the text.
Prelimin Prelimin
Contr 1 Contr 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 N
Baseline 437.7 399.2 399.4 405.9 423 432.8 518
Random Monitor 455.1 422.0 465.5 474.8 483.5 487.1 474
Elected Monitor 462.3 431.5 506.6 513.9 536.4 525.8 454
Table 2.5: Mean contribution to the public good in the baseline, random monitor, and elected monitor conditions.
N=1446 (1543 players - 97 monitors).
In the analysis of contributions (see two-sided Mann-Whitney tests in the text) I argue that the
difference between the sanctioning treatments and baseline (random vs. baseline; elected vs. base-
line), as well as the difference between random and elected treatments are significant. Additional
support for this finding comes from three statistical models in which I control for preliminary
contributions and cluster the standard errors at the farmer cooperative level (Table 2.6). Contri-
butions to the public account in public goods games are treated as proportions or fractions of the
initial endowment (in our case a fraction of 1,000 USH). To handle this type of data appropriately,
one must take into account the bounded nature of the response variable. Using a proportion in
linear regression models will generally yield out-of-range predictions for extreme values of the re-
gressors. I follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) strategy for handling proportions in which zeros
and ones may appear, as well as intermediate values. I apply a generalized linear model (GLM),
using a logit transformation of the dependent variable and the binomial distribution. Such a tech-
nique allows me to generate predictions from the model which can easily be transformed back
into units of the response variable. This is an improvement over past tradition of using censored
normal regression techniques, such as Tobit models, on proportions that include zeros and ones.
That approach is not completely appropriate, since the observed data is not really censored: val-
ues outside the interval [0, 1] are simply not possible for proportional data. Note, however, that
results using Tobit models are very similar.
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Analysis of Players’ Contributions
BL-T1 BL-T2 T1-T2
Coef. s.e Coef. s.e Coef. s.e
ATE 0.223∗∗ (0.086) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.085) 0.172∗ (0.081)
Prelim Contribution 2.552∗∗∗ (0.143) 2.238∗∗∗ (0.145) 2.204∗∗∗ (0.153)
Constant -1.385∗∗∗ (0.084) -1.256∗∗∗ (0.084) -1.018∗∗∗ (0.081)
Observations 990 970 926
Log Likelihood -449.04 -447.36 -423.52
Standard errors clustered at the farmer cooperative level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6: DV: Mean Contribution rounds 3-6. The DV, which is measured as proportions of the initial endowment, is
modeled as a function of treatment assignment, controlling for preliminary contributions. BL-T1 refers to the Average
Treatment Effect (ATE ) of random monitor (T1) compared to baseline (BL) condition. BL-T2, is the ATE of elected
monitor (T2) compared to baseline (BL), and T1-T2, is the ATE of elected (T2) compared to random monitor (T1).
Coefficients from the GLM regressions are reported following logit transformation.
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Appendix 2.B Analysis of expectations and response to punishment
Table 2.7 complements Figure 2.A in the text.
Players’ Expectations of Monitors’ Behavior
Coef. s.e.
Elected monitor 37.897∗ (18.124)
Monitor gender 6.009 (24.644)
Monitor born local -6.039 (19.758)
Monitor age 0.944 (0.725)
Monitor church attendance 6.154 (24.533)
Monitor education -1.466 (3.571)








Standard errors clustered at the farmer cooperative level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.7: DV: Change in contribution from (preliminary) round 2 to round 3. The DV is modeled as a function of
the monitor type, controlling for the monitor’s sociodemographic characteristics.
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Table 2.8 complements Figures 2.B in the text.
Response to Punishment
Coef. s.e.
Elected monitor condition -18.282 (12.45)
Sanctioned at t− 1 57.293*** (16.04)
Sanctioned by Elected 60.840** (21.47)
Preliminary contribution -0.009 (0.02)
Number of Players in Session -1.575 (4.37)
Number of players sanctioned at t− 1 3.043 (3.67)
Maximum contribution sanctioned at t− 1 -0.046 (0.03)
Minimum contribution sanctioned at t− 1 -0.043 (0.03)
Monitor gender -2.589 (14.70)
Monitor age -0.193 (0.47)
Monitor education -1.039 (2.23)
Monitor wealth 1.774 (2.03)
Monitor church attendance 0.676 (15.02)




* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 2.8: DV: Change in individual contribution from t−1 to t. The DV is modeled as a function of whether player
i has been sanctioned at t − 1 and the type of monitor, controlling for the monitor’s sociodemographic characteristics,
monitor’s sanctioning behavior at time t− 1, and player i’s preliminary contributions. Standard errors clustered at the
session level.
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Leader Selection Effect
In the text I consider the possibility of a leader selection effect. Figure 2.5 below, shows the average
sociodemographic characteristics of the monitors in the random and elected monitor conditions.
Elected monitors are disproportionally male, locally born, more educated and richer. There are,
however, no differences with respect to age and church attendance.






































Figure 2.5: Monitors’ sociodemographic characteristics. Mean values for the random (blue) and elected monitor
(red) conditions.
Table 2.9 shows that a monitor’s profile does not affect contributions. I run two models to test
the significance of the monitor’s sociodemographic profile. The first is an OLS model and the sec-
ond is a GLM model. In both cases, the dependent variable is players’ mean contribution in the
sanctioning rounds 3–6. In the GLM model, the mean contribution is calculated as a proportion
of the maximum contribution (bounded by 0 and 1). In both models, the mean contribution is
modeled as function of six characteristics of monitors (gender, local birth, age, church attendance,
education and wealth). I report results from regressions run on data from the random treatment
only. Since in the random treatment the monitors were chosen by means of a lottery, we can
exclude the possibility of spurious correlations, and confidently assess the impact of monitors’
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sociodemographics on contributions. Moreover, since some of these sociodemographic character-
istics are strongly correlated with each other (i.e., males are, on average, richer and more educated
than women), I compute a joint significance test for the OLS model and consider two statistics.
According to the R2 statistics, the model explains a mere 5% of the variance in contributions. Sim-
ilarly, the value for the F statistic is 1.34, which is much lower than the critical value needed for
significance (P = 0.2598).
Significance of Monitors’ Profile
OLS GLM
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Monitor gender 8.074 (42.063) 0.032 (0.169)
Monitor born in village -27.473 (40.722) -0.111 (0.164)
Monitor age -0.983 (1.154) -0.004 (0.005)
Monitor church attendance 88.567 (62.126) 0.359 (0.253)
Monitor education -12.016 (6.748) -0.048 (0.027)
Monitor wealth -2.109 (5.129) -0.009 (0.021)




Degrees of Freedom 6.00 6.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.9: Impact of monitors’ profile on contributions. The DV, mean contribution in rounds 3-6, is modeled, using
OLS and GLM, as function of the monitors’ sociodemographic characteristics (random monitor treatment). Standard
errors are clustered at the farmer cooperative level.
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Appendix 2.C Analysis of Monitors’ Behavior
Descriptive Analysis
1. Elected and random monitors sanction, on average, the same number of players, from 2.5
players sanctioned in round 1 to 1.5 in round 4 (See top panel, Table 2.2 in the main text).
2. The two types of monitors differ in the range of contributions sanctioned (See bottom panels,
Table 2.2 in the main text)
3. The data suggests that both types of monitors have similar sanctioning patterns. Fig. 2.6
shows, for each possible contribution, the proportion of contributors that were sanctioned.
The likelihood of being sanctioned, under both sanctioning treatments, drops sharply be-
tween 0 to about 400 USH, before flattening for higher levels of contributions. There is some
evidence suggesting that elected monitors sanction a greater proportion of those contribut-
ing between 200 to 400 USH. This difference, however, is not significant. The goal of the
matching exercise is to test whether this difference is the result of the different distribution
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Figure 2.6: Proportion of contributions sanctioned by level of contribution: Random monitor (blue) and elected
monitor (red) conditions.
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Matching Analysis based on the Distributions of Contributions
The Kullback–Leibler (K–L) divergence is a non-symmetric measure, commonly used to calculate
the difference or distance between two probability distributions. For probability distributions P
and Q of a discrete random variable, their K–L divergence is defined to be:






The K–L divergence is, therefore, the average of the logarithmic difference between the proba-
bilities P and Q, where the average is taken using the probabilities P . The K–L divergence is
only defined if (A.)
∑
P = 1, (B.)
∑
Q = 1, and (C.) if Q(i) > 0 for any i such that P (i) > 045.
To calculate the K–L divergence between two distributions of contributions to the public good, I
first calculated, for each session j, in each round t, the probability that the number of coins i was
donated to the PG (See example below, Table 2.10). Given a frequency distribution, it is pretty
straightforward to then calculate Pi, Qi, and DKL (see example in Equation 2.4).
Distribution of contributions in treatment d, for session j in Round t
Contribution-level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Frequency Pd2jt 2 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 3 1 1
Pi 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.05 0.05
Frequency Qd1jt 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2
Qi 0.15 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.05 0.1 0.1
Table 2.10: The table provides data for demonstrating how to calculate the K–L divergence measure of two possible







+ · · ·+ 0.05log0.05
0.1
(2.4)
45To overcome the problem that not all contribution-levels (coins) were realized in some session j in round t, I
smoothed the probability distribution by assigning a small positive probability when P (i) = 0 or when Q(i) = 0. After




P = 1 andP
Q = 1. The value of epsilon is the probability that a given contribution level was realized across all sessions, blocked
by treatment and round
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In Figure 2.7 I demonstrate how matching helps ensure that we compare the behavior of monitors
that face similar contributions:
Figure 2.7: In the top panel I graph the pair of distributions of contributions with the lowest K–L divergence value
(DKL = 0.01), in round 6. The bottom panel graphs the pair of distributions, in that round, with the highest K–L
divergence ( DKL = 1.17). Numbers refer to session IDs. Sessions 321 and 332 were drawn from T2 whereas sessions
225 and 237 are drawn from T1. Contribution (x-axis) are reported in monetary units (i.e., No. of coins).
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Figure 2.8: K-L divergence measure of all possible pairings: Eelected-Random monitors (solid line), and of of
Elected-Elected monitors (red dashed line). Rugged lines represent the K–L divergence measure of the matched Elected-
Random pairs.
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Figure 2.9: This figure demonstrates how matching on distributions may improve our ability to compare the behavior
of elected and random monitors. The figure graphs, for each session of elected monitor in round 5, the mean KL
divergence distance to (a) all other elected monitor sessions (black circle) and to (b) its matched pair (red diamond). For
each of the elected monitor sessions, the divergence between its distribution and the distribution of its matched pair, is
significantly smaller than its divergence to another elected monitor session picked by random.
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Figure 2.10: Number of players punished in round t by elected monitors as a function of the number of players
punished by the random monitors, for all matched pairs.
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Figure 2.11: Maximum contribution level punished in round t by elected monitors, as a function of the maximum
contribution level punished by the Random monitors for all matched pairs. Red dots signal that the maximum contri-
bution punished in that round was equal or above 8 coins (MUs). Note that -1 on the X (Y) axis refer to sessions in which
the random (elected) monitor has not punished any player (more accurately, any level of contribution.) Punishment
decisions (x-axis) are reported in MUs (coins).
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Figure 2.12: Minimum contribution that was not punished in round t by elected monitors as a function of the mini-
mum contribution that was not punished by random monitors, for all matched pairs. Punishment decisions (x-axis) are
reported in MUs (coins).
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Appendix 2.D Analysis of Observational Data
In this subsection I provide additional information that supplements the analysis of the relation
between legitimate authority and cooperation in the farmers’ natural setting.
Legitimate Authority and Cooperation (Natural Setting)
Table 2.11 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used for analyzing the observational
data. Regression results from the six multilevel random intercept models are provided in Table
2.12 below.
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Dependent Variable
Sell in Bulk (cooperate) 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 1746
Legitimacy Proxy Variables
Leader monitored 0.49 (0.5) 0 1 1723
Leaders Accountable 1.16 (0.58) 0 2 1670
Receipt given 1.41 (0.82) 0 2 1544
Name manager 0.63 (0.48) 0 1 1781
Know selection rule 0.73 (0.45) 0 1 1697
Legitimacy index (std.) 0 (1) -2.53 1.08 1476
Individual Controls
Male 0.68 (0.47) 0 1 1781
Age (units of 10) 4.56 (1.44) 1.4 9.5 1781
Formal education 0.83 (0.37) 0 1 1773
Log Seasonal Yield 5.41 (1.13) 0 9.21 1683
Years since Joining Group 3.71 (1.76) 1 8 1769
Middleman honesty 0.91 (0.28) 0 1 1698
Associational-life (std.) 0 (1) -3.14 2.85 1633
Church attendance 2.99 (0.53) 1 4 1781
Group Controls
N members (units of 50) 4.29 (2.21) 1.22 10.72 1781
Mean seasonal yield 3.8 (1.78) 0.86 7.76 1781
Leader’s Effort (std.) 0 (1) -2.69 2.53 1781
Table 2.11: Summary Statistics: variables used to analyze the relation between legitimate authority and cooperation
in the farmers’ natural environment.
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Relation Between Legitimacy and Cooperation













Know Voting Rule 0.541∗∗∗
(Yes) (0.15)
legitimacy index (std.) 0.212∗∗
(0.07)
Ind and DC Controls X X X X X X
Constant -2.746∗∗∗ -3.257∗∗∗ -1.831∗∗ -2.814∗∗∗ -2.782∗∗∗ -1.529∗
(0.66) (0.70) (0.68) (0.65) (0.66) (0.69)
Constant -0.521∗∗ -0.491∗∗ -0.584∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗
(Random Intercept) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Observations 1421 1388 1306 1456 1406 1258
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.12: Legitimacy and cooperation: natural setting. DV: Selling coffee at least once via the farmer association
in the past season (‘cooperation’). The dependent variable is modeled as a function of one of six legitimacy proxy
measures, using mulit-level regression models. All models control for individual and for group-level predictors. To
relax the assumption of conditional independence among members of the same farmer group, we include a farmer
association-specific random intercept
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Cooperative Behavior in the PGG and in the Natural Setting
Baseline Random Elected
Sold in Bulk 0.110 -0.056 0.280∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
Sex -0.185 -0.170∗ -0.045
(0.13) (0.07) (0.10)
Age (units of 10) 0.089∗ 0.007 -0.004
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Attendance at religious services -0.148 -0.101 -0.070
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08)
Years since Joining Group 0.007 0.016 -0.019
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Associational-life (std.) 0.015 -0.015 0.069
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Education (std.) -0.041 0.015 0.023
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Contribution prelim 2 (Prop.) 0.760∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant -0.282 0.279 0.236
(0.39) (0.26) (0.29)
Observations 373 364 337
Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.13: Relation between cooperation in PGG and natural setting. DV: subject’s mean contribution to the
public good in the punishment rounds (3-6). The dependent variable is modeled a function of the subjects cooperative
behavior as a member of her farmer group (i.e. sold coffee in bulk), controlling for the subjects’ socio-demographic
characteristics and for contributions in the preliminary round.
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Appendix 2.E Assessing Balance Across Treatments
Baseline Random Elected
Covariate Mean Diff Diff
Male .67 -0.002 -0.027
Age 45.24 0.174 0.888
Church attendance 2.95 0.050 0.052
Born in village .468 0.035 0.059
Read .718 0.007 -0.001
Write .688 0.015 0.006
Advanced English .212 -0.008 -0.055
Education 5.45 0.065 -0.257
Wealth 5.54 .0178 -0.303
Observations 493 449 442
Table 2.14: Sample Characteristics: column 1 reports means in baseline, whereas columns 2 and 3, report the differ-
ence from that mean for Random and Elected monitor conditions. Male, Born in village, Read, Write and Advanced
English are dummies. Church attendance is a categorical variable measuring the frequency of attending religious ser-
vices. Education and Wealth are composite measures constructed via principal component analysis, broken down to
deciles.
BL-T1 BL-T1 BL-T2 BL-T2 T1-T2 T1-T2
t− test K-S t− test K-S t− test K-S
p− value p− value p− value p− value p− value p− value
Male 0.964 1.000 0.539 0.994 0.539 0.998
Age 0.865 0.616 0.376 0.720 0.510 0.089
Church attendance 0.249 0.965 0.200 0.999 0.957 1.000
Born in village 0.443 0.916 0.222 0.367 0.604 0.999
Read 0.807 1.000 0.967 1.000 0.780 1.000
Write 0.641 1.000 0.830 1.000 0.784 1.000
Advanced English 0.800 1.000 0.059 0.460 0.093 0.675
Education 0.748 0.846 0.171 0.620 0.111 0.380
Wealth 0.944 0.676 0.236 0.117 0.213 0.351
Observations 955 955 945 945 900 900
Table 2.15: Formal Tests of Covariats Balance. Columns 1, 3, and 5, report p− values from regressing each covariate
on dummies representing treatment comparisons. Column 1 reports the significance test of the comparison between
those sampled into baseline (BL) and those sampled into Random monitor (T1); column 3 compares those sampled into
baseline against Elected monitor (T2); and column 5 compares Random (T1) to Elected (T2). Columns 2, 4, and 6 report
p − values from two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions. Note that none of the
t-tests of means nor the permutation test of distribution is statistically significant.
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Chapter 3
A Theory of Leadership Selection in
Small Groups - With Evidence from
Ugandan Farmer Associations
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3.1 Introduction
Self-help organizations are relatively small, voluntary groups that provide goods and services to
members. Examples include micro-finance groups, Chambers of Commerce, PTAs, common-pool
resource groups, artisan cooperatives and farmer associations. Such organizations are present in
many facets of economic and social life, and in countries of all income levels. Their importance
has arguably increased in recent years, particularly in developing countries, where larger political
units have democratized, decentralized and liberalized1. Thus, the ubiquity of self-help organi-
zations and their growing impact on social welfare calls for a better understanding of the factors
that determine their effectiveness, in particular.
This study considers one factor affecting the success of self-help groups: the quality of the
group leader. Leadership quality is thought of as a combination of the leader’s ability and the
amount of effort that the leader exerts while working for the group. While many factors may
affect the quality of leadership obtained by a small group, this chapter focuses specifically on two.
First, the ability of a group to monitor its leader in order to incentivize effort, which depends
on the monitoring institutions available to the group. Second, the availability of private income
opportunities outside of the group, which depends on local economic conditions. While both of
these factors are likely to evolve over time, neither can be changed rapidly from one election cycle
to the next2. Thus, I will treat these as fixed parameters for any given elections and consider
the quality of leadership that a group obtains, given the monitoring institutions and local private
income opportunities present at any specific time.
The chapter begins by introducing a theoretical model designed to elucidate some of the fac-
tors affecting leadership quality in small group settings3. The model is applicable to self-help
groups in which leaders, who play a decisive role in producing a group public good, are chosen
1Empirical evidence supports this claim: In Senegal 10% of sampled villages reported having at least one self-help
group in 1982; by 2002 this figure was 65%. In Burkina Faso the figures were 22% for 1982 and 91% in 2002 (Bernard
et al., 2008).
2From a group’s perspective, there are good reasons to ensure relative ‘stickiness’ of monitoring institutions. One
reason is to protect against attempts by incumbents to alter monitoring institutions to increase incumbency advantage.
3Throughout the chapter I use the terms ‘small groups’ and ‘self-help groups’ interchangeably.
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endogenously from the set of available members through democratic procedures. This is a fea-
ture shared by many small groups, including those described above. The model does not apply,
however, to other “small groups” in which leaders are selected from a set of non-members or are
appointed by non-members4. The starting point for this chapter is, therefore, a citizen-candidate
framework (Besley and Coate, 1997, Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), which a number of recent stud-
ies have used to investigate issues of leadership quality (Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and
Polborn (2004), Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010))5.
The model departs from existing theories in that it reflects the particular features of self-help
groups, which differ from larger political units (regions, nations, etc.) in a number of ways. First,
unlike large political units where each citizen knows only a few of her fellows, in small groups
members generally know each other well. This means that incomplete information plays a smaller
role in determining outcomes in this settings. It also means that small groups have an advantage
over large political units in offering incentive schemes that condition remuneration on effort6. Sec-
ond, small groups are often formed with a specific purpose in mind, so that members’ goals are
generally more closely aligned than in larger political units7. Third, participating in small groups,
even as the leader, is generally a part-time affair. Rarely do small groups have the resources to em-
ploy full time leaders, as is common in larger political units. The result is that leaders must choose
how to allocate their time between producing the group public good and generating private in-
come. Fourth, the leader receives significant benefits from the public good that she produces. In
contrast, in larger political units, the value that leaders derive from the public good they produce
is often small relative to the amount of effort they exert or the overall value of the public good.
This has an important effect on members’ incentives to seek leadership positions.
4In the first example, a board of directors may choose a CEO from outside a company. In the second case, leaders
of military units are commonly appointed by higher authorities, external to the group/unit. Such groups do not fit the
definition of “small groups” used in this study.
5Other important contributions to this literature include Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997). For a recent survey of the literature, see Besley (2005).
6See Besley (2004, 197-198) which provides a thoughtful discussion on the problems that large political units face in
trying to devise high-powered incentives for politicians.
7Note that the assumption that society is comprised of citizens that have competing interests, together with incom-
plete information about candidates who cannot credibly commit to voters, forms the basis of the canonical citizen-
candidate model. See, among others, Besley and Coate (1997).
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The study’s principal theoretical finding is that groups may face a trade-off between the ability
of the elected leader and the amount of effort that the leader exerts. This trade-off is driven by
two effects. First, an increase in monitoring of the leader will incentivize the leader to exert more
effort, which I call the discipline effect8. However, a higher level of monitoring may also cause high
ability members to self-select out of the candidate pool, resulting in leaders with lower ability
being elected, which I term the self-selection effect. When both of these effects are operating, the
result is a rough inverted U-shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value
of the public good produced. At low levels of monitoring, high ability leaders are elected, but
the exert little effort, leading to a low public good value. An increase in the level of monitoring
causes the leader to exert more effort, increasing the value of the public good. However, if the
level of monitoring continues to increase eventually high ability members will start to self-select
out of the candidate pool, reducing the value of the public good. Importantly, this trade-off exists
only when private income opportunities are sufficiently high. If private income opportunities are low,
then high ability members have little reason to opt-out of candidacy. Thus, when there are few
private income opportunities outside of the group activities, groups will be able to obtain high
ability leaders who also exert a relatively high level of effort.
These results extend existing theoretical work on leadership quality building on the citizen-
candidate framework, most of which has focused on larger political units. The self-selection effect
appearing in the model was suggested by Caselli and Morelli (2004), who pointed out that high
ability citizens may opt-out of the candidate pool if the rewards from holding office are set too
low. Similar results appear in Messner and Polborn (2004), who offer a model that moves towards
the small group setting by having only one leader, as opposed to the set of leaders in Caselli
and Morelli (2004), and allowing the leader to benefit from the value of the public good that
she produces. Another important contribution is Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010),
which introduces a model in which leaders can allocate their time to generating private income
while in office. They show that under these circumstances, high ability citizens will prefer to run,
but may exert little effort while in office. One contribution of my theory is to bring together these
8This terminology follows Besley (2006).
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ideas in a framework that allows me to evaluate the welfare implications of the trade-off between
leader ability and effort9. The present theory also differs from existing work in that it is adapted to
the particular features of small groups. Finally, I pay more attention to the role of private income
opportunities in determining whether the trade-off between leader ability and effort exists.
To test these results, I use original data collected through an extensive survey of associations
of coffee farmers in Uganda. These associations, recently established through a USAID funded
intervention, provide a good context for testing the model because we are able to look across a
large number of groups, all with relatively similar structures, and all formed around the same
time for the same purpose. However, while the surveyed associations have similar governance
structures, there exists a significant amount of variation across associations in the availability of
private income opportunities and in the level of monitoring undertaken by the groups, which de-
pend on their having the necessary monitoring institutions. This variation results from a number
of factors, including the identity of the facilitator who helped the farmers set up their associations,
local economic conditions, and variation in the cohesiveness of different localities, as manifested
in the strength of their social networks (Grossman, 2011c). Exploiting variations in monitoring in-
stitutions, and in local private income opportunities, allows us to assess the capacity of the model
to explain the determinants of leader quality in self-help groups.
The Ugandan farmer associations that I study fit the features of small groups, described in
the theoretical portion of the model, well. The associations are made up of farmers from several
nearby villages. All group members share a common main goal, obtaining higher prices for their
outputs, with secondary goals including obtaining lower input prices and learning about better
farming practices. The group leaders spend only part of their time working for the group, with
the rest devoted to farming their land or working at other off-farm jobs. When leaders negotiate
higher prices for their crops, they benefit directly and significantly from the group public good
through the higher price that they receive for their own crops.
9In contrast, Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010) predict that when incumbents are allowed to split their
time between private and public activities, citizens will be forced to elect either high ability leaders who do not exert
any effort towards generating group goods, or low ability leaders who do. Unlike my model, which makes clear
welfare predictions, Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010) cannot assess which of those two corner solutions
is preferable.
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The data collection effort involved conducting extensive surveys of over 3,000 members and
leaders drawn from a sample of 50 farmer associations. These data allow me to construct a broader
set of variables than were available in previous studies, including information on the value of
the public good, members’ ability, leaders’ effort, groups’ monitoring institutions, local private
income opportunities, and changes in the welfare of group members since joining their group.
These variables were measures using survey responses as well as other sources. For exam-
ple, the value of the public good is measured as the share of group members selling collectively
through the group, or the average share of members’ output sold collectively. The effort measure
depends on members’ survey responses rating the leader’s effort level, as well as the number of
collectively selling events organized by the leader. Ability is measured using information on mem-
bers’ education, literacy, English proficiency, and scores from cognitive tests that I administered.
The monitoring measure takes into account institutions such as a whether there is a committee
responsible for monitoring the leader, whether external audits were used, and whether the group
specified how much the leader should work. Local private income opportunities are measured as
the share of group members holding off-farm jobs. Measure of members’ change in welfare con-
ditions is based on change in the ownership of twelve different durable assets, such as livestock
and bicycles, since joining the group. Whenever possible, these measures were checked against
information from other sources, such as interviews with the leaders, or the groups’ books.
To summarize the empirical results, I find support for both the discipline and self-selection
effects, as well as the trade-off between them represented by the inverted U-shaped relationship
between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. Furthermore, my results suggest
that the level of private income opportunities plays an important role in determining whether
these effects coexist. Finally, I find evidence that higher quality leaders produce a higher public
good value, and that the value of the public good is associated with positive welfare effects.
Several existing studies look for evidence of a self-selection effect, including (Ferraz and Finan,
2010, Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2010, Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2010). These studies
find evidence supporting the self-selction effect, though the effect is often modest. A particular
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interesting study by Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2010), which uses data on MPs in Finland, finds
evidence of the self-selection effect for women, but not for men. The authors speculate, but do not
test, that this difference may be due to differences in the private income opportunities available to
women relative to men.
This chapter makes two advances over existing tests of the self-selection effect. First, my theory
suggests that the self-selection effect exists only under certain conditions: when the level of moni-
toring is high and private income opportunities are available. I take these conditions into account
when testing for the existence of the self-selection effect. Second, I have individual-level data on
the entire pool of potential candidates. In contrast, existing studies observe only those individuals
who choose to become candidates. This allows me to look at individual choices when assessing
the self-selection effect, and control for individual characteristics. As predicted by the model, the
empirical findings suggest that high-ability member are less likely to become the leader when the
level of monitoring is high and there are sufficient private income opportunities.
This study is also related to existing work on the relationship between the costs and rewards
of office and the effort exerted by incumbents. In a recent paper, Ferraz and Finan (2010) find
that an increase in leader remuneration leads to an increase in the effort of legislators in Brazilian
municipalities. One of the key testable predictions of my model is the discipline effect, in which an
increase in the level of monitoring causes leaders to exert more effort. These are complementary
approaches because both remuneration and monitoring affect the costs and benefits of holding
office and the returns to exerting effort10. My data allow me to measure both effort and the level of
monitoring institutions available to each group. The results suggest that an increase in monitoring
levels is associated with a significant increase in the effort exerted by the leader, consistent with
the theoretical predictions. Thus, my findings regarding the role of monitoring are similar to the
results of Ferraz and Finan (2010) regrading remuneration.
This research is related to two other sets of existing literature. First, my findings lend support
10Remuneration affects the returns to exerting effort by changing the benefits of winning reelection. Monitoring affect
these benefits in slightly different way: by tying the rewards and costs to the amount of effort exerted.
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to the growing literature on the impact of leaders’ characteristics on welfare outcomes11. Second,
the chapter is related to the study of farmer organizations as engines of growth. This literature
suggests that farmer associations can play an important role in generating development and re-
ducing poverty12, yet the success of interventions of this type have been mixed13. The impact of
leadership has been identified as one factor that could be important in determining the success of
these programs14. I contribute to this literature by showing how the governance structure of these
associations, and the economic environment in which they are embedded, can affect the quality of
leadership that they obtain and, thus, their effectiveness.
In the next section of the paper I present the theoretical model and derive several testable
predictions. Section 3.3 describes the Ugandan farmer associations that are used to test the model,
while Section 3.4 describes the data collection procedure. Section 3.5 presents a brief study of
associations from two districts, Iganga and Masaka. The empirical analysis is contained in Section
3.6, while Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theory
The model introduced in this section builds on a growing literature investigating factors that de-
termine the quality of leaders obtained through democratic political institutions utilizing a citizen-
candidate framework. There are two main differences between my model and previous theories.
First, I incorporate a number of the features found in previous studies into a single theoretical
framework. In particular, the theory includes both the discipline and self-selection effects, and
group members are heterogeneous in their ability. These features allow me to make welfare
11See, among others,Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) who study the effect of political reservations for women on the
type of public goods provided by Indian Village Councils, Jones and Olken (2005) on the effect of leaders’ quality on
growth, and Kasara (2007) on the relation between leaders’ origin and taxation policy.
12In the context of the developing world, see, among others, Narayan-Parker (2002b). In the context of the developed
world see Staatz (1987), Sykuta and Cook (2001), and Sexton (1990).
13See, e.g., (Hellin, Lundy and Meijer, 2009).
14See Bingen, Serrano and Howard (2003). Other factors that have been identified include (i) the legal and policy
environment (Hussi et al., 1993), (ii) project-design components (Bingen, Serrano and Howard, 2003) and (Shepherd,
2007), (iii) the nature of the links between producers and buyers (Shepherd, 2007), (iv) group-specific factors, such as
size, membership homogeneity, internal cohesion and trust (Stringfellow et al., 1997) and (Agrawal and Goyal, 2001),
and (v) market conditions (Hellin, Lundy and Meijer, 2009) and(Berdegue´, 2001) .
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statements regarding the trade-off between these two effects, which was not possible in previ-
ous frameworks15. Second, I present a theory that has been adapted to the small-group setting16.
The characteristics of small groups that I have described lead me to specify a model in which, (i)
members have perfect information about each others abilities, group monitoring institutions, and
the availability of private income opportunities, (ii) leaders are sanctioned (or rewarded) depend-
ing on the amount of effort they exert, (iii) group members’ preferences are perfectly aligned, (iv)
leaders divide their time between producing a group public good and earning private income,
and (v) leaders benefit significantly from the public good that they produce.
Model setup
The model considers a group of N members, indexed by i ∈ (1, ...N), which is formed in order to
produce a group public good. The members elect a leader who is responsible for producing the
good. The value of the public good produced depends on the effort exerted by the leader and the
leader’s ability. Members other than the leader do not participate in public goods production17.
Members are heterogeneous in their ability Ai ∈ (0, A¯), with no two having the same ability level,
so that group members can be strictly ordered according to their ability. Each member is endowed
with one unit of effort that can be allocated between generating private income and public goods
production. However, since only the leader produces the public good, all other members allocate
all of their effort towards generating a private income.
Two parameters play key roles in the model. The first is the level of monitoring of the leader
undertaken by the group, represented by m ≥ 0. The monitoring level is an exogenous parameter
which depends on the institutional monitoring technology available to the group, such as the
15E.g., Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010).
16Note that ‘small’ self-help groups are not defined with respect to some particular size. In effect, the size of a “small
group” is context-specific. Groups with many members may display these characteristics, though as group size grows
it seems increasingly unlikely that most or all of these characteristics will be sustained. Moreover, not every group with
few members will satisfy these criteria. Notwithstanding these caveats, I argue that these features are present in a great
many groups with few members.
17It would not change my results if all group members were forced to put a fixed amount of effort towards public
good production. The more complex possibility that there may be complementarities between leader quality and the
amount of effort that members devote to public goods production is interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper.
79 CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS
existence of a committee responsible for overseeing the leader18. Treating monitoring levels as an
exogenous parameter fits the empirical setting that I study well, as discussed in Section 3.3. It
also matches the existing literature on this topic, which generally takes the costs and rewards of
office as exogenously given19. The level of monitoring influences both the amount of effort that
the leader devotes to public goods production and group members’ candidacy choices.
The second important parameter is the value of the private income opportunities available
to group members, relative to the value public good, represented by α ∈ (0, 1). I refer to this
parameter as “private income opportunities”. In practice, this relative value may depend on both
the availability of private income opportunities, or on factors affecting the potential value of the
public good, though I focus primarily on how α is affected by the availability of private income
opportunities. It is important to note that this parameter represents income opportunities that are
outside of the group and are not affected by the level of the group public good20. Also, α is a
group-level parameter, which applies to all group members; individual-level variation in private
income opportunities is captured instead by each individual’s ability. The level of private income
opportunities will affect the leader’s allocation of effort, and each member’s candidacy choice.
Group members derive utility from their income, Yi according to an increasing and concave
utility function Ui = U(Yi). The income of a member i who does not become a candidate (nor the
leader) is given by Equation 3.1, where the leader is some individual l.
Yi = I(Ai, 1, ηI)α+ P (Al, el, ηP )(1− α) (3.1)
The I(Ai, 1, ηI) term represents member’s private income from sources outside the group ac-
tivities, which depends on the member’s ability, the member’s effort devoted to generating private
18While it is possible that these monitoring institutions are adjusted over time, these adjustments are likely to take
place slowly. This is likely do to the fact that changes to monitoring institutions must be made by incumbent leaders,
so that allowing monitoring institutions to adjust rapidly would open them to manipulation by politicians. Caselli and
Morelli (2004) describes the negative results that can occur when incumbent politicians are able to adjust the costs and
rewards of holding office.
19See, e.g. Messner and Polborn (2004) and Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010). An exception is Caselli
and Morelli (2004) who suggest that incumbent politicians can reduce the benefits of holding office in order to increase
their chances of reelection, with negative effects.
20For example, in the Ugandan farmer associations empirical setting, working for a local NGO represents a private
income opportunity, while farm work does not.
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income, which members who are not the leader will always set to one, and a random noise term
ηI . The P (Al, el, ηP ) term represents the value that a member receives from the public good, which
depends on the leader’s ability Al, the amount of effort the leader devotes to generating the public
good, el, and a random noise term ηP . The income for an individual who becomes a candidate
but is not elected the leader is the same as Equation 3.1, less some additional cost of candidacy
φ > 021. The income of the member, i = l, who becomes the leader is given by Equation 3.2.
Ul = U(I(Al, 1− el, ηI)α+ P (Al, el, ηP )(1− α)− C(m, el)− φ) (3.2)
The leader’s value from the public good depends on her ability and the amount of effort she
devotes to producing the public good, el ∈ [0, 1], where 1 − el is the amount of effort the leader
devotes to generating private income. The leader may also receive sanctions (or benefits) from
the group, based on the amount of effort exerted. These sanctions depend on both the amount
of effort exerted by the leader, as well as the amount of monitoring undertaken by the group, m,
and are represented by the C(m, el) term, which may also incorporate some fixed remuneration
paid to the leader. The ability to sanction or reward leaders based on their effort is one result of
the high level of information available in the small group setting. Finally, to be elected, the leader
must have also paid candidacy cost φ.
The fact that the sanctions or rewards that leaders receive for their service depend on effort,
rather than the public good value, is important. A rewards scheme based on effort is preferred
when there is sufficient uncertainty in the public good value, represented in the model by ηP ,
which is a normally distributed independent random variable with mean zero. This variable is
not observed by group members, so that the ultimate value of the public good is a weak signal of
leader ability and effort. Remunerating the group leader based on this signal introduced a high
level of uncertainty into their income, reducing the benefits of remuneration to risk averse indi-
viduals. High uncertainty in the value of the public good fits the empirical setting well, where the
21This candidacy cost may be monetary or social. Previous studies, such as Caselli and Morelli (2004), have high-
lighted the role of social rewards, or “ego rents”, in rewarding politicians for holding office. It seems likely that there
are similar social costs and benefits related to winning or losing elections.
81 CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS
prices negotiated by the leader depend on external forces – such as volatile world coffee prices, the
exchange rate, or changes in the structure of local competition – and members have great difficulty
in obtaining information about these market conditions. In contrast, effort is more accurately ob-
served in the small group setting. These considerations underline my decision to focus on cases in
which remuneration is based on leader’s effort, rather than the overall public good value. I discuss
this issue more formally in the Appendix. The ηI term represents similar uncertainty in private
income. This variable is independent with mean zero, and has the same probability distribution
function as ηP .
The functions I(Ai, 1 − ei, ηI) and P (Ai, ei, ηP ) are increasing in the effort and ability argu-
ments, concave in the 1 − ei and ei terms, respectively, and twice differentiable in the ability and
effort terms. The random terms ηI and ηP can be thought of as additive noise induced by external
forces, so for example, I(Ai, 1− ei, ηI) = I(Ai, 1− ei) + ηI . When no member chooses to become a
candidate, and no leader is elected, the public good value is P (0, 0, ηP ) = ηP . I assume that Inada
conditions hold in both private income generation and public goods consumption as 1 − ei → 0
and ei → 0, respectively, and that there is a complementarity between ability and effort in either
task: ∂2I(Ai, 1− ei, ηI)/∂Ai∂(1− ei) > 0 and ∂2P (Ai, ei, ηP )/∂Ai∂ei > 022.
Monitoring institutions are necessary since effort is not perfectly observable by the group, and
cannot be inferred based on the public good value due to the unobserved random noise term
ηP . Monitoring can be thought of as a mechanism that detects whether the leader is failing to
perfectly perform some leadership tasks. The more effort exerted by the leader, the less likely it
is that shirking will be detected. On the other hand, the more monitoring undertaken, the more
likely it is that the group will detect some task that the leader failed to properly perform. The
22The complementarity between ability and effort is an important assumption. The intuition behind this formulation
is that effort (including time) is the means through which ability is translated into results. For example, a highly able
individual that exerts no time at a task will achieve no results, but will achieve good results if they devote an hour to
the task. Thus, the product of their ability depends on the effort exerted. Similarly, a low ability individual who spends
an hour on a task may make a mess of things, while a high ability individual that spends the same hour will achieve
good results. So the payoff to an hour of effort also depends on ability. However, note that all of the results, except
Prop. 5, continue to hold if the complementarity between ability and effort in public goods production is set to zero,
as long as there is still complementarity in generating private income. This is an important point because the empirical
results provide no strong evidence that ability and effort are complements in public goods production in the farmer
associations I study.
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monitoring mechanism is explored in more detail in the Appendix. The C(m, ei) function will be
increasing and weakly convex in m, decreasing in ei, and twice differentiable. Also, the greater is
the level of monitoring, the greater is the benefit of increasing effort: ∂2C(m, ei)/∂m∂ei < 0.
The model has three stages. In the first stage, members decide whether to offer themselves as
a candidate for the leadership position. Members base this decision on a comparison of payoffs
from being the leader to their payoffs from being a regular group member. Next, members vote in
order to choose a leader out of the pool of available candidates. In the final stage, the elected leader
decides how much effort to devote to producing the public good, knowing that devoting effort to
producing the public good reduces the amount of effort that can be put towards generating private
income. Once the leader’s effort is chosen, the values of ηI and ηP are realized, the public good is
produced, members receive their payoffs, and the game ends.
Members begin the model with perfect information on the ability of other group members, the
group’s level of monitoring, and the availability of private income opportunities. In contrast, the
amount of effort exerted by the leader is not perfectly observed. The ability of the group to assess
the leader’s effort level will depend on the available monitoring institutions. The values of the
random variables ηI and ηP are also unobserved by group members.
To solve the model, I work backwards, starting with determining the effort that each member
would exert if they are the leader. These expected effort levels are used by members to determine
who to elect in the second stage, given each potential set of candidates. Moving back another step,
the expected election outcomes are used in members’ candidacy choices.
Leader effort
If member i is the leader, she will decide how to allocate effort between public goods produc-
tion and generating private income by solving the optimization problem below. For simplicity, I
will abuse notation slightly by writing the expected value of the I() and P() functions as follows:
I(Ai, 1− ei) = E(I(Ai, 1− ei, ηI)) and P (Ai, ei) = E(P (Ai, ei, ηP )).
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max
ei
I(Ai, 1− ei)α+ P (Ai, ei)(1− α)− C(m, ei)− φ
The optimal effort level, denoted e∗i , is the solution to the first order condition
23.
− ∂I(Ai, 1− ei)α
∂ei
+





One implication of allowing the leader to divide effort between public goods production and
generating private income is that there is the possibility that higher ability members may make
worse leaders. This will occur if higher ability members, when leaders, substitute so much ef-
fort away from public goods production that the reduction in effort offsets the benefits of their
ability. While this is an interesting possibility, in this chapter I will consider only situations in
which high ability members are better leaders. In other words, I consider only situations in which
dP (Ai, e∗i )/dAi > 0 for all possible parameter values. To do so I will make Assumption 1, which
amounts to placing restrictions on the complementarity of ability and effort in generating private
income relative to public goods production.
Assumption 1 The public good value produced in equilibrium is increasing in the ability of the group
leader.
dP (Ai, e∗i )/dAi =
∂P (Ai, e∗i )
∂Ai




 ∂2I(Ai,1−e∗i )α∂Ai∂e∗i − ∂2P (Ai,e∗i )(1−α)∂Ai∂e∗i
∂2I(Ai,1−e∗i )α
∂e∗2i





According to this expression, the change in the public good value due to the direct effect
of higher ability, ∂P (Ai, e∗i )/∂Ai, is greater than the change due to the indirect effect of effort,
(∂P (Ai, e∗i )/∂e
∗
i ) multiplied by the change in the leader’s optimal effort level induced by the
higher ability, ∂e∗i /∂Ai. There are three motivations for imposing this assumption. First, I assume
that under most circumstances, higher ability members will make better leaders. The empirical
evidence confirms that this is the case, at least, in the empirical setting that I investigate. Second,
eliminating this additional complexity will make it easier to focus on the mechanisms that I am-
23An interior solution is ensured by the functional form assumptions.
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most interested in. Third, this assumption is consistent with most of the existing literature on this
topic, making it easier to compare my work to previous results24.
Election
Given a set of candidates, group members will choose the leader based on the value of the public
good that they are expected to produce. Because individuals know the ability of all other group
members they are able to calculate the effort that each candidate would exert if elected, e∗i , and the
expected value of the public good that they would produce. Members can then rank the available
candidates according to P (Ai, e∗i )
25. Each member has one vote, which must be used to vote for
one candidate, if any are available. If no candidates are available, no vote takes place, and no
leader is elected. I consider only strategies that are not weakly dominated26. In equilibrium, each
member will always either vote for the candidate delivering the highest public good value or
themselves (if the rewards from holding office are great). The candidate delivering the highest
public good value will be elected27.
Candidacy choice
Each member’s candidacy choice will depend on a comparison between her expected utility from
being the leader and her utility from not being the leader. The key trade-off is that, as the leader,
the member benefits from the public good she produces, but producing the public good requires
substituting effort away from generating private income.
Candidacy choice is a game played simultaneously by all group members. I will look for Nash
Equilibrium solutions to this game in pure strategies. Each group member will choose between
24See Caselli and Morelli (2004), and Messner and Polborn (2004).
25This is possible given Assumption 1, which ensures that, since no two members have the same ability, and public
good production is strictly increasing in ability, no two members will deliver the same public good value.
26This rules out weakly dominated strategies in which members vote for a candidate other than their preferred
candidate, but no one has incentive to change their vote because none of them represent the decisive vote.
27There is the possibility that, if the rewards from holding office embodied by the C(m, ei) function are very large,
then all members may choose to run and vote for themselves. In this case there will be a tie vote, and I assume that the
members must vote again for a different candidate, at which point the best available candidate will be elected.
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two strategies: {Run, Not Run}. We will see that, under most circumstances, multiple equilibria
exist. This occurs because higher ability leaders (those delivering higher public good values) may
choose Run if they believe that lower ability members will choose Not Run, in which case it is
optimal for low ability members to choose Not Run. On the other hand, lower ability members
may choose Run if they believe that higher ability members will choose Not Run. This will occur if
higher ability members prefer to free ride on a lower quality leader rather than to run themselves.
The following four conditions are necessary and sufficient for equilibrium existence.
EC 1 There is at most one member who chooses Run in each equilibrium.
This condition must hold because no member i would choose Run, given that another member j
with P (Aj , e∗j ) > P (Ai, e
∗
i ) also chooses Run, since member i would never be elected under these
conditions but would still have to pay the cost of candidacy.
EC 2 If a member i chooses Run, that member must have a non-negative payoff from choosing Run relative
to a situation in which no leader is chosen, i.e., CPi ≥ 0 where,
CPi(Ai, α,m) = I(Ai, 1− e∗i )α+ P (Ai, e∗i )(1− α)− C(m, e∗i )− φ− I(Ai, 1)α (3.4)
This must hold because member i will never choose Run if she would be better off with no public
good.
EC 3 If some member i chooses Run, then no other member j, who would deliver a higher public good value
than i (P (Aj , e∗j ) > P (Ai, e
∗
i )), has a positive payoff from choosing Run given that member i chooses Run.
I.e, CPj − P (Ai, e∗i ) ≤ 0 where CPj is as in Equation 3.4.
This must hold because, in an equilibrium in which i chooses Run, it cannot pay for a better
potential leader j to also prefer Run, or else j would run, and i would not.
EC 4 If no member chooses Run, then it must be the case that no member has a positive payoff from choosing
Run relative to a case in which no one runs, i.e., CPi ≤ 0 for all i.
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If no member chooses Run, then it must be the case that no member has a positive payoff from
choosing Run relative to a situation in which no leader is elected and no public good is produced.
Candidacy Incentives
The relationship between a member’s ability and his incentive to become a candidate is central to
the model. To address this relationship, I first provide a more rigorous definition of what I mean
by candidacy incentives.
Def. 1 High ability members have greater candidacy incentives relative to low ability members when
dCPi/dAi > 0. Low ability members have relatively greater candidacy incentives when dCPi/dAi < 0.
Candidacy incentives are driven by a trade-off, faced by leaders, between having less time
to spend producing private income, and producing and benefiting from a higher value public
good. Low ability members will have greater candidacy incentives if the benefits of being the
leader fall, for higher ability members, because the higher public good value they produce does
not compensate them for the foregone private income. This is the case in Caselli and Morelli
(2004), where the benefit that leaders derive from the public good they produce is set to zero, so
low ability candidates will always have greater candidacy incentives. However, in the smaller
group setting considered here, leaders benefit from the public good they produce, which opens
up the possibility that higher ability individuals may have greater candidacy incentives28. In the
upcoming analysis, I clearly separate results which hold only when low ability members have
greater candidacy incentives relative to high ability members, which I will call Condition 1.
Condition 1 High ability members have less incentive to be the leader than low ability members, i.e.,
dCPi/dAi < 0.
This condition plays two roles in the upcoming analysis. First, I examine how the model behaves
when Condition 1 holds. Second, I will look for parameter values under which Condition 1 holds.
28See also Messner and Polborn (2004).
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The Model’s Predictions
Next I derive the predictions of the model which will later be taken to the data. I first consider how
the leader’s effort is affected by the parameters of the model, then consider how the parameters
work through member’s candidacy decision to affect the ability of the elected leader. Lastly, I
consider how the sum of these effects determines the value of the public good produced.
Discipline effect
I begin by showing the discipline effect, i.e., that holding the identity of the leader constant, an
increase in monitoring increases the leader’s optimal effort level and therefore the value of the
public good. It can also be shown that an increase in private income opportunities reduces the
leader’s optimal effort level.
Proposition 1 Holding the identity of the leader constant, the amount of effort allocated to producing
the public good is increasing in the level of monitoring, m, and decreasing in the level of private income
opportunities, α. I.e., de∗i /dm > 0 and de
∗
i /dα < 0.
This proposition can be easily derived by applying the implicit function theorem to Equation 3.3.
Self-selection effect
Here I present results that describe how high private income opportunities and monitoring can
work together to cause high ability individuals to self-select out of candidacy. The argument is
divided into three propositions. To begin, I show that an increase in monitoring reduces a group
member’s payoff from choosing Run, and can lead him to always prefer Not Run in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Consider an equilibrium with monitoring level m in which member i chooses Run, which
implies CPi(Ai, α,m) > 0. There exists a cutoff monitoring level m¯i > m for member i such that
CPi(Ai, α, m¯) = 0. For any m′ > m¯i, CPi(Ai, α,m′) < 0 and member i does not choose Run in
equilibrium.
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The intuition is that an increase in monitoring increases the leader’s expected sanctions (or
decreases the expected rewards), thus reducing the attractiveness of holding office. Thus, for each
member, there will exist some monitoring level m¯i at which she is indifferent between choosing
Run and Not Run given that no other member runs, and for any monitoring level greater than m¯i,
she will choose Not Run. A formal proof is available in Appendix 3.A. Next, I show that when
Condition 1 holds, the cutoff monitoring level m¯i is lower for higher ability members.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Condition 1 holds, so that low ability members have greater candidacy incen-
tives, and Ai > Aj . Then m¯i < m¯j .
Under Condition 1, a higher ability member will always have lower candidacy incentives.
This implies that CPi(Ai, α,m) < CPj(Aj , α,m) when Ai > Aj . Thus, individual i will become
indifferent between Run and Not Run given that no other member runs (CPi(Ai, α,m) = 0) at
a lower monitoring level than individual j. A formal proof is available in Appendix 3.A. Given
the results above, it is important to know the parameter values under which low ability members
have greater candidacy incentives (Condition 1 holds). These will be the conditions under which,
in equilibrium, higher monitoring levels will cause high ability individuals to opt out of the can-
didate pool before lower ability individuals. The following proposition shows that Condition 1
holds for high levels of private income opportunities.
Proposition 4 There exists a level of private income opportunities α¯ < 1 such that for all α > α¯, Condition
1 holds, i.e., dCPi(Ai, α,m)/dAi < 0.
The intuition here is that an increase in private income opportunities decreases the candidacy
incentives of high ability individuals more, because the private income gains that they forgo if
they become the leader are larger than for a lower ability individual due to the complementarity
between effort and ability. A formal proof is available in Appendix 3.A. Putting Propositions 2 - 4
together, Corollary 1 is obtained.
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Corollary 1 When private income opportunities are sufficiently high (α ≥ α¯), lower ability individuals
will have relatively greater candidacy incentives (Condition 1 will hold). When Condition 1 holds, high
monitoring levels will cause high ability individuals to choose Not Run in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 is the main empirical result related to the self-selection effect. It shows that private
income opportunities and monitoring can work together to drive high ability individuals out of
the candidate pool. It is this three-way relationship that is taken to the data in Section 3.6. Finally,
I derive one more result showing that, when there are sufficient private income opportunities,
higher ability leaders exert less effort, implying a negative correlation between leader ability and
leader effort.
Proposition 5 For every monitoring level m, there exists a level of private income opportunities α∗ < 1
such that for all α > α∗, leader effort is decreasing in leader ability, i.e., de∗l /dAl < 0. Similarly, there
exists a level of private income opportunities αˆ such that for all α < αˆ, de∗l /dAl > 0.
The intuition here is that the complementarity between effort and ability causes high ability
individuals to concentrate more of their effort on tasks where the returns are higher. Thus, as
private income opportunities grow, high ability leaders will substitute effort away from public
good production more rapidly than low ability members. On the other hand, when private income
opportunities are low, high ability individuals will substitute more effort towards public goods
production. A proof is available in Appendix 3.A.
Combined effects
This section explores how changes in monitoring levels affect the public good output when both
the discipline and self-selection effects are operating. Simulation results – rather than analytical
results – are used because, with a finite number of group members, the relationship between
monitoring and the public good value will not be smooth, a feature that makes deriving analytical
results difficult. Results are generated by assuming an initial distribution of abilities from which
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the ability of N group members are drawn at random. The model is then used to derive the
candidate pool, identify the leader, and calculate the public good value obtained by each group.
Repeating this procedure many times for each set of parameter values, allows us to discern how
changes in parameter values affect the outcomes of the model. Simulations are run on groups
with 10 members who’s abilities are drawn form a uniform [0,1] distribution. Results are obtained
by repeating the exercise 200 times for each set of parameter values. When there are multiple
equilibria, I focus on the equilibrium delivering the highest possible public good value29.
Particular functional forms and parameter values were selected such that they are consistent
with the model’s assumptions and to allow displaying a range of possible scenarios. For exam-
ple, functional forms and parameter values were chosen such that at low values of m and α the
incentives for individuals to be the leader are high and the candidate pool is large, while at high
values of m and α there are few incentives for individuals to be the leader and the candidate pool
is small. This ensures that the simulations cover the range of interesting scenarios. The details of
the functional forms and parameter values used are presented in Appendix 3.D.
Figure 3.1 shows the average levels of leader effort (left) and ability (right) as a function of
monitoring for various levels of private income opportunities. The left panel demonstrates the
discipline effect: an increase in monitoring increases the amount of effort exerted by the group
leader. The right panel demonstrates the self-selection effect: as monitoring increases, the ex-
pected ability of the leader decreases. This effect binds earlier when there are more private in-
come opportunities. Additional results, available in Appendix 3.D, suggest that increasing m also
reduces the ability rank, relative to other group members, of the leader.
Figure 3.2 shows the result of these combined effects on the value of the public good. There is a
clear inverted U-shaped relationship present for higher levels of private income opportunities. In
these cases, the discipline effect dominates at lower monitoring levels and the self-selection effect
dominates at higher levels. The higher are private income opportunities, the earlier this inflection
point is reached. However, at low levels of private income opportunities, the self-selection effect
29Other papers in this literature also focus on the best equilibrium. See, e.g., Bernheim and Kartik (2010). Similar
results are obtained by taking the averages over all possible equilibria (see Appendix 3.D).
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Figure 3.1: Simulated Leader Effort and Ability
disappears, and thus, there is no inverted U-shape. In this case, high ability members prefer to run
and they exert a high level of effort once elected. I now move to compare the model’s predictions
to real-world data from one set of small self-help groups.
Figure 3.2: Simulated Public Good Values
3.3 Empirical Setting
Farmer associations’ raison d’e´tre is to improve the performance of their members’ farms as eco-
nomic units engaged in market transactions. Relatively small and self-governed, farmer asso-
ciations provide members, who join voluntarily, with a group public good. The preferences of
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members of farmer groups with respect to their group’s services — the most important of which
is securing higher outputs prices through collective marketing — are closely aligned30. Because of
the high costs of transportation and of market information, dispersed small-holder farmers across
the developing world have little options but to sell to trading partners who are able to exploit
asymmetries in information and in bargaining powers. In contrast, organized farmers who sell
their cash crops via their association (in bulk), can obtain higher prices by increasing their bar-
gaining powers and by reducing buyers’ transaction costs (Staatz, 1987). Also, members of farmer
associations, which cover relatively small geographical units, tend to have a high level of infor-
mation about other members (Grossman, 2011c). These factors are consistent with the small group
features described in the theory.
APEP: The development project
All the farmer associations I surveyed were created as part of one of Uganda’s largest recent devel-
opment projects: the Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP)31. APEP’s goal was
to support small-holder farmers’ transition into commercial farming. Between 2004 and 2008 it
helped organize over 60,000 small producers into more than 2,500 village-level farmer groups,
known as producer organizations (POs), which were further organized into more than 200 farmer
associations across Uganda, known as Depot Committees (DCs). Serving, on average, 200 mem-
bers from ten neighboring village-level groups, the farmer associations were designed to exploit
economies of scale and to bargain for better prices based on quality and volume.
Studying the APEP groups presents several advantages. First, the project’s scope and size
allow me to conduct a large-scale quantitative study within the boundaries of a single nation,
thus securing the homogeneity of the political and legal environments, as well as many project-
related factors. Second, APEP groups have similar governance structures and leadership posi-
tions whose roles and functions are comparable across sites. Each farmer association is led by
30Other services that farmer groups may provide include securing lower input prices and training in agriculture.
31APEP was funded by USAID, and implemented by Chemonics International, an International Development con-
sulting firm based in Washington DC.
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an executive committee (management team), which is part of the DC board of directors. The ex-
ecutive committee is comprised of a DC manager, the chairman of the board, a secretary and a
treasurer. Operationally, the DC manager is the principal leader of the association (henceforth,
leader). The leader’s most important responsibilities include searching for buyers, negotiating
input and output prices, and organizing the collection of crops (including hiring and supervis-
ing employees). Additionally, leaders help coordinate group activities and facilitate the flow of
information throughout the association.
The association leader is chosen from the set of board directors. In other words, the board
directors — also referred to as representatives — form the pool of potential candidates for the
senior leadership position32. Responsibilities of the board of directors, which is comprised of two
elected representatives from each of the village-level POs, include monitoring the work of the DC
executives (including the leader), representing the opinions of PO members at the associational
level, and aiding in the transmission of information. Thus, there exist three types of members:
ordinary group members, DC representatives, and the DC leader33.
Third, while all of the associations adopted governance structures that are generally similar,
there exists a significant amount of variation in the monitoring structures adopted by the groups.
Early on in the intervention, APEP’s management reached the conclusion that village-level POs
were too small to be viable economic players. As a result, APEP strongly encouraged neighboring
POs to form a single association with a federal structure. A uniform template was then used by
APEP field-officers to facilitate the process of association formation34. The identity of the facil-
itator assigned to each association, the information group members had about each other prior
to the association formation, and representatives’ previous experience in participating in other
self-help groups, generated variation in the monitoring institutions that groups adopted35. Once
32At the village-level, each producer organization (PO) elects its own local leadership which is responsible for imple-
menting decisions taken by the DC leadership.
33A graphical representation of the association governance structure is provided in Appendix A, Fig. A.2.
34The process of establishing the DC governance structures took place in three workshops, led by APEP facilitators.
These workshops took place between 12 to 24 months after creation of the village-level POs. For additional information
see Chapter 4, Section4.4. The group formation manual can be provided by the author upon request.
35Groups that were created by the same facilitator share more similar structures and rules than groups created by
different facilitators. For a more detailed description and rigorous assessment of the exogeneity of the associations’
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established, groups, by and large, retained these institutions, usually enshrined in constitutions36.
Leaders’ compensation can serve as a good example for the resilience of the DCs’ governance insti-
tutions. When established, APEP facilitators strongly encouraged new groups to keep monetary
remuneration to leaders as low as possible. The data confirms that 3-5 years after their creation,
only one association paid its manager any regular salary.
3.4 Data and sampling scheme
This section briefly describes the data used in this chapter and how it was collected. To reduce
crop-related variability, I first limited the study’s target population to associations marketing cof-
fee, the most common cash crop sold by the APEP groups. I then sampled 50 associations from 5
district-areas (strata) using a stratified, random, multistage cluster design37.
Quantitative data for the empirical analysis was collected between July and September 2009
by a team of 60 local interviewers. Within each association, several different types of data were
collected. One key data set is based on individual-level surveys of ordinary group members. For
each association, I sampled six POs, for a total of 287 village-level groups38. From each sampled
PO, I surveyed, on average, six members, for a total of 36 members per association39. Sampled
members were surveyed in person by trained interviewers in the respondents’ local language, for
a total of 1,781 surveys. I refer to this data source as the “members’ survey”.
A second key data set is based on individual-level surveys of all DC representatives, for a total
of 1,316 interviews. These surveys cover the complete pool of potential candidates for the DC
leadership position. These “representatives’ surveys” only partially overlap with the “members’
surveys”, as they were tailored to capture the representatives’ roles and responsibilities within
level of monitoring, see Grossman (2011c).
36For example, the vast majority of the constitutions I examined had both quorum and super-majority rules for
making constitutional amendments.
37Additional information on the sampling scheme, including a map locating DCs in the five strata, can be found in
Appendix A, Section A.2.
38In few cases, when a farmer association had fewer than seven groups, I selected all of its POs.
39The number of sampled members from each of the six sampled village-level groups was proportional to the size of
the PO, to ensure that the sample is self-weighted.
95 CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS
the association governance structure. I collected additional data at the associational-level using
questionnaires completed by the DC senior leadership, and at the PO-level using questionnaires
completed by the PO leaders. Data on the DCs’ economic activities were also collected from the
associations’ books.
Measurement of key variables
In this section I will walk through the information and procedures employed to construct each of
the variables used in the subsequent analysis. One advantage of the farmer associations I study
is that one of the key variables in the model, the value of the public good, is relatively straight-
forward to measure. Since farmer associations’ central activity is collective marketing, it is rea-
sonable to relate the value of the public goods directly to the marketing decisions of members. A
high value public good exists when members sell a large fraction of their crops via their farmer
association40. In the analysis, I use two measures of member’s marketing decision to proxy the
value the public good: (i) an indicator variable capturing whether a member sold his crops via the
association, at least once, in the past season, and (ii) the share of a member’s total seasonal coffee
yield that was sold via the farmer group in the past season41.
Measuring the remaining key variables in the model is a more complex task. For some of the
variables — e.g., members’ ability, leader effort and group monitoring — a number of questions
were asked related to different aspects of the variable, and responses were collected from a variety
of sources. These values were then collapsed into single measures using principal component
analysis42. A similar approach was recently used by Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) to construct a
single composite index of monitoring using six monitoring proxy variables.
40I use individual marketing decisions rather than crop prices, since the former is a much less noisy signal of the
performance of the leader. This is because coffee prices depend, to large extent, on exogenous factors.
41I check my results against two alternative measures of collective marketing, gathered from interviews with group
leaders and the associations’ books and records. These alternative measures deliver similar results.
42This technique is used to re-express multiple variables as one (or more) variables that explain as much of the
variation in the original variables as possible. In technical terms, the first principal component of a set of variables
X1, X2, . . . Xn is the linear combination of these variables that exhibits maximum variance. A good source for more
information about principal component analysis is Lattin, Carroll and Green (2003). For an example of the use of
principal component analysis in practice see McKinzie (2005).
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To construct individual’s ability measure I used information on respondents’ literacy level, ed-
ucational attainment and English proficiency43. Respondents also completed two cognitive tests44.
I combined these variables into a single summary index using principal component analysis. All
of the above variables are positively correlated, and the first principal component was able to
explain more than 61% of the variance. Several checks increase our confidence in the compos-
ite ability measure. First, members who hold high-skilled off-farm jobs have significantly higher
ability scores than those who do not ( Appendix A, Fig. A.5, Panels A-C). Second, (mean) ability
scores are increasing with the leadership role in the association ( Appendix A, Fig. A.5, Panel D).
Third, the composite ability measure is highly correlated with wealth ( Appendix A, Fig. A.6).
To measure the effort leaders spend producing the public good, I combined effort ratings from
sampled members and from the DC representatives. I also used information on the number of
times the leader organized collective marketing in the past season – the associations’ most impor-
tant activity. All of these variables were positively and highly correlated, with the first principal
component explaining 45% of the variables’ variance. To check the reasonableness of the effort
measure, I compare it with the leader’s self-assessment of their effort. I find that leaders who have
high effort scores also report working longer hours and have a better sense of whether members
are following the association’s rules and by-laws.
Table 3.1 provides information on the variables I used to measure groups’ monitoring level.
The variables, which are derived from both the members and the representatives’ surveys, were
combined, using principal component analysis, to obtain a single summary index of monitoring
measure for each DC. All of the variables are positively correlated, often strongly, with the first
principal component explaining more than 46% of the variance.
The availability of private income opportunities – a group-level variable – also plays a key role
in the model. I used respondents’ employment status to construct this measure45. The primary
43Because no local language is spoken by more than 20% of Ugandans, English is the lingua franca of the business
and political class. English proficiency allows individuals to communicate with potential trading partners outside their
small geographic areas.
44The cognitive tests included two assignnments: solving a simple maze in less than two minutes and solving a raven
test comprised of 12 questions in two minutes.
45In the model, α measures the value of private income opportunities in relation to the potential value of the public
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Behavioral Measures Type Survey
Whether there is a rule regarding the manager’s time commitment dummy Reps
The extent to which external auditors are used categorical Reps
Whether respondents have asked to review the DC’s books dummy Reps
Whether someone is responsible for monitoring the DC manager dummy Reps
Attitudinal/ Perceptional Measures
Whether the manager is transparent dummy Reps
The extent to which the manager is accountable categorical Members
Whether the manager is monitored dummy Members
The extent to which the manager is transparent categorical Members
Table 3.1: Variables used to measure group monitoring level (mj)
measure of a group’s private income opportunities is the fraction of representatives in the associ-
ation holding off-farm jobs (except as unskilled laborers). Note that only data from the complete
sample of board directors were used to construct this measure, since this is the relevant candidate
pool. Alternative measures were also tested and produced similar results.
In order to test whether higher values of the group public good have positive welfare effects, I
construct a measure of the change in a member’s welfare since joining his or her farmer group. The
measure was constructed using questions about ownership of 12 different assets that reflect the
purchasing power of farmers, such as bicycles and livestock46. For each asset type, respondents
were asked to provide information on the number of items they currently have and the number of
items they had in the year before joining the group. Measurement errors, typical in survey-based
recall questions, are reduced given that (i) the median member joined her group merely three
years ago, (ii) the creation of the farmer group is considered a major milestone to the majority of
members, and (iii) the included assets are central to households in rural Uganda.
good. Because I am not able to accurately measure the potential value of the public good, I proxy (α) through a measure
of private income opportunities.
46Using asset ownership to measure the welfare of poor households is a commonly used technique in poor develop-
ing countries where monetary measures of income and wealth are problematic. See, e.g., Filmer and Pritchett (2001).
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3.5 Case studies: Iganga district vs. Masaka district
This section describes the experience of farmer associations from two district-areas, Masaka and
Iganga, before I test the model predictions more rigorously in Section 3.6. Masaka is a relatively
well-off district compared to Iganga; group members in Masaka are more educated, have more
available land, and are wealthier. Whereas the median member of a farmer association in Iganga
grows coffee on less than one acre, producing a seasonal median yield of 250 KGs, the median
group member in Masaka grows coffee on 1.5 acres, yielding 363 KGs per season. Given these
facts, one might expect that the farmer associations in Masaka would function more effectively
than in Iganga. Yet, I find that farmer groups in Iganga have higher levels of public goods pro-
duction. For example, 85% of the members of the farmer associations in Iganga report selling at
least once via their association in the past season, compared with 49% of the members of groups
from Masaka (Appendix A, Fig. A.3). In addition, members in Iganga sell 69% of their seasonal
yield via their farmer groups. In Masaka the figure is 31% (Appendix A, Fig. A.4).
The model suggests that variation in the value of the public good depend on leaders’ ability
and effort. I find that the mean ability scores of DC managers in Iganga is 0.61 standard deviations
above the mean ability scores of DC managers in Masaka (p-value=0.09)47. Furthermore, when I
examine the entire network of DC representatives, the mean ability of Iganga board directors is,
on average, 0.29 standard deviations higher than those in Masaka (p-value= 0.00). This contrast
sharply with the findings from the members’ survey, in which the average member in Masaka is
significantly more educated than members in Iganga (p-value= 0.06). In other words, high-ability
group members in Masaka appear to be less willing to take on leadership positions than those in
Iganga. Turning to the leader’s effort, I find that the average effort that leaders in Masaka exert, ei,
is 2 standard deviations lower than the effort exerted by Igangan leaders. This occurs even though,
in Masaka, the mean monitoring level is 1.5 standard deviations higher than in Iganga.
Given that leaders in Iganga have higher ability and spend more time in producing the public
good, it is not surprising that farmer groups in that district are more effective. The question then,
47P-values in this section are based on a one-tail, two-group, mean-comparison test with unequal variances.
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is why groups in Masaka, which are endowed with better educated members on average, end
up with lower quality leadership than groups in Iganga. The model provides an explanation to
this result, by pointing to the important role of private income opportunities. According to the
model, in areas that have high private income opportunities, both the discipline and self-selection
effects are present, and groups face a trade-off between leaders’ effort and ability. This causes
higher-ability members to drop-out of the candidacy pool at relatively lower levels of monitoring,
and causes elected leaders to exert less effort. In contrast, when private income opportunities are
low, my framework suggests that this trade-off is not present. Under these conditions, high ability
members will choose to be candidates and will exert high levels of effort if they are the leader, even
without the incentives created by enhanced monitoring technology.
Turning to the data, I find that groups in Masaka have, on average, the highest level of private
income opportunities, with a mean across DCs that is 0.66 standard deviations above the mean
for the entire sample. Groups in Iganga, on the other hand, have the lowest mean score of pri-
vate income opportunities for representatives, at 0.95 standard deviations below the mean for the
entire sample. This difference is both substantial and significant (p-value= 0.01). These findings
support the predictions of the model. In particular, they suggest that, because of high local private
income opportunities, groups in Masaka are forced to trade-off between leader effort and ability.
In contrast, the low levels of local private income opportunities in Iganga allow groups do avoid
this trade-off, and therefore obtain leaders with high ability, who are also willing to exert more
effort in public goods production, resulting in a higher public good value. In the next section I test
the model’s predictions on the entire sample.
3.6 Empirical analysis
In this section I look for evidence of the main predictions of the theoretical model: the discipline
effect, the self-selection effect, and the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between
group monitoring level and the value of the public good produced.
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Discipline effect
The model makes two key predictions with respect to the manager’s effort. The first prediction –
formalized in Theorem 1 – is that an increase in the level of monitoring (mj), increases the amount
of effort exerted by the group leader (ej). The second prediction is that, when private income op-
portunities (αj) are sufficiently high, high-ability leaders choose to exert less effort, all else equal
(Theorem 5). To explore these predictions I regress the standardized score of the leader’s effort
of group j on the group’s level of monitoring, private income opportunities, the ability of the
association’s leader (Aj) and the interactions between the key variables. OLS regression results
are shown in Table 3.2. The first specification includes only group monitoring level and strata
fixed effects, while the second model adds DC-level controls for the age and size of the associa-
tion, the mean size of members’ seasonal coffee yield, the association’s density of associational life
and measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization among the association’s board directors48.
The third model adds a variable measuring private income opportunities and its interaction with
monitoring, and the fourth specification adds the ability of the associations’ manager and its in-
teraction with private income opportunities and group monitoring.
In accordance with the discipline effect, I find a positive, substantial, and significant relation-
ship between groups’ level of monitoring and the amount of effort exerted by leaders. Turning
to the second prediction, tested in model D, I find some evidence that the relation between man-
ager’s ability and effort is conditional on the level of outside income opportunities (Appendix,
Fig. 3.8). When there are few private income opportunities (two standard deviation below the
grand mean), one unit change in leader ability is associated with a 0.40 standard deviation in-
crease in leader effort. In contrast, when private income opportunities are available (two standard
deviations above the grand mean), a one unit increase in leader ability is associated with a 0.11
standard deviation decrease in leader effort, as predicted in Theorem 5, though these results are not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
48Ethnic heterogeneity makes solving collective action problems more challenging, in Uganda (Bjo¨rkman and Svens-
son, 2010, Habyarimana et al., 2007). Ethnic fractionalization index was constructed using a Herfindahl concentration
index: ELF = 1−Pni=1 s2j where sj is the share of group j, and (j = 1 . . . n). To measure the density of associational-life
I calculate the group mean of the number of voluntary associations in which DC representatives are regular participants.
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DV: LEADER’S REALIZED EFFORT IN PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Monitoring (std.) 0.772∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.129) (0.235)
Monitoring × PIO -0.079 0.058
(0.117) (0.125)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.151
(0.175)
Monitoring × Leader’s ability -0.092
(0.093)
Leader’s ability × PIO -0.128
(0.128)
Group Controls X X X
Strata FEs X X X X
Observations 50 50 50 42
r2 0.720 0.781 0.791 0.800
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.2: Relation Between the association’s monitoring level and the leaders’ realized effort. Results from OLS
regressions using group-level data. PIO stands for private income opportunities.
An increase in the leader’s effort level is only valuable if it increases the value of the group
public good. A significant variation in group public good levels is observed across associations
1.1 and district-areas. For example, the share of member selling through the association in the past
season varies from a low of 49% in Masaka to a high of 85% in Iganga (Appendix A, Fig. A.3).
Similarly, the share of member’s yield sold through the group varies from 31% in Masaka to 69%
in Iganga (Appendix A, Fig. A.4). To explore how leader’s effort and ability translates into the
value of the public good, I run a series of logistic regressions, using the following specification:
yij = I[y˜ij > 0]
y˜ij = β0 + β1Aj + β2e¯j + β3(Aj × e¯j) +XijΓ1 + JjΓ2 + ζj + ij (3.5)
Here the dependent variable yij indicates whether member i sold his coffee through his farmer
association j during the past season (rather than selling it all to a local middleman). This mea-
sure is derived from the reporting of the producer organizations’ leaders49. The key independent
49Similar results are obtained by using members’ self-report as an alternative measure of the dependent variable.
CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS 102
variables are the ability of the DC leader Aj and effort ej , and the interaction between the leader’s
ability and effort. In model B I add a set of individual level controls Xij , and in model C I fur-
ther add group-level controls Jj . All models include strata fixed effects and standard errors are
clustered at the farmer association level.
Results, which are displayed below in Table 3.3, suggest that both leader’s effort and ability
are positively related to the value of the public good, though only the coefficient on the leader’s
effort is significant. Using the full specification of model C, moving from one standard deviation
below the mean effort to one standard deviation above the grand mean (a range that covers 38% of
associations) is associated with a 63% points increase in the predicted probability that a member
sells his coffee through his farmer association (p-value= 0.00), holding the control variables at
meaningful values (means or medians for categorical variables)50.
DV: SELLING IN BULK VIA THE DC IN THE PAST SEASON
Model A Model B Model C
Leader’s effort (std.) 0.716∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.198) (0.189)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.124 0.129 0.090
(0.180) (0.178) (0.196)
Leader’s ability × Leader’s effort -0.073 -0.086 -0.013
(0.136) (0.128) (0.140)
Individual Controls X X
Group Controls X
Strata FEs X X X
Observations 1456 1233 1180
Log Likelihood -877.344 -719.194 -670.097
Standard errors clustered at the farmer association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.3: Leader quality and marketing decision. Members’ decision to sell via their group is modeled as a function
of the leader’s ability and effort. Model A includes only the key independent variables, Model B includes, in addition,
a series of individual-level controls, Model C includes DC-level controls.
These results are reported in the Appendix.
50The signs of the control variables seem reasonable. Women and older members are more likely to sell in bulk. The
probability of selling via the group is positively related to the total size of coffee yield, the time since joining the group,
the dishonesty of local middlemen, and with a member’s richness of associational-life. The further a member lives
from the DC’s crop collection point, the less likely she is to bulk. Selling in bulk is positively correlated with distance to
the nearest trading center. This distance likely affects the availability of information about market prices and of buyers
‘outside’ the group, so as the distance to the local trading center increases, farmers are likely to have greater information
asymmetry and less bargaining power. Under such conditions, farmer groups are well-positioned to increase the value
of the public good for members. A full set of results can be found in Appendix, Table 3.9.
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Self-selection effect
The next central prediction of the model, presented formally in Corollary 1, is that an increase in
monitoring level decreases the likelihood that high ability members will be candidates (and thus
the probability that they become the group leader), but only in areas with sufficiently high private
income opportunities. In particular, the model predicts that when there are ample private income
opportunities and monitoring levels are high, high-ability individuals will opt out of candidacy,
so lower ability leaders will be elected.
I explore this prediction by looking at how the identity of the elected leader is affected by both
monitoring levels and private income opportunities. I run an individual-level logistic regression
on the complete sample of DC representatives, where the dependent variable indicates whether
the individual is the group leader51. The key independent variables are board director’s ability,
group’s monitoring level and private income opportunities, and the interactions between these
variables. The regression equation is given below, where y˜ij is an unobserved latent variable that
determines whether a board director becomes the DC leader, yij is an indicator variable that takes
the value one if individual i in group j is the group leader, Aij represents ability, αj represents
private income opportunities, mj represents group monitoring level, Xij is a set of individual
level controls and Fj is a set of DC-level controls. To account for correlation in the error terms of
members of the same DC, in all models I cluster standard errors at the farmer association level.
yij = I[y˜ij > 0]
y˜ij = β0 + β1Aij + β2αj + β3mj + β3(Aij × αj) + β4(Aij ×mj) + β5(αj ×mj)+
β6(Aij × αj ×mj) +XijΓ1 + FjΓ2 + ij
(3.6)
The main coefficient of interest in this analysis is β6, the coefficient on the interaction be-
51The model’s predictions are most clear for the identity of the elected leader. The model’s predictions are less clear
about the identity of the losing candidates.
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tween ability, monitoring, and private income opportunities. Based on the model’s predictions
we should expect a negative coefficient, since increase in monitoring should decrease the probabil-
ity that a higher ability individual is the leader when there are more private income opportunities.
Results obtained from the regressions are displayed in Table 3.4. These results support the
main prediction of the model, as we observe a negative and significant coefficient on the interac-
tion term between ability, monitoring level and private income opportunities. Other coefficients
take reasonable values . As expected, individual’s ability, wealth, health and the size of their coffee
yield all have a positive influence on an individual’s likelihood of being the leader. Interestingly,
individuals who are active participants in other organizations, such as church groups or village
committees, are significantly less likely to become farmer association leaders (see Appendix, Ta-
ble 3.11). This suggests that group members face time constraints which influence their candidacy
decisions, in ways that are consistent with my theory.
DV: IDENTITY OF THE ASSOCIATION’S LEADER
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Rep ability (std.) 1.128∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.207) (0.199) (0.203)
Monitoring 0.042 0.235 0.158 -0.006
(0.215) (0.150) (0.207) (0.222)
Rep ability × Monitoring -0.066 -0.050 0.139 0.121
(0.228) (0.147) (0.192) (0.199)
Private Income Opportunities (std.) 0.073 0.089 -0.018 -0.140
(0.240) (0.141) (0.147) (0.154)
Rep ability×PIO -0.218 -0.245 -0.157 -0.132
(0.265) (0.167) (0.175) (0.171)
Monitoring ×PIO 0.264 0.286∗∗∗ 0.142 0.150
(0.179) (0.088) (0.113) (0.117)
Rep ability×Monitoring ×PIO -0.349∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗ -0.246∗∗
(0.191) (0.081) (0.105) (0.103)
DC Controls X X X
Reps Controls X X
Strata FEs X
Observations 1058 1058 903 903
Log Likelihood -163.284 -162.101 -125.116 -124.294
Standard errors clustered at the farmer association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.4: Test of the self-selection effect: relationship between board director’s ability, group’s monitoring level
and private income oportunities (PIO).
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In order to get a sense of the magnitude of the relationships found in this regression, I use
a graphical representation. In Figure 3.3 I plot the predicted change in the likelihood that any
member of the association’s “potential candidates” is the actual leader, as group’s move from low
to high monitoring environment and private income opportunities changes in it’s entire range,
while setting members’ ability constant52. In the right panel, members’ ability is set to two stan-
dard deviations above the grand mean, while in the left panel it is set to two standard deviations
below the mean. As Fig. 3.3 makes clear, when members’ ability is low, the marginal effect of the
level of monitoring on the likelihood of being the group’s leader is negative, when group’s private
income opportunities are low. However, as private income opportunities become more abundant,
moving from low to a high monitoring level has a positive effect on the likelihood that low-ability
members become leaders. This change reflects the fact that high-ability members begin dropping
out of the candidacy pool. By contrast, when members’ ability is high, the effect of change in mon-
itoring levels on the likelihood of being the leader is positive when private income opportunities
are sparse. As the model predicts, the marginal effect of monitoring turns negative once private
income opportunities become abundant (about one standard deviations above the grand mean).
Inverted U-shaped relation: Monitoring and the value of the Public Good
This subsection explores the third main prediction of the model: the existence of an inverted
U-shaped relationship between groups’ value of the public good and monitoring. To test this
prediction, I fit a locally weighted regression of the value of the public good (group-means) on the
group’s monitoring level53. Figure 3.4 graphs the results using the share of members who have
sold their crops at least once in the past season via the farmer groups, as the measure of the public
goods value. Though understandably crude, a rough inverted-U shape is apparent.
52Note that the regression coefficients represent unconditional effects, whereas marginal changes of each of the inde-
pendent variables is conditional on the values of the other two variables.
53This approach was inspired by Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009).
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Figure 3.3: Marginal effect of monitoring on the likelihood of being elected as leader as private income oppor-
tunities increases in it’s entire range, for high-ability and low-ability representatives. Inner and outer dashed lines
represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals, based on bootstrap SEs (20,000 iterations). Marginal effect of monitoring
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Figure 3.4: Monitoring and the value of the Public Good. In each panel, the lines plot fitted values of locally
weighted regressions (using Stata’s lowess command and a bandwidth of 0.3) of group-level means of the value of the
public good on monitoring. 95% confidence intervals are based on bootstrap simulations with 1,000 replications.
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Welfare effects
In the last piece of the empirical analysis, I look at the relationship between leadership quality, the
value of the public good and members’ welfare. In groups with a high public good value, where
many members sell via their association, we expect a larger increase in welfare since members had
joined the group.
To test this prediction, I fit three models. First, I run an individual-level OLS regression, in
which a standardized measure of member’s welfare change since joining the group is modeled as
a function of the amount of collective marketing undertaken by the group and the member’s own
marketing decision. The amount of collective marketing undertaken by the group is measured as
the fraction of members selling via the group in the past season, whereas individual’s marketing
decisions are measured as the share of coffee yield that was sold via the association. Second, I fit
a reduced form OLS, in which member’s welfare change is modeled as a function of the leader’s
ability, effort and their interaction. Third, I model the standardized measure of member’s welfare
change as a function of the amount of collective marketing undertaken by the group, which itself
is instrumented by the leader’s ability and effort54. All key variables were standardized to allow
for easier comparison between regression coefficients. I include individual level controls for sex,
age, year of joining the group, health status and level of education, as well as association level
controls for group age and membership size. In all models I include strata fixed effects and cluster
standard errors at the association level.
Table 3.5 presents the regression results. First, I find that increase in members’ welfare since
joining the farmer group is positively and significantly related to the value of the public good
(Model A). Second, I find that leader effort is positively and significantly related to the value of
the public good but decreasing in leader ability (Model B). I find no significant effect of leader
ability on welfare. Third, I find a strong significant association between members’ welfare and the
value of the public good, when the latter is instrumented by leader’s ability and effort. Turning
54The first stage of this regression is not shown here because it is nearly equivalent to the results appearing in Table
3.3. I assume that leader’s effort and ability impact DC members’ welfare only via collective marketing activity, which
is the central activity of the association.
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to an individual member’s decision to sell through the association, I find that controlling for the
value of the public good, the larger the share of crops a member sells via the farmer association
the larger is the welfare change.
DV: CHANGE IN A MEMBER’S WELFARE SINCE JOINING THE FAMER GROUP
A: Direct B: Reduced C: IV
Fraction of members selling in bulk (std.) 0.072∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.037) (0.096)
Leader’s ability (std.) -0.020
(0.040)
Leader’s effort (std.) 0.079∗
(0.041)
Leader’s ability × Leader’s effort -0.056∗∗
(0.023)
Share of Yield sold in bulk (std.) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.036)
DC Controls X X X
Members Controls X X X
Strata FEs X X X
Observations 1448 1229 1229
r2 0.113 0.123 0.102
Log Likelihood -1908.469 -1569.030 -1583.633
Standard errors clustered at the farmer association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.5: Relation Between Value of the PG and Welfare. In model A, the standardized dependent variable is a
function of the value of the public goods measured as the fraction of members selling in bulk via the assocaition. In
model B, the dependent variable is a function of leader’s ability and effort, whereas in the model C, the key independent
variable – the value of the public good – is instrumented by the leader’s effort and ability.
3.7 Conclusions
I have argued in this chapter that self-help groups may face a trade-off between the ability of their
leader and the amount of effort the leader exerts, with consequences for the quality of leadership
obtained, the value of the public good produced, and the welfare of group members. To a large
degree, this trade-off is driven by the group’s monitoring institutions. High levels of monitoring
incentivize leaders to exert more effort, but may also drive higher ability members to self-select out
of the candidate pool. Whether this trade-off exists depends on the availability of private income
opportunities. Evidence from a sample of Ugandan farmer associations support these predictions.
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One surprising implication of the results found in this chapter is that more and better moni-
toring institutions do not necessarily lead to better outcomes. My results suggest that introducing
new monitoring institutions may result in higher ability group members opting out of candidacy
through the self-selection effect, with negative consequences for the value of the public good. The
theory suggests that these negative effects can be avoided, however, if increased monitoring of the
group leaders is balanced by an appropriate increase in leader rewards.
From a policy perspective, this study suggests that the quality of group leaders should be con-
sidered, at least partially, to be endogenous. Thus, small groups should be structured in ways that
take into account how these structures will affect the quality of leadership obtained. My results
also suggest that small group structures should take into account the private income opportuni-
ties available to group members. For example, it may not be appropriate to apply broad standards
to small groups that exist in different economic settings, as was done when APEP recommended
that farmer associations not offer monetary remuneration to leaders regardless of local economic
conditions. This also has implications for interventions that affect the set of private income oppor-
tunities available to group members. According to the theory presented in this paper, an interven-
tion that increases private income opportunities may have unintended effects on the success of
small groups operating in that area. Ideally one should take into account these externalities when
assessing the costs and benefits of development interventions.
My results tend to support the predictions of existing models designed for larger political
units. They also demonstrate, however, that previous results must be modified in order to ac-
commodate the small group setting. On the other hand, my results may also help inform our
understanding of leadership selection dynamics in larger political units. For example, Kotakorpi
and Poutvaara (2010) have speculated that differences in available private income opportunities
may explain their finding of a self-selection effect for women, but not men. I present evidence
that this intuition is correct, at least for the case of small groups. Thus, while small groups are
worthy of study in themselves, research on small groups can inform, and be informed by, research
on larger political units.
CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS 110
There remain a number of outstanding questions related to leadership quality in small groups.
One interesting set of questions centers on the ability of self-help groups to adjust the costs and
rewards of holding office in order to obtain better leadership. In the case I study, groups were
constrained by institutional structures imposed when the groups were formed, a time when they
likely lacked the information and experience to choose optimal monitoring institutions. The the-
ory suggests that there can be substantial gains if groups are able to more easily adjust monitoring
institutions (and leader remuneration) in order to obtain better leaders. However, in practice we
often observe institutional structures that are rigid or only change slowly over time. One reason
may be that allowing flexible institutional structures increases the ability of incumbent leaders to
make changes to benefit themselves. Understanding the trade-offs surrounding the flexibility of
institutional structures is likely to be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A Proofs
Proof of Prop. 2
Two conditions must hold to prove this Proposition55. First, we need. dCPi(Ai, α,m)/dm < 0.








Second, we need limm→+∞CPi(Ai, α,m) < 0. This must hold given the result above and the
weak convexity of C(m, e) with respect to m. These two results, together with the continuity of
the CPi(Ai, α,m) function imply that as m increases eventually a monitoring level m¯i is reached
at which CPi(Ai, α, m¯i) = 0 and any further increases in m result in CPi(Ai, α,m) < 0.
Proof of Prop. 3
We have two members with Ai > Aj . Under Condition 1, this implies that CPi(Ai, α,m) <
CPj(Aj , α,m) Suppose thatm = m¯i is such thatCPi(Ai, α,m) = 0. This implies thatCPj(Aj , α,m) >
0. Given Prop. 2, it must be the case that m¯i < m¯j .
Proof of Prop. 4
This proof requires two steps. First, we need to show that dCPi/dAi is decreasing in α. To do
this, we show that d2CPi/dAidα < 0. The second step involves showing that there exists some
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Using Equation 3.3, this simplifies.
55As mentioned, the model was formalized together with W. Walker Hanlon. I use the plural form in this section to
signal that the proofs are the result of a joint effort.
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Note that de∗i /dα < 0, ∂
2I(Ai, 1 − e∗i )/∂Ai∂e∗i < 0, and ∂2P (Ai, e∗i )/∂Ai∂e∗i > 0. Thus, all terms
are negative except (∂2I(Ai, 1 − e∗i )/∂Ai∂e∗i )(de∗i /dα) > 0. Denote −de∗i /dα = ∆ > 0. We rewrite
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We are looking for an α¯ such that dCPi/dAi ≤ 0 for all values of m. To begin, set dCPi/dAi = 0
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to get a cutoff α¯(m) given a particular monitoring level m.
α¯(m)
(







∂P (Ai, e∗i )
∂Ai
)
(1− α¯(m)) = 0
Applying the implicit function theorem to this formula, we can show that dα¯(m)/dm > 0. Thus,
we need to find α¯ = limm→+∞α¯(m). As m → +∞, e∗i → 1. Thus, the α¯ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies












Proof of Prop. 5



















The denominator of this expression is negative, so the sign depends on the numerator. When
α = 1 the numerator will be ∂2I(Ai, 1 − e∗i )/∂Ai∂e∗i < 0. Therefore, since this is a continuous
function, we must have de∗i /dAi < 0 for sufficiently high α. Similarly, when α = 0, the numerator
will be ∂2P (Ai, e∗i )/∂Ai∂e
∗
i > 0 and we must have de
∗
i /dAi > 0 for sufficiently low α.
Appendix 3.B Incentive mechanism
In this section we substantiate our argument that when there is a great deal of uncertainty regard-
ing the value of the public good, an incentive scheme based on leader’s effort will be preferred to
one based on outcome. The driving force behind this theoretical result is that members are risk
averse. Compensating the leader based on the public good value forces her to accept additional
uncertainty in her utility function, reducing the utility that she derives from being the leader.
Compensation based on effort, which is more easily observed, avoids the disutility generated by
this additional uncertainty. This advantage must be weighed agains the fact that compensation
based on the value of the public good allows higher ability members to exert less effort than lower
ability member and still receive the same costs or benefits from holding office. This reduces the
opportunity cost of holding office for high ability members, relative to low ability members, in-
creasing the chances of high ability members choosing to become candidates. These issues have
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been analyzed previously (Baker, 2000, Lazear, 1986), and so we only revisit them briefly here.
Consider two incentive schemes. The first is based on effort and denotedC1(m, ei). The second
is based on the public good value and denoted C(P (Ai, ei, ηP )). The utility of a manager under
an effort-based, and output-based performance scheme, respectively, are given below.
U1 = U [I(Al, 1− el, ηI)α+ P (Al, el, ηP )(1− α)− C1(m, el)− φ]
U2 = U [I(Al, 1− el, ηI)α+ P (Al, el, ηP )(1− α)− C2(P (Al, el, ηP ))− φ]
Now consider the effect of an increase in the variance of ηP (with a commensurate increase in
the variance of ηI ). The effect on the utility through the first and second terms inside the U() func-
tion will be equivalent regardless of the incentive scheme, ceteris paribus. However, an increase in
the variance of ηP will also act throughC2(P (Al, el, ηP )) under the output-based incentive scheme,
which will cause U2 to decrease more rapidly in ηP than U1. Thus, if there is sufficient uncertainty
in the value of the public good, the returns to being a leader may be lower under an output-based
incentive scheme than under an effort-based incentive scheme. This would motivate groups to
offer effort-based incentive schemes, such as the scheme posited in this paper.
Appendix 3.C Monitoring mechanism
The monitoring technology in this theory can be motivated as follows. Suppose that there are a set
of T tasks that the group leader should fulfill. If the leader allocates an effort level e∗l ∈ [0, 1] to the
leadership position, then a fraction e∗l of these tasks are completed, while 1 − e∗l of them remain
undone. The monitoring technology m ∈ [0, T ] allows the group to look at m of these tasks and
observe whether they were completed. The leader is then punished based on the number of tasks
identified which are incomplete. If we consider a large number of tasks then this is equivalent to
a variable with a binomial distribution, where the probability of identifying an incomplete task
is 1 − e∗l and m gives the number of observations obtained. The expected number of incomplete
tasks observed is then m(1− e∗l ) with variance me∗l (1− e∗l ).
In order to simplify the model it is helpful to modify the framework above to eliminate the
uncertainty. One way to do this is to assume that the expected value is always achieved, i.e., that
the group always observesm(1−e∗l ) incomplete tasks given an effort allocation e∗l and monitoring
level m. This simplification allows us to ignore the impact of the member’s risk aversion on
their effort allocation, greatly simplifying the analysis. Note that the resulting function C(m, e∗l )
satisfies the model assumptions.
115 CHAPTER 3. THEORY OF LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN SMALL GROUPS
Appendix 3.D Simulations
The following functional forms are used in the simulation exercise.
I = Aβi (1− ei)1−β P = p ∗Aβi e1−βi C = m(1− ei)
The parameter values used for the simulations are N = 10, β = .5, φ = .1, and p = .1. The
simulations are run for values of m from 0 to 0.4 by steps of .02 and for α = {0.47, 0.49, 0.51, 0.53}.
Figure 3.D presents additional results from the simulation exercise. The data are constructed
by ranking the individuals in each group by their ability, with 10 being the highest and 1 being the
lowest ability member. It shows the ranking of the member that ultimately becomes the leader.
The main point here is that not only is leader ability falling, but that it is falling even though higher
ability members are available.
Figure 3.5: Simulated Leader Ability Rank
We also calculate results where we take average values over all equilibria, rather than just the
equilibrium that delivers the best manager, for each set of parameter values. The average leader
effort, leader ability, and public good value produced are displayed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below.
These show the same results as obtained when we focused only on the best available equilibrium.
Note that in some cases there will be only one equilibrium and that under these conditions these
results will be exactly the same as those displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
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Figure 3.6: Simulated Leader Effort and Ability Averaged Over All Equilibria
Figure 3.7: Simulated Public Good Value Averaged Over All Equilibria
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Appendix 3.E Empirics
Figure 3.8: Marginal effect of leader ability on effort as a function of the private income opportunities. Marginal
effects are estimated by holding continuous variables at mean values and categorical variables at median values.
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Figure 3.9: Marginal effect of collective marketing on assets-base. This figure shows the relation between collective
marketing and and the presence of items used to construct the welfare index. It provides information on the marginal
effect of the value of the public goods measured as the fraction of members selling in bulk on the likelihood that member
i from DC j has more of item ks since joining the farmer group. Marginal effects are calculated for an increase of 10%
in the fraction of members selling in bulk from the grand mean, holding continuous variables at their mean levels
and categorical variables at their median. The Ordered logit model include strata fixed effects and clustered standard
errors at the association’s level. The figure suggests that the primary driver of the increase in measures welfare was an
increase in livestock (cows, sheep, hens).
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DV: LEADER’S REALIZED EFFORT IN PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Monitoring (std.) 0.772∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.129) (0.235)
Private Income Opportunities 0.087 0.014
(0.132) (0.168)
Monitoring × PIO -0.079 0.058
(0.117) (0.125)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.151
(0.175)
Monitoring × Leader’s ability -0.092
(0.093)
Leader’s ability × PIO -0.128
(0.128)
Age of DC -0.108 -0.115 -0.165∗
(0.082) (0.085) (0.093)
N members (units of 50) 0.069∗ 0.062 0.031
(0.040) (0.044) (0.077)
Mean Seasonal Yield (units of 100) 0.103∗∗ 0.083 0.056
(0.050) (0.060) (0.089)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.113 -0.195 -0.706
(0.527) (0.563) (1.003)
Religious fractionalization -0.625 -0.489 -0.481
(0.632) (0.644) (0.770)
Associational-life (std.) -0.288∗∗ -0.330∗∗ -0.444∗∗
(0.125) (0.140) (0.161)
Middleman honesty 1.050 1.376 1.639
(1.248) (1.421) (1.985)
Constant 0.483∗∗∗ -0.274 -0.536 -0.385
(0.123) (1.101) (1.222) (1.906)
Strata FEs X X X X
Observations 50 50 50 42
r2 0.720 0.781 0.791 0.800
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.6: Relation Between the association’s monitoring level and the leaders’ realized effort. Results from OLS
regressions using group-level data. This table replicates Table 3.2 in the main text, while also providing the full set of
coefficients for the control variables. PIO stands for private income opportunities.
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DV: LEADER’S REALIZED EFFORT IN PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Monitoring (std.) 0.733∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.107) (0.107) (0.143)
Private Income Opportunities 0.066 -0.070
(0.104) (0.127)
Monitoring × PIO -0.087 0.094
(0.083) (0.114)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.246∗∗
(0.116)
Monitoring × Leader’s ability -0.152
(0.095)
Leader’s ability × PIO -0.122
(0.109)
Age of DC -0.137 -0.144∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.087) (0.098)
N members (units of 50) 0.051 0.045 -0.010
(0.044) (0.044) (0.053)
Mean Seasonal Yield (units of 100) 0.108∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.062
(0.052) (0.053) (0.060)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.610 -0.649 -1.586∗∗
(0.607) (0.599) (0.698)
Religious fractionalization -0.798 -0.691 -1.079
(0.764) (0.781) (0.879)
Associational-life (std.) -0.371∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.138) (0.149)
Middleman honesty 2.023 2.240 3.299∗∗
(1.369) (1.371) (1.448)
σregions 1.245 0.792 0.817 0.353
Observations 50 50 50 42
Log likelihood -51.035 -43.960 -43.062 -34.637
Standard errors clustered at the strata (region) level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.7: Relation Between the association’s monitoring level and the leaders’ realized effort. This Table comple-
ments Table 3.2 in the text, by providing results from random intercept mixed-effects regression models. PIO stands for
private income opportunities.
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DV: LEADER’S REALIZED EFFORT IN PUBLIC GOODS PRODUCTION
Measure A Measure B Measure C Measure D
Monitoring (std. 0.427∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.617∗ 1.451
(0.219) (0.235) (0.311) (0.994)
Private Income Opportunities -0.063 0.014 -0.056 -0.095
(0.171) (0.168) (0.158) (0.159)
Monitoring × PIO 0.008 0.058 0.006 -0.010
(0.156) (0.125) (0.136) (0.163)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.099 0.151 0.111 0.089
(0.171) (0.175) (0.181) (0.156)
Monitoring × Leader’s ability -0.166 -0.092 -0.119 -0.186
(0.118) (0.093) (0.124) (0.142)
Leader’s ability × PIO -0.127 -0.128 -0.144 -0.120
(0.139) (0.128) (0.127) (0.136)
Age of DC -0.203∗ -0.165∗ -0.163 -0.215∗
(0.114) (0.093) (0.099) (0.122)
N members (units of 50) 0.045 0.031 0.030 0.052
(0.073) (0.077) (0.095) (0.075)
Mean Seasonal Yield (units of 100) 0.117 0.056 0.085 0.153
(0.095) (0.089) (0.101) (0.091)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.801 -0.706 -0.776 -0.945
(1.112) (1.003) (1.002) (1.083)
Religious fractionalization -0.893 -0.481 -0.690 -1.108
(0.803) (0.770) (0.762) (0.912)
Associational-life (std.) -0.459∗ -0.444∗∗ -0.437∗∗ -0.428
(0.232) (0.161) (0.192) (0.258)
Middleman honesty 3.015 1.639 1.200 3.218
(2.561) (1.985) (2.399) (2.650)
Constant -1.339 -0.385 -0.080 -2.587
(2.292) (1.906) (2.252) (2.267)
Strata FEs X X X X
Observations 42 42 42 42
r2 0.730 0.800 0.760 0.719
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.8: Robustness Check: this table provides a robustness check for the composite monitoring variable. It com-
pares the relation between the association’s monitoring level and the leaders’ realized effort (Table 3.2 in the main
text), by juxtaposing four different measure of monitoring. Measure A is a composite index constructed using only
perceptional/attiudinal information (e.g. whether the manager is accountable); Measure B is constructed by adding
behavioral information and is our preferred measure used throughout the paper (e.g. whether external auditors are
used); Measure C is constructed by adding information on whether leaders provide receipts to members who sell in
bulk; Measure D is simply whether there is a rule specifying an effort requirement. Results from OLS regressions using
group-level data. PIO stands for private income opportunities.
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DV: SELLING IN BULK VIA THE DC IN THE PAST SEASON
Model A Model B Model C
Leader’s effort (std.) 0.716∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.198) (0.189)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.124 0.129 0.090
(0.180) (0.178) (0.196)




Age (units of 10) 0.060 0.073
(0.056) (0.058)
Seasonal Coffee Yield (units of 100) 0.045 0.041
(0.032) (0.032)
Years since Joining Group 0.111∗∗ 0.124∗∗
(0.054) (0.057)
Middleman honesty 0.393∗∗ 0.354∗
(0.198) (0.194)
Education (Std.) -0.043 -0.007
(0.072) (0.076)
Leader’s co-villager 0.387 0.455
(0.396) (0.421)
Associational-life (std.) 0.028 0.051
(0.071) (0.075)
Community leader -0.011 0.001
(0.141) (0.145)
Farming Primary Occupation 0.391
(0.264)
Village distance to District Capital 0.009
(0.007)
Village Distance to Trading Center 0.115∗
(0.063)
Village Distance to DC Crop Collection -0.091∗∗
(0.042)
N members (units of 50) 0.158∗
(0.094)
Age of DC 0.043
(0.137)
Constant 0.603 -0.405 -1.448∗
(0.382) (0.489) (0.776)
Strata FEs X X X
Observations 1456 1233 1180
Log Likelihood -877.344 -719.194 -670.097
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9: Members’ decision to sell in bulk as a function of the leader’s ability and effort. This table replicates
Table 3.3 in the main text, while also providing the full set of coefficients for the control variables. Model A includes only
the key independent variables, Model B includes, in addition, a series of individual-level controls, Model C includes
DC-level controls (C). In all models standard errors are clustered at the farmer association level.
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DV: SELLING IN BULK VIA THE DC IN THE PAST SEASON
Model A Model B Model C
Leader’s effort (std.) 0.841∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.225) (0.245)
Leader’s ability (std.) 0.110 0.126 0.134
(0.210) (0.208) (0.228)




Age (units of 10) 0.112∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.051) (0.053)
Seasonal Coffee Yield (units of 100) 0.029 0.024
(0.018) (0.018)
Years since Joining Group 0.103∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.045) (0.047)
Middleman honesty 0.348 0.340
(0.257) (0.264)
Education (Std.) -0.063 -0.032
(0.077) (0.081)
Leader’s co-villager 0.567∗∗ 0.615∗∗
(0.254) (0.271)
Associational-life (std.) 0.059 0.089
(0.083) (0.087)
Community leader 0.090 0.049
(0.167) (0.175)
Farming Primary Occupation 0.245
(0.163)
Village distance to District Capital 0.006
(0.007)
Village Distance to Trading Center 0.098∗∗∗
(0.035)
Village Distance to DC Crop Collection -0.113∗∗∗
(0.033)
N members (units of 50) 0.128
(0.108)
Age of DC 0.091
(0.200)
Constant 0.453 -0.870∗ -1.947∗∗
(0.280) (0.453) (0.850)
σregions .409 0.425 0557
σgroups 1.040 1.009 1.050
Observations 1456 1233 1180
Log Likelihood -824.826 -683.420 -638.064
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.10: This table complements Table 3.3 in the main text. Here I fit three-levels random intercept logistic regres-
sions, in which members’ decision to cooperate is modeled as a function of the leader’s ability and effort. Model A
includes only the key independent variables, Model B adds a series of individual-level controls, Model C includes also
DC-level controls (C). In all models, members are nested within farmer groups which are nested within strata.
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DV: IDENTITY OF THE ASSOCIATION’S LEADER
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Rep ability (std.) 1.128∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.207) (0.199) (0.203)
Monitoring 0.042 0.235 0.158 -0.006
(0.215) (0.150) (0.207) (0.222)
Rep ability × Monitoring -0.066 -0.050 0.139 0.121
(0.228) (0.147) (0.192) (0.199)
Private Income Opportunities (std.) 0.073 0.089 -0.018 -0.140
(0.240) (0.141) (0.147) (0.154)
Rep ability×PIO -0.218 -0.245 -0.157 -0.132
(0.265) (0.167) (0.175) (0.171)
Monitoring ×PIO 0.264 0.286∗∗∗ 0.142 0.150
(0.179) (0.088) (0.113) (0.117)
Rep ability×Monitoring ×PIO -0.349∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗ -0.246∗∗
(0.191) (0.081) (0.105) (0.103)
N members (units of 50) -0.098∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.212∗∗
(0.037) (0.076) (0.084)
Ethnic fractionalization -0.711 -1.005 -2.175∗∗
(0.533) (0.714) (0.996)
Community leader 0.163 0.209
(0.467) (0.457)
Wealth (std.) 0.380∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.139)
Associational-life (std.) -0.370∗∗ -0.401∗∗
(0.173) (0.186)
Seasonal Coffee Yield (units of 100) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017)
Good health 1.260 1.280
(0.866) (0.883)
Born in village 0.423 0.463
(0.368) (0.369)
Constant -3.642∗∗∗ -3.032∗∗∗ -4.574∗∗∗ -4.529∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.252) (1.038) (1.095)
Strata FEs X
Observations 1058 1058 903 903
Log Likelihood -163.284 -162.101 -125.116 -124.294
Standard errors clustered at the association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.11: Relation between reps’ ability and group’s monitoring level and private income opportunities. This
table replicates Table 3.4 in the main text, while also providing the full set of coefficients for the control variables. PIO
stands for private income opportunities.
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DV: CHANGE IN A MEMBER’S WELFARE SINCE JOINING THE FAMER GROUP
A: Direct B: Reduced C: IV
Fraction of members selling in bulk 0.072∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.037) (0.096)
Leader’s ability (std.) -0.020
(0.040)
Leader’s effort (std.) 0.079∗
(0.041)
Leader’s ability × Leader’s effort -0.056∗∗
(0.023)
Share of Yield sold in bulk (std.) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.028) (0.030) (0.036)
Seasonal Yield (units of 100) 0.011∗∗ 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Years since Joining Group 0.059∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Education attainment 0.013 0.017 0.014
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Associational-life (std.) 0.097∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Community leader 0.010 0.015 0.014
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Leader’s co-villager 0.116 0.163 0.171∗
(0.088) (0.100) (0.104)
Male 0.163∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.051) (0.049)
Age (units of 10) -0.106∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Good health 0.105∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.089∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.051)
Shop owner 0.159 0.205 0.228
(0.133) (0.139) (0.142)
Age of DC -0.027 -0.027 -0.064
(0.028) (0.028) (0.041)
N members (units of 50) -0.002 0.010 -0.031
(0.021) (0.021) (0.036)
Constant -0.073 -0.161 0.098
(0.190) (0.165) (0.247)
Strata FEs X X X
Observations 1448 1229 1229
r2 0.113 0.123 0.102
Log Likelihood -1908.469 -1569.030 -1583.633
Standard errors clustered at the farmer association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.12: Relation Between Value of the PG and Welfare. This table replicates Table 3.5 in the main text, while
also providing the full set of coefficients for the control variables. In model A, the standardized dependent variable is
a function of the value of the public goods measured as the fraction of members selling in bulk via the assocaition. In
model B, the dependent variable is a function of leader’s ability and effort, whereas in the model C, the key independent
variable – the value of the public good – is instrumented by the leader’s effort and ability.
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Chapter 4
Do Leader Selection Rules Impact
Accountability? Exploiting Exogenous
Variation in the Formation of Ugandan
Farmer Associations
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4.1 Introduction
Social scientists have long argued that governance institutions affect economic and political out-
comes. A sizable literature focuses on leadership selection rules, debating the possible trade-offs
between the election and appointment of office holders. The question of leadership selection is
arguably the most salient issue in judicial studies (Hanssen, 1999)1, for instance, and has also re-
ceived increased attention from scholars of corporate governance following the recent financial
crisis (Frey and Benz, 2005).
Yet, a survey of the literature on the impact of the rules for selecting officials – such as judges,
public regulators, school board members and the CEOs of traded companies – suggests that the
ongoing debate over the relative virtues of elections and appointments is far from settled. On the
one hand, there are good theoretical reasons to assume that different leadership selection methods
will have varying effects on political and economic outcomes of interest. The empirical findings,
however, are ambiguous.
One reason for the mixed results likely stems from the question of context: the appointment
of a CEO by a company’s board of directors may be only weakly comparable to the appointment
of a utility regulator by an elected state governor, for example. Yet, even within studies of the
same types of institutions, research in this field is plagued by endogeneity problems. The fact
that the adoption of governance institutions tends to be a function of other group-specific factors
makes assessment of causal impact nearly impossible (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001).
In other words, there may be unobserved characteristics that correlate both with the adoption of
certain governance institutions and the socio-political or economic outcomes of interest (Dal Bo,
Foster and Putterman, 2010). Finally, past work is mostly based on aggregated cross-national or
intra-state data. The structure of such data seriously limits our ability to gain insight into the
micro-foundational processes associated with different selection methods2.
1“It is fairly certain that no single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews over the past 50 years as the
subject of judicial selection”– the election versus the appointment of state judges” (quoted in Hanssen (1999, p. 205)).
2Causal inference is further frustrated by the fact that institutions are bundled within states and also change slowly
over time (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
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This paper contributes to the debate by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in leadership
selection rules within the context of local self-help organizations. Self-help organizations are rel-
atively small, voluntary groups that provide goods and services to members. Examples include
micro-finance groups, Chambers of Commerce, PTAs, common-pool resource groups, artisan co-
operatives and farmer associations. Such organizations are present in many facets of economic
and social life, and in countries of all income levels. Their importance has arguably increased in
recent years, particularly in developing countries, where larger political units have democratized,
decentralized and liberalized3. Thus, the ubiquity of self-help organizations and their growing
impact on social welfare (Grossman, 2011a) calls for a better understanding of the factors that
determine their effectiveness, in particular.
More specifically, this paper studies Ugandan farmer associations that were created as part
of the Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP), 2004-20094. APEP is among the
largest recent rural development projects in East Africa. This intervention targeted over 60,000
smallholder farmers from 30 districts throughout Uganda in an effort to support their transition
to commercial farming. Smallholder producers were organized into farmer groups of about 20-25
members known as producer organizations, or POs. POs operated at the village level. To exploit
economies of scale and to increase the farmers’ bargaining power, APEP subsequently organized
an average of ten neighboring POs into larger ”associations,” known as Depot Committees.
The APEP associations share virtually identical organizational structures. This is because most
aspects of group structure were specified in an extensive training manual provided to all the
project field staff that oversaw the formation of larger associations. As per the APEP manual,
each farmer association is led by an executive committee (management team), which is part of the
DC board of directors. The executive committee is comprised of a DC manager, the chairman of
the board, a secretary and a treasurer. Operationally, the DC manager is the principal leader of the
3Empirical evidence supports this claim: In Senegal 10% of sampled villages reported having at least one self-help
group in 1982; by 2002 this figure was 65%. In Burkina Faso the figures were 22% for 1982 and 91% in 2002 (Bernard
et al., 2008).
4APEP was funded by USAID and implemented by Chemonics International, an International Development con-
sulting firm based in Washington D.C.
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association (henceforth, leader)5. The leader’s most important responsibilities include negotiat-
ing input and output prices, organizing the collection of crops (including hiring and supervising
employees), and searching for buyers. Additionally, leaders help coordinate group activities and
facilitate the flow of information throughout the association. Responsibilities of the board of direc-
tors, which is comprised of two elected representatives from each of the village-level POs, include
monitoring the work of the DC executives (including the leader), representing the opinions of PO
members at the associational level, and aiding in the transmission of information.
Crucially, though, the APEP field manual failed to specify the rule that the new associations
should adopt for selecting managers. Instead, the local field facilitators were unguided in their
advocacy of either appointment or election rules. In this respect, the idiosyncratic preferences of
APEP facilitators played an influential role in the process of group formation.
In the event, APEP facilitators recommended appointment-based selection in approximately
60% of cases. Specifically, these facilitators recommended that the DC board of directors appoint
the DC manager6. A large number (78%) of DCs that received a recommendation to appoint
leaders followed the suggestion. By contrast, APEP facilitators in the remaining 40% of cases
suggested that PO members use popular, direct voting to select the DC manager7. Attesting to the
centrality of the APEP facilitators in the process of group formation, 94% of associations followed
this recommendation.
This chapter uses the facilitator recommendation as an instrumental variable with which to
test the impact of varying leadership selection rules. I consider possible impact along two di-
mensions8. First, I employ behavioral measures to examine the impact of leader selection rules
on monitoring and accountability within groups. Findings suggest that popular direct elections
yield significantly higher levels of monitoring and accountability, substantially increasing the (i)
5The DC manager is equivalent to a CEO in a traded company. In about a quarter of the sampled DCs, the DC
manager also serves as the chairman of the board.
6The term appointment here loosely lumps up slightly different ways in which DC board of directors, which is
comprised equally of representation from constituent POs, select the manager. These included, for instance, a show of
hands among the members of the board of directors, or deliberated consensus.
7In direct vote associations, all registered members from each of the village-level group can cast their vote. The
direct-vote method, however, also loosely lumps up some variations in quorum requirement and election technology.
8I discuss the validity of this instrument below, in Section 4.4
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frequency of selection processes (i.e. elections or (re-)appointments), (ii) the likelihood that an
association hires external auditors to examine its books and records; and (iii) the likelihood that
the association conducts internal audits. In addition, members in direct election associations are
significantly more likely to receive receipts when selling their crops through the association9.
Consistent with these behavioral results, I find that both ordinary members and board direc-
tors in direct-vote associations are more likely to perceive the DC leader as being monitored and
accountable. Among other things, this suggests that, contra some arguments for appointment-
based systems, members of farmer associations are sophisticated voters, capable of constructing
realistic judgments regarding a leader’s actions. Further, the leaders of direct vote associations
themselves testify to higher levels of restraint placed on the leadership of direct-election associa-
tions: directly elected leaders are more than two times more likely than appointed leaders to report
that other board directors warned them they were not doing their job well or were not exerting
enough effort.
Secondly, I examine the impact of leader selection rules on the profile of the chosen leaders.
Here, I test the hypothesis that appointments yield more competent and/or trustworthy leaders,
as compared to popularly elected leaders. The intuition here, developed more extensively in Sec-
tion 4.3, is that, compared to average group members, board directors are more informed about
candidates and the current ‘state of the world’, have longer time-horizons, and are more likely to
base their vote on the welfare of the group rather than narrow self-interest. I do not find evidence
to support this argument. Selection methods do not appear to impact the profiles of leaders with
respect to (i) ability (i.e. marketable skills) or other socio-demographic attributes, (ii) centrality of
network position, or (iii) other-regarding preferences.
After reporting these main results, I turn to examine mechanisms linking elections and ac-
countability. To do so, I conducted a set of well-known behavioral experiments with members of
the farmer associations, which I adapted for the question in hand. These experiments are impor-
9In Uganda, most coffee farmer associations are unable to pay members cash-on-delivery. Instead farmers receive a
receipt when delivering their crops to the association, which specifies the volume delivered (in kilograms). Only after
the association collects the crops from all its members, the manager can finalize a deal with potential buyers. Members
report being paid, on average, two to three weeks after they have delivered their coffee to their group.
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tant because they provide evidence of revealed preferences. First, using a simple Dictator Game
(DG), I find that elected leaders allocate almost twice as much as appointed leaders to anony-
mous association members, though they give slightly less than their appointed counterparts to
anonymous strangers. Second, using a modified third-party punishment (TPP) experiment, I find
that elected monitors are about three times more likely to sanction group members (“deciders”) who
transfer an unequal share of a joint endowment to other group members (“passive recipients”).
These findings suggest that the selection process itself changes the reciprocal expectations between
leaders and members independently from reelection considerations (Grossman, 2011b). Finally, I col-
lect and analyze social network data in order to test for the existence of a “familiarity effect,”
or, an effect whereby growing familiarity between appointed officials and appointees creates a
governance culture that is inimical to accountability. Indeed, I find evidence for such an effect,
suggesting again that appointment-based systems are undesirable in this context.
These findings are consistent with Olken (2010), who shows that villagers who cast direct votes
to select development projects experience dramatically higher satisfaction rates with the project,
as well as greater perceived benefits. This is true even though the actual projects selected did not
differ significantly across conditions. Findings presented here are also consistent with Huber and
Gordon (2004), who finds that elected judges are more responsive to the public, but do not differ
significantly from appointed judges in terms of their levels of education or experience. Similarly, I
find evidence that direct elections yielded significantly more accountable and responsive leaders,
and also find no evidence that appointed and elected leaders differ in terms of their observed
attributes. These results may help explain the fact that, since their inception, membership in direct-
vote farmer associations has increased at a much higher rate than appointed-based associations.
This paper is also related to recent experimental work on the impact of governance institutions
in the context of community driven development (CDD) projects (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov,
2010, Olken, 2010). I aim to expand this nascent literature in three ways. First, the objective of
the above studies has been to assess the relative effectiveness of methods for selecting develop-
ment projects, whereas this paper focuses instead on the impact of the method for selecting local
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leaders10. Also, whereas Olken (2010) and Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2010) have focused on
single-tier, village-level councils, this study considers membership-based, multi-tier organizations
that span several neighboring villages. As I discuss in Section 4.3, the question of leadership selec-
tion is even more salient in multi-tier organizations than in single-tier organizations. Finally, this
is the first leadership selection study to include behavioral experiments and social network anal-
ysis, which enables us to better identify and understand the causal mechanisms plausibly linking
governance institutions to the behavior of leaders and constituents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides additional information on the specific
context under consideration, including the organizational structure of APEP farmer associations.
Section 4.3 presents a theoretical framework from which I derive testable hypotheses. Section
4.4 discusses the study’s identification strategy in depth, and Section 4.5 provides information on
the sampling scheme and data. Main results are reported in Section 4.6, and Section 4.7 explores
possible causal mechanisms undergirding these findings. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 The Research Site: APEP
As mentioned above, the farmer associations considered in this paper were created as part of the
Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Project (APEP). The project was funded by USAID and
implemented by Chemonics International. The project, which began in 2004, covered 30 districts
throughout Uganda and involved organizing 60,000 smallholder farmers into over 2,500 village-
level producer organizations (POs). The goal of the project was to to support smallholder transi-
tion into commercial farming, and thereby promote economic development in Uganda.
10Olken (2010) and Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2010) use randomization to assign villages with different meth-
ods for selecting development projects. In addition, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2010) vary the size of the selec-
torate: council members are either elected by a small subset of the village or by the village in large.
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APEP Groups’ Governance Structure
Two years into APEP, it became clear that farmer groups at the village level lacked the organi-
zational capacity and bargaining power to become viable economic entities. In response, APEP
decided to encourage neighboring POs to form larger associations. The resulting farmers’ associa-
tions (or DCs) came to serve, on average, 200 farmers from ten neighboring villages. The DCs were
designed specifically to exploit economies of scale, to reduce transaction costs for trading partners,
and to increase farmers’ bargaining power by increasing the volume of their transactions.
The organization of village-level groups into parish-level associations, however, did not come
without drawbacks11. Villages are often information-rich environments. This allows village-level
self-help groups to use the flow of information between members not only to coordinate activities,
but also to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard problems. By contrast, the creation of
associations (multi-tier organizations) likely reduces the efficiency of information flows, thereby
hindering coordination and exacerbating agency problems. Regarding adverse selection, the cre-
ation of associations may reduce stakeholders’ information concerning candidate qualifications12.
As for moral hazard, associations increase the information asymmetry between leaders and the
more widely dispersed members, while also plausibly reducing informal, norm-based constraints
on leaders. The formation of associations also tends to introduce greater heterogeneity among
members, thereby reducing their incentives and capacity for collective action.
These agency problems are reminiscent of the challenges that dispersed shareholders face in
their relation with the management of traded companies13 In fact, in their effort to overcome these
challenges, APEP designed the structure of the farmer associations with a corporate governance
template in mind14. Influenced by project field-facilitators who presided over the process of group
11In Uganda, districts are the central local administrative unit. Districts consist of 2-4 counties, each county has 3-6
sub-counties, each sub-county consists of 3-6 parishes, and each parish has about 5-15 villages. Between 200 and 800
households live in each village. Many services such as dispensaries, markets and trading centers, are organized on the
basis of parish borders. DCs commonly serve one or two parishes, at most.
12Reducing the quality of the signal on candidates’ quality should reduce the likelihood that high-ability members
run for office, given positive candidacy costs and assuming that members are risk-averse.
13See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a comprehensive review of the literature that views corporate governance as a
set of tools designed to mitigate against agency problems.
14This was confirmed in a series of interviews with APEP management and Chemonics consultants.
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formation, all APEP associations share the following two-tier structure. At the village-level, pro-
ducer organization (PO) members elect local leaders who are responsible for implementing de-
cisions taken by the association. At the association level, registered PO members also elect two
representatives to a board of directors, which functions as the association’s main governance body.
Thus, even in associations that I refer to as appointment-based associations, democratic participa-
tion is used to elect representatives to the board of directors. A graphical representation of the
association governance structure is provided in Supplementary Appendix A, Fig. A.2.
Board directors have responsibilities as members of the board that include more than merely
representing their POs at the association level. Apart from participating in plenary sessions, direc-
tors commonly serve on at least one of the association’s committees. These include, among others,
the influential executive committee as well as loans, auditing, marketing and procurement com-
mittees. In all APEP associations, the board is entrusted with the power to appoint directors to
their respective committees15. In other words, though directors are elected by their respective POs
to serve on the board as their representatives, association members do not have a say in the alloca-
tion of responsibilities at the board-level16. This is because the work of committees is bureaucratic
in nature: committee members are expected to serve the entire association, not the narrower in-
terests of their respective POs. Given the explicitly bureaucratic nature of these roles, there is no
argument to have members directly elect board directors to their respective roles on the board.
What, then, is the case for allowing members to directly elect a board director to serve as the
DC manager (leader)? First, DC leaders are responsible for the timely collection and quality of
crops. They, therefore, interact frequently and directly with association members. The quality of
this interaction crucially depends on the extent to which members trust their leader17. The interac-
tion may be contentious, as leaders oversee the sanctioning of members whose actions undermine
15The most prestigious positions, such as chairman of the board, tend to be contested and are therefore decided
through some voting procedure, usually a show of hands. Allocation to other positions tends to be based on seniority
and voluntarism, and depends on the interests, expertise and time constraints of representatives.
16Put plainly, association members do not vote on which director will serve on what committee and at what role.
17Leaders can breach trust in several ways: when members deliver their crops to sell in bulk, managers can muddle
with the weighting scales or exploit members’ illiteracy when documenting the bulked volume. Some leaders have been
caught reporting prices lower than that which was actually secured from buyers, pocketing the difference. Leaders can
collude with buyers, selling the group’s crop below market prices in exchange for a hefty commission, etc.
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the association’s marketing activities18. Third, because DC leaders travel frequently, representing
the association in other contexts (e.g. larger towns and cities, or in higher level administrative
settings), members are incentivized to become close to their leader. This is because leaders are
believed to posses information that members value19. Finally, the effort that leaders put into their
work can significantly impact the effectiveness of the association and thereby members’ welfare
(Grossman, 2011a). Members thus not only have a clear personal stake in the identity of the DC
leader, but also tend to view him (always him) as their representative20.
As mentioned earlier, we observe two selection methods for the DC managers across organiza-
tions. In over half of the associations, all registered members vote directly for their preferred can-
didate for the senior leadership position. In the remaining associations, board directors appoint
the leader. Which method is more appropriate for selecting group leaders? What are the tradeoffs
between direct vote and appointment in the context of self-help organizations? The importance of
these questions transcends the boundaries of Ugandan farmer associations. Across the develop-
ing world it is becoming increasingly common to witness the amalgamation of several small-size
groups into a single association. This process is especially prevalent in micro-insurance, micro-
lending and farmer groups, where large gains can be made from increased bargaining power,
reduction in transaction costs for trading partners, and from other scale considerations.
Before describing the study’s strategy for identifying the impact of the different selection meth-
ods, the following section reviews the debate concerning elections and appointments in compara-
ble contexts. From this discussion I derive a set of hypotheses, which I then test in Section 4.6.
18The bylaws commonly require members to apply “best agriculture practices.” Managers have the power to reject
crops due to low quality. In addition, members are required to refrain from side selling to middlemen. Violation may
trigger some form of social sanctioning (e.g. public shaming), and in extreme situations, monetary fines.
19This information may or may not be related to the farmer association’s core activities.
20Dozens of interviews with association members suggested that they perceive DC leaders to impact their livelihood
at least as much, if not more than, local government officials.
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4.3 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical and empirical work on the implication of differences in governance institutions
across states (Besley and Case, 2003) and countries (Persson and Tabellini, 2003) is sizable and
growing21. Within this broad topic, a political economy literature evolved around the pros and
cons of methods for selecting public officials, where a plurality of selection methods co-exist in
different jurisdictions. Examples include heads of regulatory agencies (Besley and Coate, 2003),
school boards members (Hess, 2008), and judges (Hanssen, 1999), who are appointed by politicians
in some jurisdictions, but are directly elected by the public in others22.
As noted above, the literature on corporate governance is also relevant to this study. Scan-
dals over manager compensation, fraudulent bookkeeping (e.g. the Enron scandal), and, more
recently, the financial crisis of 2008, have prompted scholars to revisit basic tenants of corporate
governance. This includes challenging the common practice of appointment of CEOs by a board of
directors, rather then by shareholders (Frey and Benz, 2005). In what follows, I synthesize across
these two literatures and formalize hypotheses.
Information, Independence and Accountability
Much of the debate between appointment and election-based systems focuses on the tradeoff be-
tween independence and information, on the one hand, and accountability and responsiveness,
on the other. Most generally, appointment is preferred when concerns over independence and
information asymmetries are strongest.
First, appointments arguably play an important role in facilitating the independence of offi-
cials, where independence is desired to mitigate time-inconsistency problems. The case for ap-
pointments is thus stronger when there is reason to believe that elected officials will fail to resist
popular pressure to produce short-term results at the expense of longer-term gains (Alesina and
21This literature is especially interested in the effect of governance institutions on the size of government and on
policies that have distributional consequences. For a recent review see Funk and Gathmann (2009).
22Unlike legislators, whose selection through popular direct-vote is a defining feature of modern democracies, the
method for selecting other public officials is still a matter for debate.
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Tabellini, 2008). This factor constitutes the basic justification for central bank independence (Ro-
goff, 1985). Similarly, an oft-cited defense of CEO appointment by board directors is that board
directors are thought to have longer time-horizons than share-holders.
Second, appointments may also be preferred when the issue at hand is not salient, yet orga-
nized stakeholders have interests that do not coincide with the preference of the majority. In such
cases, a dormant electorate may allow special interest groups to mobilize their members to in-
fluence the identity of public officials in ways that undermine the interest of the general public.
This argument underlies the recent shift towards mayoral control of urban boards of education,
for instance, which has replaced the election-based system put into effect during the Progressive
Era (Hess, 2008)23. Similarly, the fear that large institutional investors will capture traded com-
panies against the interest of small, dispersed or dormant shareholders is yet another justification
for endowing board directors with the powers to appoint CEOs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Third, the relative benefits of appointment are often linked to information asymmetries, which
undermine constituents’ ability to meaningfully differentiate candidates, and to hold officials to
account. Specifically, according to Maskin and Tirole (2004), constituents’ ability to make informed
choices and hold officials to an account diminishes as: (i) the technicality and/or unfamiliarity24
of an issue increases, (ii) the cost of decision-relevant information increases, or (iii) the difficulty
in obtaining feedback about the quality of decisions increases25. In such cases, the public — in
the form of group members, shareholders, or citizen-voters — is poorly positioned to evaluate
the performance of the official/CEO. Hence, one argument suggests that in order to minimize
adverse selection problems and to reduce officials’ incentive to pander in information-low envi-
ronments (Gordon and Huber, 2002), it is best to keep the official accountable to a small number
of knowledgeable appointees rather than to the public at large.
Indeed, in my interviews with APEP field-facilitators in Uganda, those who had encouraged
the newly founded farmer associations to adopt an appointment rule justified their recommen-
23Hess (2008) finds that mayoral takeovers (i.e. appointment) improves student achievement and fiscal efficiency
compared to directly-elected boards of education. His findings, however, are strongly contested.
24Familiarity here refers to how much exposure the electorate has with this sort of issue.
25The ability to map between an official’s actions and outcomes is possible but only after a relatively long period.
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dation by pointing to considerations similar to those described above. First, it was argued that
board directors, who are significantly more educated and have larger plots of land than average
members, are also more likely to have longer time horizons and see the “larger picture” when
selecting a DC leader. In other words, directors are thought to be more likely to select candidates
who can produce the highest possible value of public goods, rather than candidates who can pro-
vide private goods26. Secondly, APEP-facilitators pointed to the concern that if associations adopt
a popular direct vote, a low turnout in the general assembly, the venue in which popular elections
are commonly held, will enable nearby villages to elect “their” candidate, who may not be the
most competent candidate. An appointment method, it was claimed, mitigates this concern, since
each village is equally represented on the board of directors.
Turning to the information asymmetry argument, APEP facilitators who had encouraged an
appointment rule also argued that, compared to the average member, board directors have more
information about the relative competence and honesty of candidates due to their more prominent
social and economic positions27. Put differently, ordinary members lack the information needed
to make sound judgments regarding the relative qualities of various candidates, or so some of the
APEP facilitators believed.
Additionally, APEP facilitators who had encouraged appointment often claimed that board
directors are able to evaluate the contribution of incumbents to the value of the public good more
accurately. It is difficult, in general, to track between a leader’s actions and group-level outcomes
in farmer associations because the crop price secured by a DC leader is typically affected by several
exogenous factors, such as exchange rate and international coffee prices28. Compared to board
directors, ordinary members are believed to be less informed about external “states of the world”,
which makes them more likely to vote out over-performers and retain under-performers29. This,
26Private goods refers here mostly to benefits that can be obtained through ‘closeness’ to a candidate, which may or
may not be related to coffee production.
27Farmer associations serve, on average, ten villages; most farmers do not often travel outside their village. By
contrast, prominent villagers are more likely to travel, engage with each other through commercial, political and social
networks, and participate in activities at the parish and sub-county levels.
28Other factors include variability in level of competition between buyers in the region and the supply of coffee in
Uganda, which is a function of rainfall conditions as well as pest outbreaks.
29Members are more likely to overestimate a leader’s role in securing higher prices from trading partners. This
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in turn, should reduce the quality of elected leaders. Finally, increasing reelection uncertainty of
high-performers should also aggravate adverse selection in cases where high-ability members are
risk-averse30.
To summarize, if (i) board directors have longer time horizons, (ii) the election of DC leader is
not politically salient, or (iii) members are less informed about candidate qualities and the “states
of the world”, then appointment-based associations should be better positioned than popular
direct-vote associations to select better leaders, or leaders with “higher profiles” defined as hav-
ing attributes that are conducive for producing higher valued public goods. Applying the above
framework to APEP’s Ugandan farmer associations, a testable hypothesis emerges:
Hypothesis 7 Appointment-based associations are likely to select more able and/or honest leaders than
associations that use popular direct-elections.
It is possible, however, that accountability and responsiveness considerations may counterbal-
ance the information and independence considerations. The key point is that appointment based
systems can more easily be manipulated for personal gains while raising concerns about a loss of
transparency31. For example, Shaub et al. (2005) demonstrate that growing familiarity between
appointed officials and their appointees is conducive to a governance culture that takes shortcuts,
cooks the books, or adopts other practices that do not effectively serve the interests of stakehold-
ers. Appointing officials, they argue, makes it easier for them to control data, limit accountability,
and reduce opportunities for stakeholder input. On a similar note, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
provide evidence that, in traded companies, although shareholders have the right to elect board
directors, those representatives need not necessarily represent shareholders’ interests and are in
is because trading partners will increase the price offered to farmer association – compared to a world in which the
association does not exist – because the association reduces significantly their transaction costs. Interviews with leading
coffee buying companies suggest that buying companies will return 25-40% of the transaction costs savings to the
groups, to ensure their durability. This may lead members to require too little effort from leaders or set a reelection
threshold too low. This too can encourage low ability members to enter the candidacy pool (Grossman, 2011a).
30For a more formal discussion of these issues, see Grossman (2011a).
31For example, a long-standing concern with regulated industries is that the regulators tend, over time, to become
dominated by stakeholders that they are supposed to regulate. Similarly, elected judges may be beholden by criminal
groups that control the electoral process.
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fact likely to collude with, or be under the control of, the company’s management32. Finally, in
a recent review, Frey and Benz (2005) analyze the failure of board directors to check the powers
of managers of traded companies. In response to what they see as a breakdown of accountability,
they call for a shift towards direct democracy in corporate governance: allowing shareholders to
vote directly on issues that were traditionally under the purview of board members. These include
the selection of external auditors as well as the identity of senior management.
Empirical findings concerning outcomes of different selection methods for public officials sug-
gest that elections tend to be consistent with higher levels of accountability and responsiveness.
For example, in the literature on appointed versus elected regulators, consumer-prices data sug-
gest that elected regulators produce more pro-consumer policies than appointed regulators, in
areas as diverse as public utilities (Besley and Coate, 2003), telecommunications (Smart, 1994) and
life-insurance companies (Fields, Klein and Sfiridis, 1997). Similar findings are reported in the
literature on judicial selection. Huber and Gordon (2004), for example, find that elected judges
become significantly more punitive the closer they are to standing for reelection. The authors in-
terpret this as a sign that election increases responsiveness to the public, independent of the judges’
personal and ideological attributes33. Hence theory and empirical evidence suggest that direct
elections increase the responsiveness of representatives, broadly construed, and can mitigate the
danger that managers and board directors collude against the larger group’s interests.
Hypothesis 8 Leaders of associations that use popular, direct elections are more likely to be accountable
and responsive than their counterparts in appointment-based associations.
With these hypotheses in mind, it is worth noting that although the literature discussed in
this section contributes greatly to our understanding of the stakes of leadership selection rules, it
is also plagued by endogeneity concerns. As a result, findings remain contested‘34. The goal of
32Besley and Coate (2003) make a similar argument in the case of regulators. The fact that the public elects the
appointee does not guarantee that the public’s interest will be secured due to bundling effects.
33In a review of the literature on elected versus appointed judges, Champagne (2003, p. 416) concludes that appointed
judges ”do not have substantially different background characteristics than do elected judges”. Huber and Gordon
(2004) argue, therefore, that the selection institutions effect behavior independently of their effect on the profile of the
selected judges.
34For example, against the backdrop of recent work (e.g., Besley and Coate (2003)) that finds that elected regulators
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this paper is to contribute to the debate by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in leadership
selection rules among otherwise comparable institutions in order to identify their causal effect.
The next section considers this empirical strategy in detail.
4.4 Plausible Exogenous Variation in Leader Selection Rules
As mentioned above, APEP’s original mission was to organize dispersed smallholder farmers
into producer organizations (POs), at the village-level. About two years into the program APEP
decided that POs, which served approximately 20-25 members, lacked the capacity, bargaining
power, capital and volume to become viable economic players. In response, APEP’s management
refocused the project: In addition to creating new farmer groups, they decided to encourage ex-
isting groups to join neighboring POs, thereby forming associations at the parish-level35. APEP
hired and trained a set of local field-facilitators to visit the POs and oversee the establishment of
larger-level associations (DCs).
This paper’s identification strategy rests upon the fact that (i) APEP field-facilitators played a
foundational role in establishing these groups, and (ii) the idiosyncratic preferences of individual
field-facilitators are plausibly orthogonal to other characteristics of the groups they were hired to
work with. To evaluate this strategy, it is necessary to reconsider processes of group formation
and field-facilitator involvement.
The instrument
In their effort to establish larger associations, field-facilitators first secured the agreement of group
members. They then worked closely with representatives from each PO on the association’s de-
sign. Importantly, this process was guided by a 22-page long field manual, which outlined the
are more responsive to the public interests, Cavazos (2003) finds that consumer-price differences disappears after con-
trolling for population density and percent of rural population. Cavazos argues that states that use direct elections are
‘different’ than those using appointments, pointing to the fact that the majority of states that elect public commissioners
are low-population density states with a high proportion of rural residents.
35Local districts in Uganda are termed parishes.
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steps field-facilitators should take to establish larger associations36. Through a series of work-
shops spread across three weekends, facilitators guided the PO representatives through discussion
of issues, such as the DC organizational structure and the allocation of responsibilities between
office holders, and between the POs and the DC. Facilitators made recommendations on a wide
set of issues such as operating budgets, membership dues, annual registration fees, marketing
commissions and other rules and bylaws, commonly enshrined in DC constitutions. These recom-
mendations were derived from the manual, and were thus uniform across groups. The centrality
and uniformity of the this process is attested to by the fact that all APEP associations — regardless
of facilitator identity — ended up with similar organizational structures and division of power
between the POs and the DC.
Yet, although it was elaborate, the manual did not specify every aspect of group formation.
For this reason, although all associations share a basic organizational structure, DC constitutions
differ in such aspects as the number of times the general assembly convenes and quorum require-
ments for passing resolutions and bylaws. Crucially, the manual was also silent on the question
of leadership selection rules.
As a result, we observe that five of the eight facilitators operating in the study area encouraged
associations to enact an appointment-based system, whereby the board of directors (where all POs
are equally represented) would appoint a DC manager (leader), while the three other facilitators
suggested that members directly elect their leader. In interviews, facilitators were clear on the fact
that their recommendations were based on their personal belief concerning the most appropriate se-
lection method. With this in mind, I propose to use facilitator recommendation as an instrumental
variable (IV) for leadership selection rule. The counterfactual that forms the basis of the identifica-
tion strategy is the outcome of interest (e.g. leader accountability), had APEP allocated to district
S, a field-facilitator with different idiosyncratic priors with respect to the relative effectiveness of
a given leader selection rule.
36A copy of the training kit/manual can be shared upon request.
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Assessing the validity of the instrument
To formalize the identification strategy, let Z ∈ {0, 1} be a binary variable indicating a facilita-
tor’s recommendation, where Zj0 indicates that the facilitator encouraged the jth DC to have the
board directors appoint the DC manager, and Zj1 indicates that the trainer encouraged popular
direct vote. Let d ∈ {0, 1} indicate the actual selection rule a DC adopted, where dj0 indicates the
adoption of an appointment method and dj1 indicates popular direct vote. Out of 50 farmer associ-
ations that were randomly sampled, 32 (64%) were encouraged to use appointments (Zj0), and 18
DCs (36%) were encouraged to use direct elections (Zj1). Take-up rates were high: 25 associations
(78%) of the 32 that were advised to use representatives’ vote followed (dj0) this recommenda-
tions, and only 7 adopted instead a direct-vote rule (dj1). Similarly, 17 of the 18 associations (94%)
that were advised to use direct vote complied, and only a single DC did not. These high take-up
rates further attest to the centrality of facilitator recommendations in the process of rule selection.
Following the literature on encouragement research design (Angrist and Krueger, 2001), I
adopt APEP facilitator recommendations as an instrumental variable (IV). This allows me to iden-
tify an unbiased local average treatment effect (LATE) for ”compliers”: farmer associations that
used direct vote, but would have used appointments had they been assigned a field-facilitator
with different priors. This design requires satisfying several conditions (Angrist and Pischke,
2009, Ch. 4). First, the association between the instrument and the independent variable must
be strong. Second, the instrument needs to be independent of potential outcomes. Third, the
instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction37.
As for the association between Z and d, first-stage regression of leader selection rule on fa-
cilitator’s recommendation produces a high and significant coefficient (p-value = 0.00). As for
independence from potential outcomes, there are several good reasons to believe that the instru-
ment (facilitator’s recommendation) satisfies this condition. First, the allocation of facilitators to
specific districts was “as good as random”, since it was based on criteria that were unrelated to spe-
37There are no reasons to suspect that monotonocity and homogenous partial effects (Dunning, 2008b) – the fourth
and fifth conditions – do not hold in our case.
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cific group attributes38. Second, as mentioned above, interviews with field-facilitators claim to have
based their recommendation on their prior beliefs regarding the appropriate selection method, not
about the group they were interacting with.
What we require here are reasons to believe that facilitators did not tailor their recommenda-
tions to specific groups based on group attributes. Aside from their self-reports, how can we prove
this is the case? First, had facilitators conditioned their advice on group characteristics, we should
witness variability in their recommendations. The data shows, however, that field-facilitators
made the same recommendation to all the DCs they helped create, including those that are out-of-
sample (Appendix, Table 4.14). Second, farmer associations that were encouraged to use elections
have similar pre-treatment covariates to associations encouraged to use appointments (Appendix,
Table 4.13)39. The assignment to treatment Zj , therefore, did not depend on factors such as the
size of membership body or age of the association. Finally, it is worth noting that general member
turnout to the DC general assembly in associations recommended to use direct vote is only slightly
higher than turnout in associations that were recommended to use appointments (60% compared
to 55%). This demonstrates that recommendations to use direct-vote (Zj1) were not targeted only
to those associations that have an engaged membership body, for instance.
There are still other concerns, however. For an unbiased IV estimation, the instrument Zj must
affect the outcomes of interest only via its impact on the instrumented variable, i.e., the choice of
selection rule (dj). There are two concerns with respect to possible violations of the exclusion
restriction. First, it is possible that some facilitators are more competent than others and that these
differences are not orthogonal to Zj40. Second, facilitators may have taken additional actions that
38The first criterion guiding the allocation of facilitators to districts was local language proficiency. Since Uganda
has almost 40 vernacular languages, and since English, the Ugandan official language, is not widely spoken in rural
areas, the ability to communicate in a vernacular was a major concern for the APEP staff. The second criterion was the
facilitator home district. APEP preferred to dispatch facilitators to areas other than their home districts. The rational
was to reduce the likelihood that facilitators will engage in income generating activities outside the project.
39Unfortunately, APEP did not collect baseline data on the farmers, hence the small number of pre-treatment covari-
ates at the association level. Given the large turnover in membership since the groups had formed, I was unable to use
the sample of current members to assess balance.
40The key point is not whether facilitators differ in competence, but whether this difference is correlated with treat-
ment assignment. To fix ideas, imagine how a controlled randomized trial would have unfolded. In an ITT design,
groups would go through a similar facilitation process apart from the encouragement to adopt a certain randomly cho-
sen leader selection rule. Even if assignment of groups to treatment is random, we cannot rule out the possibility that,
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affected the outcomes of interest to this study, and these actions may not have been orthogonal to
Zj . For example, it is quite possible that facilitators who recommended the use of elections were
more sensitive to accountability concerns, stressing governance issues more forcefully during the
facilitation process.
The small number of facilitators (eight) as well as the inability to decouple facilitators’ at-
tributes from their recommendation or from district (fixed) effects are limitations of this iden-
tification strategy. Define γ as the direct effect of facilitator attributes on the study’s outcome.
Random assignment would have ensured that in expectation the impact of facilitation competence
and sensitivity to governance issues can be ignored (E[γ = 0]), but not necessarily in a particular
sample. This limitation is present even if we are willing to accept that the assignment of facilitators
to districts is as good as random.
To address possible violations of the exclusion restriction, I enlist two approaches. First, to
corroborate the study’s findings I use results from the behavioral experiments I conducted as
a measurement tool. In other words, while it is a plausible concern that facilitators influenced
other aspects of group formation alongside leadership selection rule, it is less plausible that this
influence should affect the experimental results other than through the institutions they helped
put in place at the association’s inception. Second, I re-estimate the IV regression using Conley,
Hansen and Rossi (2010) sensitivity analysis. As I explain more formally in Appendix 4.C, this
method allows me to conduct inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction assumption (i.e.
assuming γ > 0).
Several features of APEP minimize, but do not eliminate, the extent to which violations of
the exclusion restriction are of real concern. Primarily, the raison d’eˆtre of the project was group
formation. Once a farmer group was formed, facilitators moved on to the next village to form
another group. The large area of coverage as well as the large number of groups and associations
under the purview of each facilitator necessarily limited the interaction between facilitators and
groups once group formation was complete. This feature of APEP seriously constrained the ability
in practice, facilitators had different ’facilitation’ abilities (see Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu (2006)).
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of facilitators to influence outcomes after the initial setup of DCs. Also APEP maintained a very
strict “no-handout“ policy, discouraging field staff from going beyond their role as facilitators.
This further reduced facilitators’ ability to exert direct influence on associations outside of their
influence during the brief facilitation period. A more formal treatment of the paper’s identification
strategy can be found in Appendix 4.A. In sum, the instrument of facilitator recommendation
satisfies requirements for IV regression necessary to justify the analysis presented here.
4.5 Sampling and Data Sources
This section briefly describes the data used in this paper and how it was collected. To reduce crop-
related variability, I first limited the study’s target population to associations marketing coffee, the
most common cash crop sold by the APEP groups. I then sampled 50 associations from 5 district-
areas (strata) using a stratified, random, multistage cluster design41. Quantitative data for the
empirical analysis was collected between July and September 2009 by a team of local interviewers.
Within each association, several different types of data were collected. At the association level,
data was collected using a questionnaire completed in an interview with members of the DC ex-
ecutive committee. Data on the DCs’ economic activities were also collected from association
books and records. For each association, I sampled six producer organizations (POs), for a total
of 28742. I also conducted interviews with the leaders of sampled producer organizations, from
which I derive more group-level data. Additionally, I collected individual-level data: From each
sampled PO, I further sampled approximately six members for a total of 36 members per associ-
ation43. Sampled members were surveyed in person by trained interviewers in the respondents’
local language for a total of 1,781 surveys. I refer to this data source as the “members’ survey”.
The set of PO representatives to the board of directors, including members of the executive
41Additional information on the sampling scheme, including a map locating DCs in the five strata, can be found in
Supplementary Appendix A.
42In a few cases, when a farmer association had fewer than seven POs, I selected all of its village-level groups.
43The number of sampled members from each of the six sampled village-level groups was proportional to the size of
the PO. This assured that the sample is self-weighted.
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committee, form ‘the complete network of DC representatives’. This network is also the com-
plete pool of potential candidates for the DC manager’s position. A significant effort was made to
survey all members of the network of DC representatives. In each sampled farmer association I
surveyed (i) the four DC executives, (ii) the chairmen of all village-level POs, whether or not their
group was sampled, and (iii) one or two representatives from each village-level PO, irrespective of
whether their PO was sampled. Thus, I have individual-level data on the complete set of potential
candidates for the senior management position, for a total of 1,316 interviews. These “representa-
tives’ surveys” only partially overlap with the members’ surveys, as they were tailored to capture
the roles and responsibilities of representatives within an association’s organizational structure.
In addition, each of the representatives completed a social network module based on a roster
of the names of all DC representatives. This social network data allows me to analyze both the
structure of the DC leadership network (e.g., its density), as well as the position of each member
within the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The survey team visited each association up to
four times to reduce attrition, which was brought down to less than ten percent.
4.6 Results
In this section I report the study’s main findings. The first set of results correspond to Hypothesis
8, namely whether elected leaders are more accountable and responsive than appointed leaders.
Accountability refers here to the subjection of leaders to rewards and sanctions based on their
behavior in office. Responsiveness refers to an incumbent’s modification (or maintenance) of her
behavior according to signals of group members’ preferences (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin,
1999). Using a set of behavioral measures, I demonstrate that direct-elections result in leaders
who are more accountable and responsive to association members than appointed leaders.
To corroborate this finding, I report a second set of results concerning perceptions of leader
accountability both by members and by board directors. These perceptions are consistent with the
finding that elected managers are more accountable and responsive than appointed managers.
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The third set of results are tests of Hypothesis 7, which states that appointed leaders will have
‘higher profiles’ than elected leaders. Higher profile refers here to attributes that likely increase
the ability of the manager to perform successfully her roles and responsibilities, thus increasing
their likelihood of providing more highly valued public goods. I find no evidence to support
Hypothesis 7 across any of the three dimensions of a leader’s profile: ability, network centrality
and other-regarding preferences.
Monitoring, Accountability and Responsiveness
I begin by testing whether DC leader accountability is a function of leader selection rules. Both the
treatment variable (selection rule) and the variables used to measure monitoring, accountability
and responsiveness are discrete. There are two common parametric approaches for estimating
causal effects in such cases. One approach uses Linear Instrumental Variable estimation strategy
that disregards the binary structure of the outcome and treatment variables (Altonji, Elder and
Taber, 2005, Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The second computes maximum-likelihood estimates of a
bivariate probit (BP) model, which assumes that the outcome and treatment are each determined
by latent linear models with jointly normal error terms (Maddala, 1983, Neal, 1997).
For each of the dependent variables tested in this section I estimate both BP and linear IV mod-
els. The BP models allow me to report Average Treatment Effects (ATE) and Average Treatment
Effects on the Treated (ATT), whereas the linear IV models allow me to report Local Average Treat-
ment Effects (LATE). Following Chiburis, Das and Lokshin (2010) recommendation, I bootstrap
standard errors in all parametric regression models. I adopt the most conservative approach, ad-
justing bootstrapped standard errors to account for clustering at the field-facilitator level. A more
technical exposition of the linear IV and BP estimators can be found in Appendix 4.A.
Given the discrete nature of the dependent variables, the increase in probability attributed to
a one-unit increase in a given predictor is dependent both on the values of the other predictors
and the starting value of the given predictors. For this reason the interpretation of regression
coefficients is not straightforward. To help appreciate the substantive significance of the models’
149 CHAPTER 4. LEADER SELECTION RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
coefficients, I report and graph predicted probabilities in the main text and provide regression
tables in Appendix 4.B44.
Monitoring and Accountability
I use two measures of accountability. The first measure includes two parts, namely the extent to
which an association employs external and/or internal auditors. This data is derived from inter-
views with the complete set of board directors. External auditors are licensed accountants who are
non-members hired by the association specifically to conduct an audit of the group’s books. Inter-
nal auditing refers to requests by board directors to personally view the association’s books and
records. I find that the predicted probability that board directors report hiring external auditors
in appointment-based associations is 0.22 (0.14− 0.32). This figure more than doubles in the case
of direct vote associations (0.53, ranging from 0.34 − 0.71 at the 95% confidence interval). This
difference is substantial and significant (p-value= 0.00). Regarding internal audits, I find that the
predicted probability that a board director has ever asked to review the associations’ books is al-
most 50% higher in direct vote associations (0.29, with 0.23− 0.36 at the 95% confidence interval),
than in associations in which the DC manager is appointed (0.20, with 0.15−0.26). This difference
is both substantial and significant at conventional levels (p-value= 0.09)45.
The second measure of accountability is the frequency of selection procedure. Interviews I
conducted prior to the enumeration activity indicated that a non-negligible number of associations
fail to hold a leader selection process — whether appointments or elections — in the frequency
stipulated in their constitution. In other words, though leaders are selected for fixed terms, not
all associations hold selection processes for the senior leadership position at the end of the fixed
term. Importantly, this failure can be a source of contention, especially among aspiring board
directors. Using data collected at the DC-level, I find that associations that use direct vote have
held selection processes for the DC manager position more frequently than appointment-based
44Clustering standard errors at the field-facilitator level usually yields larger standard errors than clustering at the
farmer association level. Throughout the section, predicted probabilities are calculated by using the largest standard
errors, holding continuous variables at mean values and categorical variables at their median values.
45The full-set of regression results can be found in the Appendix, Table 4.7.
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associations, controlling for pre-treatment covariates such as the association’s age and original
number of POs (p-value= 0.00). This result provides additional support to the finding that popular
direct elections result in more accountable leaders.
Remarkably, the managers themselves attest that direct-vote associations are better at holding
the DC leaders to account. Directly elected leaders are more than two times more likely than ap-
pointed leaders to report being warned by other board directors for not doing their job well or for
not putting enough effort (p-value= 0.01)46. This finding, reported in Table 4.2 in Appendix 4.B,
further increases our confidence in the reliability of the above accountability measures.
Responsiveness
I now turn to test whether higher levels of leader accountability are associated with greater re-
sponsiveness to ordinary members. I use two measures of leader responsiveness. The first mea-
sure is a binary indicator of whether the DC manager writes receipts to members who sell their
crops through the group. Since members receive payments only about three weeks after they
deliver their crops to the farmer association, written receipts serve as a guarantee against possi-
ble exploitation. Since written receipts constrain managers’ ability to take advantage of ordinary
members, the likelihood that members obtain receipts when selling in bulk can be interpreted as
the extent to which managers acquiesce to a popular demand.
Using the sample of ordinary members, the predicted probability that a member in a direct-
vote association will report obtaining receipts from her manager when selling in bulk is 0.94
(0.92 − 0.95). This figure drops to 0.65 in the appointment-based associations (0.44 − 0.82 at 95%
confidence intervals). This difference is significant (p-value= 0.00) and substantial. For robustness,
I corroborate these results with interviews with the complete set of board directors. In direct-vote
associations the predicted probability that a board director would claim that the manager provides
receipts “at least sometimes” to members who sell in bulk is 0.92 (0.88 − 0.95). This figure drops
46The question wording is: “where you ever warned by other PO or DC leaders because you were not your job well,
or not putting enough effort”?
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to 0.59 (0.40 − 0.76) for appointed leaders. This difference is, again, significant and substantial.
That the IV regression results, obtained from two different sources, produce very similar findings
further increases our confidence in the study’s conclusions.
Following Huber and Gordon (2004) who use the severity of sentences to measure judges’ re-
sponsiveness, the second measure of leader responsiveness is the extent to which social sanction-
ing is used to enforce group norms of cooperation with respect to collective marketing. Elsewhere
I have discussed at length the collective action problem associated with collective marketing, the
single most important public good produced by the farmer group (Grossman, 2011b). It is suffi-
cient here to recall that the price the DC leader can obtain from buyers depends crucially on the
volume and quality of the group’s coffee. To mitigate the social dilemma associated with quality
enhancing investments, DCs commonly pass resolutions and bylaws requiring members to use
best-agricultural practices47. To mitigate the social dilemma associated with marketing choice,
DCs forbid members from side-selling to middlemen. Since the DC leader’s prime responsibility
is organizing and coordinating the group’s marketing activity, he is also responsible for enforcing
those rules and bylaws48.
I find that compared to members in appointment-based associations, members in direct-vote
associations are significantly more likely to report being sanctioned for producing low quality
crops, or for side-selling. For example, the predicted probability that a member in direct vote
association reports ever being sanctioned for side-selling is 0.27 (0.23 − 0.32). This likelihood is
about 2.5 times larger than the predicted probability of members in appointment-based associa-
tions (0.11, with 0.08 − 0.16). Similarly, the predicted probability that a member in a direct-vote
association reports ever having been sanctioned for not using “best agricultural practices” is 0.41
(0.36−0.47), but only 0.27 (0.2−0.35) when the DC leader is appointed. In both cases the difference
in sanctioning probabilities is significant at the 95% confidence intervals.
47Best agriculture practices refer, for example, to the frequency of weeding, mulching and pruning, and to the meth-
ods used for picking and drying coffee beans. Sanctioning here commonly takes the form of rejecting member’s coffee
from participation in bulk marketing. Other punishments include public shaming during group meetings.
48That leaders are responsible for ensuring that rules and bylaws are enforced does not necessarily indicate that they
execute punishments. Usually PO leaders will sanction defectors during a PO meeting through “naming and shaming”.
DC leaders, however, encourage and coordinate this type of decentralized social sanctioning.
CHAPTER 4. LEADER SELECTION RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 152
Perceptions of accountability and responsiveness
The variables I use to measure leaders’ accountability and responsiveness were chosen following
dozens of semi-structured interviews with both members and board directors in the months lead-
ing up to full survey enumeration. However, in order to ensure that the interpretation I give to
the above variables – e.g., writing receipts or hiring external auditors – aptly captures monitoring
and accountability, I asked the survey respondents an additional set of questions designed to elicit
their perceptions of their leader’s level of accountability.
First, sampled members were asked whether they believe that board directors are monitoring
the actions and activities of the DC manager. Consistent with the behavioral results, I find that
members in direct-vote associations are significantly more likely to perceive their manager to be
monitored. The predicted probability that an ordinary member reports that her elected leader is
sufficiently monitored is 0.57 (0.51 − 0.62); this figure drops to 0.48 in the case of an appointed
leader (0.43 − 0.53). To confirm these results, I asked the board directors if “there is anyone who
is responsible for making sure the DC manager does their job diligently and transparently?” In
direct-vote associations, the predicted probability that a board director responded positively is
0.71 (0.61− 0.79), but only 0.57 when managers are appointed by the board (0.48− 0.65).
Finally, members were asked how accountable or unaccountable they believe their DC lead-
ership to be, in general. In direct-vote associations, the predicted probability that a member per-
ceives the leadership to be unaccountable is 0.05 (0.03 − 0.07), which is significantly lower than
in the case of appointed leaders (0.13, with 0.08 − 0.20 at the 95% confidence intervals). Simi-
larly, the predicted probability that the manager is perceived to be very accountable is only 0.21 in
appointment-based associations (0.17− 0.25), against 0.33 in direct-vote associations (0.30− 0.36).
Figure 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 provide graphical representations of this section’s results for board direc-
tors and sampled members, respectively.
The validity of variables used to measure abstract concepts such as monitoring, accountability
and responsiveness can naturally be questioned. However, the fact that results are consistent
across a large set of behavioral and attitudinal measures, as well as across different data sources,
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improves confidence in the study’s main finding: leaders are more closely monitored and deemed
more accountable where members participate directly in their selection.
Figure 4.1: Leader selection rule and accountability (representatives’ survey). Predicted values are estimated by
setting continuous control variables to their mean values and categorical variables to their median values. Standard er-
rors are bootstrapped using 1,000 iterations, adjusted for the clustering nature of the data (8 strata for field-facilitators).
Leader Profile: Ability, Socio-Demographics and Network Position
In this section I turn to test Hypothesis 7, which states that, compared to directly elected managers,
appointed managers have a ‘higher profile’: attributes that likely increase the ability of managers
to perform successfully their roles and responsibilities.
Since each DC has a single manager, the analysis in the section is based on a relatively small
sample size (n = 50). The small sample size is especially problematic in IV parametric estima-
tions, which can be biased when asymptotic property assumptions are not met (Chiburis, Das and
Lokshin, 2010). This problem is compounded by the clustered nature of the data (i.e. associations
nested within districts and attached to a facilitator), resulting in low statistical power. To mitigate
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Figure 4.2: Leader selection rule and accountability (members’ survey). Predicted values are estimated by setting
continuous control variables to their mean values and categorical variables to their median values. Standard errors are
bootstrapped using 1,000 iterations, adjusted for the clustering nature of the data (8 strata for field-facilitators).
concerns about these problems, I present two sets of results. First, I report Linear IV estimations,
in which standard errors are bootstrapped using a large number of iterations49.
Second, where there are reasons to fear possible type II errors, I report p-values based on non-
parametric randomization inference tests. Recall that the counterfactual that informs the identifi-
cation strategy is “what if the facilitator assigned to area S would have a different preference with
respect to the appropriate selection rule”. Since there are only eight facilitators in the study-area,
with 3 recommending direct-vote (Zj1) and 5 appointments (Zj0), there are 56 possible combina-
tions of “shuffling” facilitators between different S. By reshuffling Zj , randomization inference al-
lows to compute exact p-values by comparing observed statistics (here, mean difference Y¯j1− Y¯j0)
to all possible mean differences in the sample (Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2008).
49Following a personal communication with Jeffery Woodbridge, when conducting analysis at the association-level,
I use bootstrapped standard errors based on 10, 000 iterations that do not take into account possible clustering in the
data generating process. Given that facilitators’ recommendations (Zj) are collinear with districts, and given the small
number of clusters, additional clustering results in unreliable standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors that ignore
higher-order clustering turns to be more conservative, since bootstrapped standard errors that accommodate clustering
are consistently lower than the ones reported in this section.
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Leader ability
I use four proxy measures of manager’s ability that are strongly and positively correlated with
marketable skills in Uganda50: (i) manager’s educational attainment on a six-category scale; (ii)
English proficiency51; (iii) score on two cognitive tests52; and (iv) an ability composite index that
is constructed from the above variables via principal component analysis53. In addition, I ranked
the network of board directors according to their standardized ability composite index score, and
tested whether appointment-based associations result in managers with higher rankings.
Using a Linear IV estimation strategy, I find little evidence in support of Hypothesis 7: ap-
pointed leaders do not score significantly higher than elected leaders on five out of six proxy mea-
sures of ability (Appendix, Table 4.8). First, differences between appointed and elected leaders
with respect to English proficiency (p-value= 0.41), the composite ability index (p-value= 0.84) and
managers’ ability ranking (p-value= 0.69) are highly insignificant. Second, I find that appointed
leaders score slightly lower on both cognitive tests. Lastly, though I find that appointed managers
attained slightly higher education levels (at the 90% confidence level), exact p-value from a ran-
domization inference test is not significant at conventional levels (0.16, see Appendix, Fig. 4.11).
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the failure to reject the null hypothesis – that the impact
of selection rules on ability is no different than zero – is likely not due to low statistical power.
In addition, I do not find evidence in the data that appointment-based associations result in DC
leaders with other socio-demographic attributes that might enhance leader effectiveness, such as
age, religiosity (measured as attendance in religious services), richness of associational life (mea-
50Fig. A.5 in the Supplementary Appendix A demonstrates the strong positive correlation between the composite
ability measure and job status. Similarly, Fig. A.6 demonstrates the positive correlation between the composite ability
measure and wealth. These correlations increase our confidence that the composite ability index captures relevant
marketing skills.
51Because no local language is spoken by more than 20% of Ugandans, English is the lingua franca of the business
and political class. English proficiency allows individuals to communicate with potential trading partners outside their
small geographic areas.
52The cognitive tests included two assignments: solving a simple maze in less than two minutes and solving a raven
test comprised of 12 questions in two minutes. For additional information see the Supplementary Appendix.
53All of the variables that are included in the ability index are positively correlated, and the first principal component
was able to explain more than 61% of the variance. The ability index included also indicators for respondents’ ability
to read and write. I do not report these in Fig. 4.10 since all DC managers are literate.
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sured by the number of social, economic and political groups and associations in which the leader
participates actively), total land size in acres, and experience (measured as the number of years
the leader has been growing coffee.) The full set of Linear IV regression results are reported in
Table 4.9 in the Appendix.
Leaders’ centrality of network position
Finally, I test whether appointed and elected leaders differ in their network centrality position.
Centrality indices measure the importance of a node within a network. The intuition here is that
the more central an actor is within a well-defined network, the better positioned she is to coordi-
nate activities and transmit information between other network actors. Since much of the work
of DC managers revolves around coordination and dissemination of information, the manager’s
node centrality is likely to be positively correlated with leader performance (Mehra et al., 2006).
As briefly mentioned above, to test whether the DC leader’s network position is a function of
leader selection rule, I have collected network data using a complete roster of board directors in
each of the 50 sampled associations54. In each DC, network data was collected the following three
dimensions55: (i) Friendship56, (ii) Prior Acquaintance57, and (iii) Advice58.
One natural way to measure the centrality of a node within a network is degrees – the number
of direct connections a node has. Degree centrality builds on the basic intuition that a prominent
network actor is one that has high involvement in many relations (Freeman, 1979). Since the three
types of relation – friendship, prior acquaintance and advice – are directional, I measure the Inde-
gree centrality or ”Prestige” of all nodes: the extent to which a social actor in a network receives or
serves as the object of relations sent by others in the network (normalized by the number of direct
54The term ‘complete’ refers here to the fact that the board of directors is a clearly defined organizational structure
with clear and transparent membership rules. Using a simple roster, each board director was asked to provide infor-
mation on his or her ties with all other directors.
55Network questions were asked only when respondents answered positively a basic sorting question “Do you know
[NAME]?”
56Wording: “Is [NAME] a close friend or do you just know him or her? by close friend, I mean that you (a) eat
together regularily; (b) you can leave your child with him or her if you need to travel for several days; and (c) he or she
will help you in case of family death”.
57Wording: “Did you speak to [NAME] on a regular basis before the creation of the DC?”
58Wording: “In the past 12 months, have you asked [NAME] for information or advice on matters related to the DC?”
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ties). More formally, Prestige, or Indegree centrality, is defined as CD(ni) =
di(ni)
g−1 where di(ni) is
the indegree of a node ni and g is the number of all nodes in the network.
Another common centrality measure is ‘Betweenness’, which is arguably among the most im-
portant centrality indices (White and Borgatti, 1994). In most basic terms, Betweenness measures
the extent to which a given node lies on non-redundant shortest paths (geodesics) between third
parties, and is therefore concerned with how actors control or mediate the relations between dyads
that are not directly connected. The more often that actor i is located on the shortest path between
numerous dyads, the higher is the actor’s potential to control interactions and information flows.
I find no evidence in the data that appointed managers interacted more frequently with other
directors on a regular basis before the creation of the DC than elected leaders did. Similarly I do
not find that appointed managers are nominated more frequently as friends or confidents of other
DC board directors – attributes that are positively correlated with successful DCs. Thus I do not
find support for hypothesis 7; appointed rulers are no more likely to have higher profiles than
elected leaders. The full set of regression results is reported in Appendix 4.E, Table 4.10.
4.7 Causal Mechanisms
The paper’s main finding is that, at least in the Ugandan farmer associations I study here, directly
elected leaders of self-help associations are significantly more accountable and responsive than
appointed leaders, even though they do not differ significantly in their observable attributes. In
this final section of analysis, I turn to investigate the mechanisms that mediate between elections
and accountability. Specifically, I test two possible mechanisms. The first mechanism is rooted in
a rich social psychology literature that studies the way procedures condition the relation between
leaders and followers in small-groups situations. Informed by this literature, I use a set of ‘lab-
in-the-field’ behavioral experiments to test whether elections create higher expectations of elected
leaders, compared to appointed leaders. Here, the impact of leader selection rule is thought to
operate at the individual-level.
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The second mechanism I test is derived from the corporate governance literature. Here I use
social network analysis to test the hypothesis that a growing familiarity between appointed offi-
cials and appointees creates a governance culture inimical to accountability (Shaub et al., 2005).
According to the “familiarity hypothesis”, the impact of leader selection rules is thought to operate
at the organizational level.
Reciprocal Expectations as expressed in behavioral games
Social psychologists have long argued that the method through which a leader obtains its author-
ity creates different psychological environments for both the leader and followers (Read, 1974). Hol-
lander and Julian (1970) argue that, compared to appointments, elections increase popular demands
on the leadership role. This is because when group members elect a leader, the group is believed
to support one specific candidate over others and thus in a way transfers hopes and expectations
upon that individual. Ben-Yoav, Hollander and Carnevale (1983) also advance a demand-side ex-
planation, demonstrating experimentally that subjects expect elected leaders to be more respon-
sive to the needs of followers. More recent work has focused on supply-side explanations. Elgie,
Hollander and Rice (1988) find that elected leaders express, on average, a greater sense of commit-
ment and indebtedness towards group members. They stipulate that this is because members are
the source of elected leaders’ legitimacy. Finally, De Cremer and van Dijk (2008) use a laboratory
experiment to test the hypothesis that leadership selection rules determine the share that leaders
retain for themselves from a common resource. They not only find that appointed leaders take
significantly more of the common than their elected counter-parts, but they also find that subjects
are more accepting of norm violating behavior by appointed leaders.
In what follows, I employ a series of behavioral experiments to test the hypothesis that elec-
tions change the reciprocal expectations between leaders and member59. The use of behavioral ex-
periments serves two purposes. First, the experiments’ strong internal validity allows for clear
59In the above laboratory studies, the identity of the leader as well as the group affiliation were manipulated by the
researcher. I improve on these studies here by using natural groups and leaders. See Grossman (2011b) for a discussion
on external validity in the context of lab-in-the-field experiments.
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identification of a well-defined causal relation (Berkowitz and Donnerstein, 1982). Second, recall
the concerns regarding possible violations of the exclusion restriction. It seems quite unlikely that
a facilitation process that took place 4-5 years ago will directly affect subjects’ play in the behav-
ioral experiments.
The first experiment I conducted is a dictator game (DG), which allows me to obtain measures
of conditional altruism. In DGs, two anonymous players are allotted a sum of money – in this case,
10 coins of 100 Ugandan Shillings. The first player (‘the decider’) offers a portion of this sum to
a second player, who cannot reject the offer (‘passive recipient’). The decider thus dictates the
portions of the stake allocated to herself and to the passive recipient. In this one-shot, anonymous
game, a purely self-interested individual would offer zero. It is common to interpret offers in the
basic DG as a measure of altruism, as it is not directly linked to kinship, reciprocity, reputation, or
the immediate threat of punishment (Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin, 2004).
In my version of the DG, each of the DC managers was asked to make two separate allocation
decisions: one to an anonymous resident of the sub-county (i.e., ‘stranger’ condition) and one
to an anonymous member of the farmer association60. Figure 4.3 summarizes the results of this
experiment (see also Appendix, Table 4.11). Note that the treatment in the DG is whether a leader
was elected or appointed, which is instrumented by the facilitators’ recommendation. In other
words, the difference between allocations of appointed and elected leaders should be thought of
as LATE.
First, I find that elected and appointed managers allocate a similar amount to ‘strangers’. The
predicted allocation of elected managers to strangers is 213 USH, whereas appointed managers
allocate an average of 250 USH (p-value= 0.53)61. These allocations can be interpreted as a base
measure of altruism, where social distance has been maximized. Importantly, the results of the
‘stranger’ variant corroborate our earlier finding that elected and appointment methods produce
leaders with similar attributes – in this case other-regardness preferences.
60Members were told that they were receiving an allocation from one of the ‘leaders of the DC’. Managers were
informed prior to making their allocation decision exactly what members were being told about the identity of the
sender.
61Predicted values are calculated by setting control variables to their mean values.
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Though both elected and appointed leaders allocate, on average, to unknown group members
more than to ‘strangers’, the effect of shortening the social distance on elected leaders is much
more pronounced. Whereas appointed leaders allocate to anonymous members 339 USH, elected
leaders allocate to members 70% more (574 USH, p-value = 0.09). Since DC managers were aware
of the fact that the identity of the sender is unknown to the recipients, these results provide further
evidence of a supply-based explanation, which cannot necessarily be reduced to reelection con-
siderations. Namely, at least in the context of self-help associations, popular direct elections seem
to trigger a stronger commitment from the part of local leaders, who reciprocate their election.
Figure 4.3: Dictator allocation by Leader Selection Rule. Predicted values are based on a Linear IV Estimation in
which the DV is modeled as a function of an association’s leader selection rule, instrumented by the DC facilitator’s
recommendation. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 10,000 iterations.
Results from a second set of experiments — a series of Third Party Punishment experiments
(TPPs) — support this hypothesis. In TPPs, two players are allotted a sum of real money (10 coins
of 100 Ugandan Shillings), and a third player gets one-half of this sum (5 coins). Player 1 (the
‘decider’) must decide how much of the stake to transfer to Player 2 (a ‘passive recipient’, who
makes no decisions in the game). Then, before learning the actual amount Player 1 transferred
to player 2, Player 3 must decide whether to pay 1 coin (which is 20% of his/her endowment) to
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punish Player 1, causing Player 1 to suffer a deduction of 3 coins, for all possible transfers Player
1 might make. Thus I use the conventional strategy set protocol, (Henrich et al., 2010), in which
punishment strategy of Player 3 is elicited prior to Player 1 actual allocation for all possible offers.
The game theoretical prediction of TPP is straightforward: Since the experiment is an anony-
mous one-shot interaction, a purely self-interested Player 3 would not pay to punish Player 1.
Knowing this, a purely self-interested Player 1 should always offer zero to Player 2. Since the pay-
off of Player 3 depends only on her punishment decisions, an individual’s willingness to punish
provides a direct measure of the subject’s willingness to suffer a personal cost in order to enforce
a norm of fairness between other group members.
In my version of the TPP experiment, both the decider and the passive recipients were ordi-
nary, randomly selected association members. The third player (the ’punisher’) was one of the
four DC executives62. Results are presented below in Fig. 4.7 and in Table 4.12 in the Appendix.
The magnitude of these effects is striking. In all unequal allocations, directly-elected leaders are
about two to three times more likely to punish deciders who kept more than 6 coins for them-
selves. Since punishment decisions are costly, and because DC leaders were aware of the fact that
members do not know the identity of the monitor, these results further strengthen the hypothesis
that the procedure of elections trigger a stronger obligation to reciprocate on the part of leaders.
One of those manifestations is a stronger commitment to engage in costly punishment of members
violating norms of cooperation.
The TPP findings can, therefore, help explain the observational data reported above: that com-
pared to appointment-based associations, members in election-based associations are more likely
to report being sanctioned by association leaders for producing low quality coffee, or for side-
selling to middlemen.
62I report only results for the DC managers. Note that DC executives knew that players 1 and 2 are members,
members knew that player 3 was ‘one of the DC leaders’, and players 3 knew what Players 1 and 2 knew.
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Figure 4.4: Third Party Punishment by Leader Selection Rule. Predicted values are based on a Linear IV Estimation
in which the DV is modeled as a function of an association’s leader selection rule, instrumented by the DC facilitator’s
recommendation. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 1,000 iterations. On the X-axis are the number of coins
allocated by player 1.
Testing for a “familiarity effect”
I now turn to test for the presence of a “familiarity effect,” wherein a growing familiarity between
appointed officials and appointees creates a governance culture inimical to accountability. I use
social network data collected for each of the 50 sampled boards of directors to test this mechanism.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I test whether the density of the friendship and the ad-
vice network differs between associations that use different leader selection rules. If a “familiarity
effect” exists, we should see that a board of directors using appointment rules has a denser friend-
ship network63.
Using a linear IV regression, I find that the (Local Average Treatment) effect of moving from
appointments to elections on the density of the friendship network is -0.49 (p-value= 0.00). Put dif-
ferently, the friendship network density of boards of directors that use appointments is 53% larger
63Network density is one of the most widely used measures of social network structure (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Density describes the general level of linkages among the points in a graph, and is defined as the number of actually
occurring relations or ties as a proportion of the number of theoretically possible relations or ties.
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than the friendship network density of boards of directors using direct-elections. Interestingly, I
find that in associations in which leaders are directly elected, the advice network of board directors
is denser, though the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p-value= 0.31). Secondly,
I test for the existence of a correlation between the density of the friendship and advice networks
and an association’s level of monitoring and accountability. As Fig. 4.5 makes clear, the more
dense the friendship network of board directors is, the less likely is the board is to use internal au-
ditors (left panel), external auditors (middle panel), or to ensure that the manager writes receipts
to members selling in bulk (right panel). By contrast, as demonstrated in Fig. 4.6 the more dense
the advice network of board directors is, the more likely the board of directors is to perform its
monitoring function. These findings are consistent with the idea that appointments create affinity
between appointees and appointed officials that can be detrimental to monitoring.
Figure 4.5: Friendship Network Density and Monitoring. Line represents the prediction for the DV (monitoring)
from a linear regression of monitoring on network density.
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Figure 4.6: Advice Network Density and Monitoring. Line represents the prediction for the DV (monitoring) from
a linear regression of monitoring on network density.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of varying leaderships selection rules—appointment or election—
within the context of local, multi-tier self-help associations. Past work on leadership selection rules
has been constrained by pervasive identification problems. This study addresses the identification
challenge by exploiting unique conditions that resulted in plausibly exogenous variation in leader
selection rules within Ugandan farmer associations.
Results presented here suggest that direct elections have a positive, substantial and significant
effect on the accountability and responsiveness of local leaders, at least in this context. Put simply,
governance institutions matter. This finding is consistent across a large number of behavioral and
perceptional measures and holds across a variety of different data sources, including members,
board directors and DC managers. This increases confidence in the study’s main results.
Turning to causal mechanisms that might link elections to accountability, results from a set of
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behavioral experiments provide relatively strong evidence that elections increase the commitment
of local leaders towards ordinary group members, independently of reelection considerations.
One mechanism that might explain this finding concerns reasons why appointed leaders fail to
monitor as successfully as their democratically elected counterparts. Using original social net-
work data, I present evidence of an ‘affinity effect,’ whereby appointment corresponds to affinity
between appointees and appointed officials inimical to monitoring and accountability.
By contrast, I find little evidence that leadership selection rules impact the profile of selected
leaders. Contrary to the expectations of the facilitators who recommended appointments, ap-
pointed leaders do not posses observed profiles or attributes that are more conducive to successful
fulfillment of their roles and responsibilities. Recalling the study’s theoretical framework, that ap-
pointed leaders do not have ‘higher’ profiles than elected leaders indicates that information asym-
metry problems are not severely aggravated by moving from an appointment to an election-based
rule. Two possible explanations might account for this. First, it is quite possible that parishes in
Uganda are small enough to remain information-rich environments, and thus villagers have suf-
ficient knowledge of potential candidates. Alternatively, it is possible that where popular direct
elections take place, PO members consult their more informed representatives before casting their
vote. In this scenario, election outcomes closely mirror appointment outcomes, since the opinions
of local representatives carry a disproportionally large weight. Future research should investigate
these dynamics in greater detail.
Findings presented here also indicate that low saliency is not a major concern, at least in the this
context. This may be because the selection of an association leader has significant implications for
the livelihood of members, as was described to me in innumerable interviews. Another possible
reason for the relatively high salience of leader selection is that popular elections take place in the
context of annual or biannual general assembly meetings. Members also vote on by-laws and res-
olutions, and receive useful information about their association’s activities in these meetings. The
fact that turnout in general assembly meetings exceeds 60% lends support to this interpretation.
There are several important caveats to the study’s key findings, including external validity,
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sample size, and length of study period. On the first point, there is some reassurance in the fact
that main findings presented here are consistent with results from the study of Indonesian Village
Councils (Olken, 2010) and of judicial decisions in the US (Huber and Gordon, 2004). The extent
to which the results of this study apply to other types of associations, however, or to countries
with different income levels is an open question for future research to address.
Concerning sample size, it should be repeated that this study is based on a relatively small
number of associations (50), which were founded with the help of a small number of field facili-
tators (8). Though the results point to large and statistically significant effects of leader selection
rules on accountability and responsiveness, some caution must be used in interpreting the lack of
impact on leader profiles. That said, even if such effects exist (though they are not captured by
randomization inference tests or by the Linear IV estimation), they are evidently much smaller in
magnitude than the effects of direct-voting on accountability.
Finally, this paper considers only short-term effects of direct election on accountability and
leader profiles. It is possible that in the long run, strategic adaptations and accumulative knowl-
edge may impact the results. In addition, the long-term effectiveness of leaders with respect to
the production of club goods and services — not addressed in this chapter — may further alter
the evaluation of the different leadership selection rules over time. Each of these caveats points
to fruitful avenues for future research. At present, this study’s findings contribute to the broader
debate over leadership selection rules. Whether by limiting “affinity effects” or by changing the
reciprocal expectations between leaders and followers, this study finds that allowing group mem-
bers to directly elect their own leaders has a strong, positive impact on leader accountability.
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Appendix
Appendix 4.A Identification Strategy
There are two complications in estimating the effect of leader selection rules. First is the problem
of self-selection: political and social units (be they groups, communities and countries) select rules
for electing their leader in a complex political process that is endogenous to the unit’s characteris-
tics. One way for dealing with this problem is via an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. If (a)
the final stage is fully specified, and (b) equations for earlier stages include instruments to address
endogeneity, then if (c) the dependent variable in the final stage is continuous and unbounded
then instrumental variable techniques such as 2SLS are consistent (Roodman, 2009).
Throughout the analysis, when the dependent variable is continuous, I fit a linear 2SLS IV
model64. The Linear IV model considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment
dj (leader selection rule) on a fully observed variable yj , conditional on two sets of independent
variables Zj and Xj . The primary interest is in the regression function:
yj = αy + βX ′j + δdj + εj (4.1)
where dj is an endogenous dummy variableE[ε|d 6= 0] indicating whether the association uses
appointments (dj0) or popular direct elections (dj1) to select it’s manager. Xj is a n×K matrix of
exogenous control variables and εj is a group-level error term. The binary decision to obtain the
treatment dj is modeled as the outcome of a linear function of the exogenous covariates Zj and a
random component υj . Specifically,
d∗j = αd + ΠZj + υj (4.2)
where
dj =
1, if d∗j > 00, otherwise (4.3)
It is also assumed that εj and υj are normally distributed with mean zero;Cov(Z, ε) = 0;Cov(Z, υ) =
0, and Cov(Z, d) 6= 0. To be a valid instrument Z ⊥ (Yj0, Yj1, dj0, dj0). See Imbens and Angrist
64As mentioned in the main text, when using individual-level data, I estimate bootstrapped standard errors based on
10,000 iterations that take into account the nested structure of the data. By contrast, when using association-level data,
I estimate bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 iterations that do not account for possible higher-level nesting.
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(1994) for Local Average Treatment Effect derivation (LATE).
There are additional complications if, however, the dependent variable is binary. In such cases,
I follow Chiburis, Das and Lokshin (2010) recommendation to use both Linear IV regressions (Al-
tonji, Elder and Taber, 2005), as well as Maximum Likelihood (ML) Seemingly Unrelated Equa-
tions (SUR) Bivariate Probit (Neal, 1997, Roodman, 2009). In both estimation techniques, I use
bootstrapping to estimate standard errors.
Equations in an SUR system seem unrelated in the sense that the dependent variables are gen-
erated in a process that is independent except for correlated errors, that share a multidimensional
distribution. ML SUR can consistently estimate parameters in an important subclass of mixed-
process simultaneous systems: ones that are both recursive, i.e., with clearly defined stages and
that are fully observed, i.e., that endogenous variables appear on the right hand side not as latent
variables, but only as observed variables. Therefore, such estimation procedure is ideal for en-
couragement study designs, such as our own. Define,
d∗j = αd + ΠZj + υj
y∗j = αy + βX ′j + δdj + εj (4.4)
dj =
1, if d∗j > 00, otherwise (4.5)
yj =
1, if y∗j > 00, otherwise (4.6)
where y∗j is a latent variable whose value determines the binary outcome yj , d
∗
j is a latent
variable whose value determines the leader selection rule adopted by the association (i.e., ap-
pointment by directors dj0 or direct vote by ordinary members dj1), Zj is an exogenous variable
affecting the value of d∗j , X = (x1, . . . , xk)
′ is a column vector of covariates (individual and group-
level controls), and β is a vector of coefficients.
We further assume that (υj ; εj) are independent of Z and are jointly distributed as standard
bivariate normal with correlation ρ, where ρ measures the endogeneity of dj in the y∗j equation.
For the full derivation of the likelihood function of a two-stage probit, see Roodman (2009) and
Chiburis, Das and Lokshin (2010).
169 CHAPTER 4. LEADER SELECTION RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Appendix 4.B Monitoring, Accountability and Responsiveness
Leader Accountability by Leader Selection Rule (Self-Report)
Bivariate Probit Linear IV Bivariate Probit Linear IV
Direct vote 1.03 0.37∗∗ 1.43∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.68) (0.19) (0.60) (0.17)
Age of DC (centered) 0.57∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.06)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.01
(0.01)
Constant -0.79∗∗ 0.21∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ 0.18∗
(0.38) (0.11) (0.34) (0.10)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 2.54 0.76∗∗∗ 2.52 0.76∗∗∗
(685.42) (0.11) (35.08) (0.11)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
(34.24) (0.01) (3.04) (0.01)
Age of DC (centered) 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.01
(58.24) (0.05) (14.49) (0.05)
Constant -0.98 0.17∗∗∗ -0.98 0.17∗∗∗







Observations 45 45 45 45
r2 0.10 0.19
Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 iterations) in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.2: Leader Accountability by leader selection rule (Self-Report). The DV is modeled as a function of an
association’s leader selection rule, instrumented by the facilitator recommendation. In columns 1 and 3 I report re-
gression results from maximum likelihood bivariate probit, whereas in columns 2 and 4 I report linear instrumental
variable estimation. In all models standard errors are bootstrapped(1,000 iterations), ignoring possible dependencies
in higher-order clusters. Note that the ATE in th third cloumn and the LATE estimate (forth column) are virtually
identical.
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Number of Selection Processes by Leader Selection Rule
IV Poisson Linear IV
‘ Direct vote 0.55∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.27)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)




First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 0.79∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)




Bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 iterations) in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.3: Number of Selection Processes by leader selection rule. The DV – Number of selection processes for the
DC manager position since the creation of the farmer association – is modeled as a function of an association’s leader
selection rule, which itself is instrumented by the DC facilitator’s recommendation.
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Figure 4.7: Figure describes the distribution of beta coefficients estimates from a reduced form regression of facilita-
tor’s recommendation on manager’s ability ranking (ITT). The distribution of betas is estimated using randomization
inference: all possible permutations of selecting three facilitators out of eight recommending direct-vote (Zj = 1).
Reported P-values are exact.
CHAPTER 4. LEADER SELECTION RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 172
Relationship between Leader Selection Rule and Accountability
(Members Survey)
Receipts Side-Sell Bad Quality Monitored Accountable
Direct vote 1.14∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.22∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)
Sex 0.14 -0.05 -0.10∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.03
(0.13) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
Age (units of 10) 0.02 0.00 -0.09∗∗ -0.01 0.06∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Education (Std.) 0.07 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Years since Joining Group 0.05∗∗ -0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Church attendance 0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
Associational-life (std.) 0.12∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Manager’s co-villager 0.02 0.09 0.17 -0.17 0.20∗∗
(0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08)
Middleman mistrust 0.23 -0.14 0.13∗ 0.08 0.35∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
Original No. of POs 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Age of DC 0.25∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.02
(0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant -1.28∗∗∗ -1.35∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗ -1.50∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.24) (0.26) (0.33) (0.26)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 2.50∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.58∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Original No. of POs 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age of DC 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
athρ -0.69∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -0.13 -0.04 -0.14∗∗
(0.29) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07)
ATE 0.30∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
ATT 0.37∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
LATE 0.28∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 1359 1536 1536 1501 1465
ρ -0.60 -0.38 -0.13 -0.04 -0.14
Log Likelihood -1170.24 -1320.53 -1567.27 -1591.33 -1397.57
Standard errors clustered at the field-facilitator level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.5: In Model “Receipts”, the dependent variable is binary, indicating whether the respondent reports receiving receipts from
the DC manager when selling in bulk. In Model “Side-Sell” and “Bad Quality”, the dependent variables are binary, indicating whether
the respondent reports ever being punished for side-selling and for producing low quality, respectively. In Model “Monitored”, the
dependent variable indicates whether the respondent believes that the DC manager is monitored. In Model “Accountable”, the
dependent variable indicates whether the respondent perceives the DC manager to be very accountable. Standard errors for ATE,
ATT and LATE are bootstrapped using 1000 iterations, adjusted for 8 strata (field-facilitators)
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Relationship between Leader Selection Rule and Accountability
(Board of Directors)
External (N) External (Y) Internal Receipts Monitored
Direct vote -0.77∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.28∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.37
(0.34) (0.33) (0.17) (0.28) (0.34)
Sex 0.09 0.11 0.35∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Age (units of 10) -0.05 -0.06∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Years since Joining Group 0.06∗∗∗ -0.03 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Rep ability (std.) 0.03 0.07 0.17∗∗∗ -0.10∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Associational-life (std.) 0.06∗∗ 0.00 0.10∗∗ 0.09 0.08∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Wealth (std.) 0.02 0.02 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Age of DC -0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ -0.08 0.25∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07)
Original No. of POs -0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.02∗ -1.43∗∗∗ -0.58 -0.13 -0.85∗∗
(0.56) (0.54) (0.38) (0.62) (0.42)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 2.43∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.45) (0.53) (0.45) (0.45)
Age of DC -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.09) (0.09) (0.20) (0.09) (0.09)
Original No. of POs 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
athρ 0.37 -0.34∗ -0.15 -0.70∗∗∗ -0.14
(0.23) (0.20) (0.10) (0.23) (0.18)
ATE -0.29∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
ATT -0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
LATE -0.30∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
midrule Observations 1065 1065 1054 1058 1079
ρ 0.35 -0.33 -0.15 -0.61 -0.13
Log Likelihood -1091.50 -1052.19 -929.76 -909.04 -1078.57
Standard errors clustered at the field-facilitator or farmer association level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.7: In Models “External (N)” and “External (Y)”, the dependent variables are binary, indicating whether the respondent
reports that the DC has ever used external auditors. In Model “Internal” the dependent variables are binary, indicating whether
the respondent reports ever asking to review the group’s books. In Model “Receipts”, the dependent variable indicates whether
the respondent believes that the DC manager provides receipts to members selling in bulk. In Model “Monitored”, the dependent
variable indicates whether the respondent perceives the DC manager to be monitored. Standard errors for ATE, ATT and LATE are
bootstrapped using 1000 iterations, adjusted for 8 strata (field-facilitators)
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Appendix 4.C Sensitivity Analysis
Using Dunning (2008a) framework, the instrumental variable applied in this paper is only ‘plau-
sibly exogenous’. In other words, the exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the IV
inference is suspect. To address this concern I build on recent work by Conley, Hansen and Rossi
(2010) who develop practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion re-
striction. The key to Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2010) method is to define a parameter γ that
reflects how close the exclusion restriction is to being satisfied in the following linear structural
model:
Y = αy + βX + δd+ γZ +  (4.7)
d = αd + ΠZ + υ (4.8)
Where Y is the outcome variable, X is a matrix of endogenous treatment variables, E[X] 6=
0, with β the treatment parameter.  are unobservables; Z is a matrix of instruments that are
assumed uncorrelated with ; i.e., E[Z ′] = 0; and Π is matrix of first-stage coefficients. When X is
endogenous, the parameters β and γ are not jointly identified, so prior information or assumptions
about γ are needed in order to obtain estimates of β – the parameters of interest. The IV exclusion
restriction is equivalent to the dogmatic prior belief that γ equals zero. Conley, Hansen and Rossi
(2010) definition of plausible exogeneity considers the possibility that γ is near zero but perhaps
not exactly zero. Allowing γ 6= 0 provides sufficient structure to allow for estimation and inference
while relaxing the IV exclusion assumption.
Here I present results from one of the authors’ proposed sensitivity tools. In this approach, the
researcher merely specifies a set of possible values for γ, (i.e. the support of γ). Conditional on
any potential value of γ, interval estimates for β, the treatment parameter of interest, can easily be
obtained. Taking the union of these interval estimates across different values provides a conser-
vative (in terms of coverage) interval estimate for β. The main advantage of this method is that
it does not require complete specification of a prior distribution of γ, but only specification of a
range of plausible values for γ. In the following analysis β should be interpreted as the LATE and
γ as the average direct effect of Z on Y . For further information, see Conley, Hansen and Rossi
(2010)[p. 6–8].
Applying this method to our study, I estimate the interval estimate for β for a range of plau-
sible values for γ for two accountability measures: utilization of external auditors and obtaining
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receipts from the DC manager when selling in bulk65. Starting with the use of external auditors,
when γ = 0, the LATE estimate of moving from appointments to direct elections is 0.31 with
0.15− 0.48 at the 95% confidence intervals. Figure 4.8 demonstrates how the confidence intervals
of β change as γ increase. When γ = 0.12 the lower bound of β intersects with zero. In other
words, so long as the direct effect of Z on Y – i.e,. the direct effect of the field-facilitator on ac-
countability that is not captured by the leader selection rule – is less than 38% of the direct impact
of the leader selection rule, we can assume that elections have a positive impact on the likelihood
that an association uses external auditors.
Turning to likelihood of writing receipts, when γ = 0, the LATE estimate of moving from
appointments to direct elections is 0.32 with 0.18 − 0.47 at the 95% confidence intervals. When
γ = 0.15 the lower bound of β intersects with zero (Fig. 4.9). In other words, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that elections have no impact on the likelihood that managers write receipts,
only when the direct impact of field-facilitators on writing receipts exceeds about 50% of the LATE
estimate.
Figure 4.8: Union of Confidence Intervals with γ Support Assumption: External Auditing.
65The LATE estimates I report here use data from the representatives’ survey, and are based on simple linear IV
regression models (2SLS) with standard errors clustered at the association-level.
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Figure 4.9: Union of Confidence Intervals with γ Support Assumption: obtaining receipts.
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Figure 4.10: Relation between leader selection rule and leader ability, measured as (A) mean education-level on
a six-point scale; (B) proportion of leaders that can communicate in advanced English; (C1) mean number of correct
responses to a 12-question raven test; (C2) proportion of leaders who solved a maze; and (D) mean score of a composite
ability index. Leaders appointed in black and directly elected in grey.
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Leader Ability by Leader Selection Rule (LATE)
Edu English Raven Maze Index Rank
Direct vote -0.88∗ -0.18 0.13 0.31∗∗ -0.05 1.03
(0.46) (0.21) (1.31) (0.13) (0.25) (2.59)
Original No. of POs (centered) -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17)
Age of DC (centered) -0.03 -0.03 -0.31 0.03 -0.01 0.75
(0.19) (0.08) (0.46) (0.06) (0.10) (0.93)
Constant 3.50∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 5.43∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.12) (0.68) (0.11) (0.16) (1.45)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of DC (centered) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01





Observations 45 45 42 42 42 45
Bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 iterations) in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.8: Linear IV estimation in which the DV is a function of the leader selection rule, instrumented by the facilita-
tor’s recommendation: In model ‘Edu’ the DV is manager’s education attainment on a 6-level scale; in Model ‘English’
the DV is binary indicating whether the manager can speak advanced English; in model ‘Raven’ the DV is the number
of questions solved out of 12 in a simple raven test; in model ‘Maze’ the DV is binary indicating whether the manager
solved a simple maze test in less than two minutes; in model ‘Index’ the DV is the standardized composite ability index,
and in model ‘Rank’ the DV is the manager’s ability rank from high to low. For the binary outcomes (‘English’ and
‘Maze’ ) I report, in addition, ATE and ATT from Bivariate Probit bootstrapped estimation (1,000 iterations).
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Figure 4.11: Figure describes the distribution of beta coefficients estimates from a reduced form regression of facil-
itator’s recommendation on manager’s education attainment (ITT). The distribution of betas is estimated using ran-
domization inference: all possible permutations of selecting three facilitators out of eight recommending direct-vote
(Zj = 1). Reported P-values are exact.
Figure 4.12: Figure describes the distribution of beta coefficients estimates from a reduced form regression of facili-
tator’s recommendation on manager’s ability ranking (ITT). The distribution of betas is estimated using randomization
inference: all possible permutations of selecting three facilitators out of eight recommending direct-vote (Zj = 1).
Reported P-values are exact.
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Leader Socio-demographic Profile by Leader Selection Rule (LATE)
Age Church Associations Expereince Local
Direct vote -0.12 -0.03 -0.61 -7.26 -0.66∗∗∗
(4.27) (0.15) (0.79) (5.33) (0.23)
Original No. of POs (centered) -0.23 0.00 -0.07 -0.22 0.01
(0.29) (0.01) (0.07) (0.32) (0.01)
Age of DC (centered) -1.18 -0.10∗ -0.01 -0.56 0.02
(1.90) (0.06) (0.29) (2.10) (0.07)
Constant 46.41∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗∗ 5.85∗∗∗ 23.91∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(2.63) (0.10) (0.52) (3.04) (0.12)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of DC (centered) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 45 45 42 45 45
r2 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04
Bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 iterations)
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.9: Linear IV estimation in which the DV is a function of the leader selection rule, instrumented by the facilita-
tor’s recommendation: ‘Age’ is a continuous variable measuring the leader’s age; ‘Church’ is a four category variable
measuring the leader’s frequency of attendance in religious services; ‘Associations’ is a continuous variable measur-
ing the number of social, economical and political groups and organizations in which the leader participates actively;
‘Experience’ is a continuous variable measuring the number of years the leader has been growing coffee; and ‘Local’ is
binary measuring whether the leader was born in his current village.
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Appendix 4.E Social Network Analysis
Leader Network Centrality by Leader Selection Rule (LATE)
Prestige Betweenness
Friend Prior Advice Friend Prior Advice
Direct vote -1.86 0.42 5.13 15.94 5.47 -9.84
(2.88) (3.31) (3.47) (16.55) (9.53) (37.08)
Original No. of POs (centered) 0.62∗ 0.60∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.93 0.56 8.26
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (1.26) (0.74) (6.86)
Age of DC (centered) 0.70 1.25 2.12∗∗ 12.33∗∗ 4.25 30.38
(1.06) (1.02) (1.08) (5.85) (2.94) (22.16)
Constant 15.55∗∗∗ 16.93∗∗∗ 15.69∗∗∗ 29.75∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗ 74.19∗∗∗
(1.67) (1.64) (1.73) (7.47) (3.99) (26.87)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44
r2 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.07 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.10: Leader Network Centrality. Columns 2-4 report LATE of Leader selection rule on on the score of the man-
ager’s Indegree (‘Prestige’) network centrality for three types of network relations: (i) Friendship; (ii) Prior Acquain-
tance; and (iii) Advice. Columns 5-7 report LATE of Leader selection rule on the score of the manager’s ‘Betweenness’
network centrality.
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speak      dc # 8
N= 20   density= 0.579   centralization= 0.38
speak      dc # 13
N= 26   density= 0.837   centralization= 0.143
speak      dc # 14
N= 17   density= 0.618   centralization= 0.277
speak      dc # 38
N= 26   density= 0.64   centralization= 0.205
speak      dc # 41
N= 19   density= 0.661   centralization= 0.324
speak      dc # 49
N= 20   density= 0.674   centralization= 0.301
speak      dc # 54
N= 12   density= 0.909   centralization= 0.091
speak      dc # 56
N= 23   density= 0.605   centralization= 0.269
speak      dc # 58
N= 15   density= 0.695   centralization= 0.253
speak      dc # 62
N= 12   density= 0.682   centralization= 0.373
speak      dc # 64
N= 19   density= 0.673   centralization= 0.279
speak      dc # 75
N= 15   density= 0.848   centralization= 0.148
Figure 4.13: Acquaintance Network (board directors) by farmer association. Question wording: “Did you speak to
[NAME] on a regular basis before the creation of the DC?”
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close friend      dc # 8
N= 20   density= 1.242   centralization= 0.503
close friend      dc # 13
N= 26   density= 1.388   centralization= 0.39
close friend      dc # 14
N= 17   density= 1.382   centralization= 0.315
close friend      dc # 38
N= 26   density= 1.178   centralization= 0.477
close friend      dc # 41
N= 19   density= 1.31   centralization= 0.271
close friend      dc # 49
N= 20   density= 1.463   centralization= 0.509
close friend      dc # 54
N= 12   density= 1.682   centralization= 0.3
close friend      dc # 56
N= 23   density= 1.368   centralization= 0.427
close friend      dc # 58
N= 15   density= 1.248   centralization= 0.467
close friend      dc # 62
N= 12   density= 1.742   centralization= 0.355
close friend      dc # 64
N= 19   density= 1.485   centralization= 0.425
close friend      dc # 75
N= 15   density= 1.4   centralization= 0.374
Figure 4.14: Acquaintance Network (board directors) by farmer association. Question wording: “Is [NAME] a
Close Friend?”
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advice      dc # 8
N= 20   density= 0.405   centralization= 0.547
advice      dc # 13
N= 26   density= 0.443   centralization= 0.24
advice      dc # 14
N= 17   density= 0.316   centralization= 0.348
advice      dc # 38
N= 26   density= 0.338   centralization= 0.575
advice      dc # 41
N= 19   density= 0.251   centralization= 0.395
advice      dc # 49
N= 20   density= 0.479   centralization= 0.532
advice      dc # 54
N= 12   density= 0.606   centralization= 0.318
advice      dc # 56
N= 23   density= 0.273   centralization= 0.582
advice      dc # 58
N= 15   density= 0.429   centralization= 0.335
advice      dc # 62
N= 12   density= 0.303   centralization= 0.218
advice      dc # 64
N= 19   density= 0.269   centralization= 0.616
advice      dc # 75
N= 15   density= 0.4   centralization= 0.39
Figure 4.15: Acquaintance Network (board directors) by farmer association. Question wording: “In the past 12
months, have you asked [NAME] for information or advice on matters related to the DC?”
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Appendix 4.F Behavioral Games
Leader Allocation Decisions: Dictator Game
Stranger DC Member
A B A B
Direct vote -46.95 -36.91 167.24 183.53∗
(60.11) (59.46) (152.13) (108.61)
Original No. of POs (centered) -4.21 10.23
(3.63) (7.13)
Age of DC (centered) 19.14 72.25∗
(20.95) (40.38)
Constant 254.36∗∗∗ 250.10∗∗∗ 370.97∗∗∗ 361.54∗∗∗
(33.39) (33.46) (70.11) (46.59)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Original No. of POs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of DC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 44 44 44 44
r2 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.11: Linear IV Estimation of Leader Allocation Decision in the DG. The DV is modeled as a function of an
association’s leader selection rule, instrumented by the DC facilitator’s recommendation Z. Since The control variables
have been centered the constant is the predicted allocation for appointed managers, and the coefficient on direct vote
is the increase in allocation for elected manager. Standard errors are bootstrapped using 10,000 iterations.
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Leader Third-Party Punishment Experiment
10 9 8 7 6
Direct vote 0.43∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.28
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19)
Original No. of POs (centered) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age of DC (centered) -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 0.25∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
First-Stage Regression (DV: Direct vote)
Z 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Age of DC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Original No. of POs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 43 43 43 43 44
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.12: Linear IV Estimation of Leader Punishment in TPP experiment. The DV is modeled as a function of an
association’s leader selection rule, instrumented by the DC facilitator’s recommendation. Since The control variables
have been centered the constant is the predicted probability of sanctioning for appointed managers, and the coeffi-
cient on direct vote is the increase in predicted probability of sanctioning for elected manager. Standard errors are
bootstrapped using 1000 iterations.
187 CHAPTER 4. LEADER SELECTION RULES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Appendix 4.G Balance
Reps GA OLS K-S Reps GA
Covariate Mean Mean P-value P-value N N
DC Age 3.00 2.56 0.268 0.226 32 18
(1.02) (0.92)
Years under APEP 3.84 3.33 0.043 0.054 32 18
(1.11) (1.08)
No. Original POs 9.56 10.17 0.808 0.930 32 18
(4.89) (8.18)
No. Original Members 161 178 0.781 0.496 22 16
(106) (179)
PIO -0.15 0.28 0.344 0.107 32 18
(1.08) (0.78)
Table 4.13: Assessing balance across selection rules (DC Characteristics). In column 5 I report p − values from
OLS regressions of each covariate on treatment assignment. Column 6 reports exact p − values from two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions. PIO stands for Private Income Opportunities.
APEP Trainer Region District Zj = 0 Zj = 1 dj = 0 dj = 1 Sampled DCs
Elisa Tegyeza West Ibanda 6 0 5 1 6
Joseph Katto West Mbarara 0 1 0 1 1
Joseph Katto West Kiruhura 0 7 1 6 7
Wilburforce Tibairira East A Iganga 5 0 4 1 5
David Baligindwire East B Kamuli 11 0 9 2 11
Vincent Okoth Central A Masaka 7 0 5 2 7
Daniel Kambale Central A Rakai 3 0 2 1 3
Edison Kawalya Central B Mityana 0 1 0 1 1
Edison Kawalya Central B Mubende 0 3 0 3 3
Noa Kuluse Central B Mubende 0 6 0 6 6
Total 32 18 26 24 50
Table 4.14: Assessing exogenous variation in leader selection rule. Table provides information on the leader selec-
tion rule recommendation Zj and leader selection rule adoption dj by APEP field-facilitator.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
189 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The chapters that make up this dissertation have shown that how leaders are selected and who
decides to run for office have a strong impact on the effectiveness of small self-help groups. The
effectiveness of self-help groups in public goods production, in turn, has a positive and significant
impact on their members’ welfare. In the concluding remarks I wish to point to some conflicting
and puzzling findings, to reflect on the external validity of the study’s result and to suggest future
avenues for research.
Leader Selection Rule, Monitoring and the Self-Selection Effect
The empirical findings of chapter 4 are in tension with the results of chapter 3. This tension calls
for a closer examination of the role monitoring institutions play in public goods production. I
briefly point towards some possibilities that will hopefully be taken up in future work. In chapter
4, I demonstrate that popular direct vote results in leaders who are more tightly monitored, and
hence more accountable and responsive. In chapter 2, I demonstrate that accountability has a
positive effect on cooperation. By contrast, in chapter 3, I show that more and better monitoring
institutions do not necessarily lead to better outcomes because they may result in higher-ability
group members opting out of candidacy through the self-selection effect. Beyond a certain point,
monitoring has negative consequences for the value of the public good (recall Fig. 3.4).
The model I present in chapter 3 suggests that increase in leader rewards may offset the neg-
ative effects from increased monitoring. In a recent study, Ferraz and Finan (2010) reach similar
conclusions. By contrast, Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) argue that an increase in politicians’ salary
decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians, because it exacerbates the
problem of adverse selection. The intuition is that politics becomes relatively a more attractive op-
tion for all levels of political skills. The extent to which higher rewards may affect the quality of the
candidacy pool depends on the strength of the competence signals that potential candidates emit.
In other words, whether higher rewards can offset the negative impact of monitoring depends on
the richness of information that group members have on each other.
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My model assumes that self-help groups have perfect information on members’ abilities. In
such a case, an increase in leader rewards should have a positive effect on the value of the public
good produced. Whereas, this may be a relatively reasonable assumption when studying parish-
level associations in rural Uganda (as findings from chapter 4 seem to confirm), it may not be
a reasonable assumption in other contexts. Relaxing the assumption of perfect information and
addressing possible interactions between monitoring institutions, information levels and reward
schemes, both theoretically and empirically, offer interesting avenues for future research.
Public Goods Games
Results from the public goods games have also raised a set of new puzzles and questions that
future work should address. On one hand, in the public goods experiment (chapter 2) I did not
find much evidence suggesting that elected and random monitors punish differently. On the other
hand, in chapter 4, I find that elected leaders punish significantly more frequently than appointed
leaders using both observational and experimental data (e.g., Third Party Punishment game). Ev-
idently more work is needed to reconcile those conflicting findings.
Secondly, one of the central finding of the public goods games is that in the presence of a cen-
tralized sanctioning authority, groups can reach higher levels of cooperation and that monitors
are willing to bear the cost of punishing in order to increase cooperation. As I noted above, these
results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using peer-punishment institutions, with the pos-
sible advantage that a centralized system of monitoring will be more efficient than a decentralized
one. Future studies should investigate this claim directly: under what conditions — type of players,
group-size, size of social-return, cost of punishment, etc. — are centralized-sanctioning regimes more
efficient than decentralized peer-punishment?
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Leaders’ Socio-demographic Attributes
One of the relatively surprising findings of this dissertation is that, in both the observational
and the experimental data, I can only uncover a small and insignificant impact of leaders’ socio-
demographic attributes on cooperation. Similarly, though I find that leader ability has a positive
effect on members’ cooperation, it’s impact becomes insignificant once I account for other factors,
such as leader effort (chapter 3) or leader selection rules (chapter 4). How should we interpret
these counter-intuitive findings?
First, that I do not find that leaders’ socio-demographic attributes play a large role in inducing
cooperation may simply be due to the characteristics of the APEP groups. As noted, the APEP
associations cover a fairly narrow demography, wealth disparities between members are small,
and the membership body is relatively homogenous religiously and ethnically. Alternatively, it
may be that leaders’ attributes matter even in our case, but the inability to reject the null hypothesis
results from low statistical power. In chapter 4 I provide, however, some reasons to believe that
low statistical power is not driving these results.
Finally, it might be that some leader attributes matter, but such impact is not related to easily
observable variables such as age or wealth, but to less directly measured variables such as status
in one’s community. For example, it may be interesting to examine the effectiveness of self-help
groups in which the group leaders are also community leaders, against the effectiveness of groups
where leadership in the groups and the community do not overlap. In this dissertation I did not
examine directly the impact of the centrality of leaders’ network position nor their standing in the
community. I plan to address those topics in subsequent studies.
Network Effects
The use of network data in chapter 4 demonstrates the utility of focusing on the type of social ties,
in addition to the common focus on the strength of social ties. When examining the relationship
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between the structure of the board of directors network and a group’s level of monitoring, I find
that dense ‘friendship’ networks are negatively correlated with monitoring and accountability,
whereas dense ‘advice’ networks are positively correlated. Unfortunately, since I do not have
baseline network data from the founding days of the APEP associations, I am reluctant to make
here any causal claims. Designing studies that can identify the casual effect of different types of
social ties is a promising and exciting future avenue of research.
More so, in the dissertation I have focused only on the relation between the features of a net-
work and group-level monitoring. However, there are some goods reasons to believe that the
position or role of group members within a social network — including their ties with the group leader
— may affect their cooperative behavior. I plan to address this question directly in future work.
External and Scope Validity
Finally, the above discussion naturally raises the following question: to what extent are the study’s
empirical findings conditional on the specific characteristic of the APEP groups; for example, the fact that
they operate in information rich environments? Since I have embedded some discussions about
external and scope validity — as defined in Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2001) — in the different
chapters, I will address this issue here only in passing by reflecting on the external and scope
validity of two of the study’s key findings.
Consider the key findings of the public good game regarding the independent impact of leader
selection rules and the mediating role that legitimacy plays in tying between elections and co-
operation. I argue that these results have a strong external validity and scope validity. First, I
demonstrate in chapter 2, that these findings do not depend on the richness of information that
characterizes the APEP groups1. Second, Uganda is a ‘hard case’ for testing the legitimating role
of elections, given its long history of fraudulent elections. Third, Ugandan farmer associations
1This is because I designed the PGG experiments (i) to include a large number of subjects (ten), (ii) from a pool of
ordinary members that did not hold any leadership roles, (iii) using a random sample of subjects from six different
villages.
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are also a ‘hard case’ for testing whether the design of intuitions has an independent impact on
cooperative behavior. The farmer groups are relatively small, group members know each other
well, and ties between members extend to spheres other than their joint membership in the farmer
groups. In such conditions one might expect that local norms and informal rules would prevail.
Demonstrating the impact of institutional design in a hard case such as this, increases the confi-
dence that leader selection processes matter in larger political units where formal rules have ‘a
stronger bite’.
Consider, by contrast, the external validity of one of the key results of chapter 4, that appointed
leaders are not more able or altruistic than elected leaders. In that chapter I hypothesized that this
finding likely depends on the fact that the APEP groups serve a small geographic area, in which
communities tend to be relatively homogenous in terms of wealth, religion and ethnicity. Since
these conditions support information flows, it remains to be tested whether appointments result
in more able leaders where the quality of information is lower. Similarly I stipulated that this
result might be due to the fact that electing leaders of farmer groups is a salient issue, given the
leaders’ ability to significantly impact the members’ welfare. In other types of groups, where the
ability of leaders to affect members’ welfare is smaller, we may find different results to the ones
reported in chapter 4. The extent to which this finding depends on (i) the quality of information
flows and/or (ii) the saliency of leadership selection, is an open question that will hopefully be




195 APPENDIX A. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA
Appendix A
Empirical setting and data
A.1 Selection of Development Project
In this section I summarize some of the reasons for studying the APEP groups to inform the em-
pirical parts of the dissertation. Briefly, the APEP project presents many advantages. First, the
project’s scope and size allow me to conduct a large-scale quantitative study within the bound-
aries of a single nation, thus securing the homogeneity of the political and legal environments, as
well as many project-related factors.
Second, as noted above, the process of group formation occurred under the lead of a few
project field-trainers. As a consequence, APEP groups, which were formed around the same time
and for the same purpose, have similar governance structures and leadership positions whose
roles and functions are comparable across sites.
Third, while all the APEP associations have similar governance structures, there exists a sig-
nificant amount of variation across associations in variables of interest, such as the value of the
public good produced [chapter 2], availability of private income opportunities [chapter 3] and
leader selection rules [chapter 4].
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Fourth, the Ugandan farmer associations that I study fit the features of small self-help groups,
described in the theoretical model [chapter 3], well. The associations are made up of farmers
from several nearby villages. All group members share a common main goal, obtaining higher
prices for their outputs, with secondary goals including obtaining lower input prices and learning
about better farming practices. The group leaders spend only part of their time working for the
group, with the rest devoted to farming their land or working at other off-farm jobs. When leaders
negotiate higher prices for their crops, they benefit directly and significantly from the group public
good through the higher price that they receive for their own crops.
Finally, that the study’s subjects are members of pre-existing groups contributes to the exter-
nal validity of the study’s findings. This is especially true given the study’s reliance on behavioral
‘lab-in-the-field’ experiments for identification of causal relations. It has been argued that labo-
ratories are a rather poor setting for testing how subjects balance the tension inherent in social
dilemmas (Burnham and Johnson, 2005). Laboratories strip individuals from context, and are lim-
ited in their ability to replicate the mutual trust, past experience, shared norms and group identity
which are central for balancing tension between private and public interests (de Rooij, Green and
Gerber, 2009, Henrich et al., 2004, Levitt and List, 2007). This consideration has led researchers to
argue that pre-existing groups are the most natural setting to test theories about the emergence of
cooperative behavior (Herrmann, Tho´ni and Ga¨chter, 2008, Nowak, 2006, Rand et al., 2009).
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A.2 Sampling Design
This section briefly describes the sampling scheme used in this dissertation. To reduce crop-related
variability, I limited the target population to only those associations that marketed the same crop.
Coffee was selected since it was the most common cash crop marketed by the APEP groups. Lim-
iting the sample to coffee reduced the universe of farmer association in about half: from 204 to
113. An additional 8 DCs were excluded due to the following: I excluded 2 associations from Bu-
giri because coffee turned to be very peripheral in that district. I further excluded 5 associations
from Busheni district because those groups were formed many years before APEP, and were not
comparable in terms of their organizational capacity. Finally I excluded from the sample an asso-
ciation from Kamwenge because it was the single DC in that district and surveying it would have
been logistically complicated and prohibitively expensive. The final universe of cases comprises
of 105 farmer associations, all created by APEP facilitators after 2005. Once the target population
was chosen, I used a stratified, random, multistage cluster design to select our sample.
Step 1: Define Strata Though the universe of farmer associations is spread over 9 districts, I
grouped associations into 5 strata. Strata were defined by meaningful district-areas: neighboring
districts that were covered by the same project field trainers and trading partners, and that share
a dominant ethnicity and/or were historically part of the same district. Figure A.1 presents a map
showing the location of the sampled districts.
Step 2: Farmer Associations (DCs) Based on a power calculation performed on simulated data,
I sampled 50 farmer associations. I used unequal probability sampling without replacement to
sample associations within strata (proportional to their size). The number of associations that
were sampled from each stratum was proportional to the number of associations in each strata.
According to this scheme, each sampled associations is representative of his stratum, without a
need to further use weights.
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Step 3: Village-level Producer Organizations (POs) Prior to sampling group members, I used
an independent random sample to select six producer organizations (or POs) from each associa-
tion, for a total of 287 POs. In few cases, when a farmer association had fewer than seven POs, I
selected all of its village-level groups.
Step 4: Group Members I sampled 36 respondents (36) from each farmer association. The num-
ber of sampled members from each of the six sampled village-level producer organizations was
proportional to the size of the groups. This assured that the sample is self-weighted. Total sample
size is thus 50 DCs X 6 POs X 6 members per PO = 1,800. I succeeded in surveying 1,781 out of
the 1,800 sampled group members. I refer to this data source as the “members’ survey”.
Step 5: Relevant Pool of Potential Candidates The DC board of directors, composed of all rep-
resentatives from the PO groups, including those that become the leader, is the relevant pool of
candidates for the leader’s position. A significant effort was made to survey each of the DC board
members. To keep the size of the relevant pool of candidates manageable, I adopted the following
rule: when the number of groups that make the DC was up to ten, I surveyed the PO chairper-
son, the two most active representatives from each farmer group, and any members holding DC
executive positions (this includes the DC manager as well as a Chairperson, Secratary, and Trea-
surer). When the number of groups was larger, I invited only the PO chairperson plus the most
active other PO representative, plus those members holding DC executive positions. For exam-
ple, if a farmer association is comprised of eight village-level producer organizations, I surveyed
28 prominent members based on their position: 4 DC executives + 2*8 PO representatives + 8
PO chairmen). The survey team visited each association up to four times to reduce attrition-rate,
which was brought down to less than ten percent. A summary of the sample scheme is provided
in table A.1 below.
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Table A.1: Sample Design
Step Sampling Unit (SU) Number of SUs Sampling Method
1 Target Population 105 DCs Coffee growers
2 District-area 5 Stratified – proportional to # of DCs in strata
3 Farmer Associations (DCs) 50 unequal probability without replacement
4 Produce Organizations (POs) 6 per DC Clustered – simple random sample.
5 Group members 36 per DC Clustered – probab proportional to group size.
6 Potential Pool of Candidates ∼ 28 per DC No sample: Complete Network.
Figure A.1: Location of sampled farmer associations by strata. Colors indicate sample strata.
Numbers indicate the number of farmer associations sampled within each strata and district.
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Figure A.2: APEP associations organizational structure. In this Figure I present the organiza-
tion structure of the APEP associations. Each farmer association (known as DC) is comprised of
about 10 village-level producer organizations (POs), themselves comprised of about 20-25 mem-
bers. Each of the POs that make up the association elects two representatives to serve on the DC
board of directors. The DC is led by a DC manager, who may be thought as the CEO. Respon-
sibilities of the board of directors include, monitoring the work of the DC executives (including
the manager), representing the opinions of PO members at the associational level, and aiding in
the transmission of information. The manager’s most important responsibilities include negotiat-
ing input and output prices, organizing the collection of crops (including hiring and supervising
employees), and searching for buyers. Additionally, leaders help coordinate group activities and
facilitate the flow of information throughout the association.
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A.3 Data Sources
I use five main data sources to construct the variables used in the empirical parts of the disserta-
tion: (i) Members’ Survey; (ii) Representatives’ Survey; (iii) Network Data (iv) PO questionnaire;
and (v) DC questionnaire.
Members’ Survey: An individual-level survey executed to a random sample of group members
who do not hold any leadership position in the association. Trained enumerators administered
the members’ surveys in a face-to-face interview, for a total of 1,781 surveys.
Representatives’ Survey: An individual level survey of directors, who represent the village-
level POs at the farmer association board. These include the four members of the executive com-
mittee, PO representatives who serve as directors at the DC-level, and the chairpersons of the
village-level POs. Trained enumerators administered the members’ surveys in a face-to-face inter-
view, for a total of 1,313 surveys.
Network Data: Each of the representatives (i.e., board directors) that completed a ‘Representa-
tives’ Survey’ was also asked to complete a network module based on a roster of the names of all
DC representatives. The social network data allows me to analyze both the structure of the DC
leadership network (e.g., its density), as well as the position of each member within the network.
PO questionnaire: This questionnaire was administered to 3-4 leaders from each of the six sam-
pled village producer organizations (POs), for a total of 287 group-questionnaires. These ques-
tionnaire had two parts. In the first part, PO leaders were asked to provide information at the
group-level (e.g., the group’s year of foundation, its number of members, etc.) At the second part,
group leaders were asked to provide additional information on the group members using a com-
plete list of members. This part included information such as the leader’s assessment of the crop
quality of each of the members, and whether members sold their coffee to middlemen.
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DC questionnaire: In each of the 50 sampled farmer associations, a trained enumerator inter-
viewed the four DC executives together (DC manager, DC chairman of the board, DC Treasurer,
and DC Secretary). This questionnaire was designed to capture information at the association-
level (e.g. DC year of creation, number of POs, identity of APEP trainer, rules and procedures,
buyers information, etc.). In addition, the executives were asked to provide information on the
marketing activities of the association using the DC’s books and records.
A.4 Implementation
The survey instruments were piloted during the first two weeks in July 2009, and were translated
to one of three local languages. Data was collected between late July 2009 and September 2009 by
a group of 60 experienced local interviewers (enumerators), who administered all instruments in
the native language of the respondents. Enumerators, who were hired directly by the PIs, were di-
vided into three ”language” teams. The eastern team covered 16 farmer associations in Iganga and
Kamuli districts, where Basoga is the primary local language. The central team covered 20 DCs
from Mubende, Mityana, Masaka and Rakai districts, where locals speak Luganda. Finally, the
western team covered 14 DC from Kiruhura, Mbarara and Ibanda districts, where Ranyankole is
the lingua franca. Enumerators went through a lengthly training in class (4 days) and in field set-
ting (4 days), which included also training on human subjects issues as well as survey techniques.
Enumerators were supervised by team leaders by ratio of 1:5.
In each sampled association, data was collected in four rounds. First, an interviewer scheduled
a meeting with the DC executives. In that meeting the interviewer introduced the study and asked
for the DC leaderss’ cooperation. In addition, in that meeting s/he administered the DC-level
questionnaire, and obtained a list of all DC board directors. In the second day of enumeration,
the research team conducted interviews with group representatives to the DC board and with
the chairmen of all village-level groups, who were mobilized by the DC executives to a central
location. In addition to individual-level interviews, leaders from each sampled village-group were
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asked to respond to a PO questionnaire, and to provide a complete list of all group members.
Between the second and third round, I sampled 36 members from each sampled DC (including 8
replacements). Immediately after the sampling procedure, an interviewer travelled back to meet
with the associations’ leadership. In that meeting, the interviewer gave the DC leaders the list of
sampled members and coordinated with them the next round of interviews. Once again, I relied
on the DC leaders to mobilize the sampled members to a centralized location. In the third day
of enumeration, individual-level interviews were conducted with the sampled members and with
representatives who were not present in the previous day. Finally, the survey team traveled to
each association for an additional day in order to reach sampled members or representatives who,
for any reason, were not present in the main enumeration days.
A.5 Missing Data
Great care was taken to reduce missingness. The research team administered association-level
questionnaires in all 50 DCs PO questionnaires in 287 out of 289 sampled village-level farmer
groups. Out of a sample of 1,800 ”ordinary” members (i.e. farmers with no leadership role) the
research team managed to conduct individual-level surveys with 1,781 farmers. As for data in
surveys that were missing at random (MAR), I used Patrick Royston’s ICE multiple imputation
package in Stata, which applies a chained equations approach. I imputed missing data only for
some asset variables and demographic characteristics, but chose not to impute data for farmers’
activities as group members, such as marketing decisions and agricultural practices.
A.6 Sample Descriptive Statistics
Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 provide some descriptive statistics, respectively, for the sample of ’ordi-
nary’ members and group, DC representatives, and the associations overall.
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Table A.2: Members: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Dependent Variables
Bulked at least once with DC (self-report) 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 1746
Bulked at least once with DC (leaders-report) 0.61 (0.49) 0 1 1712
Welfare Increase (std.) 0 (1) -4.52 3.04 1759
Independent Variables
Sex (male) 0.68 (0.47) 0 1 1781
Age 45.58 (14.42) 14 95 1781
Education (Std.) 0 (1) -1.53 1.88 1781
Seasonal Coffee Yield (units of 100) 3.80 (5.45) 0 100 1756
Years since Joining Group 3.71 (1.76) 1 8 1769
Middleman honesty 0.91 (0.28) 0 1 1698
Leader’s co-villager 0.11 (0.31) 0 1 1782
Associational-life (std.) 0 (1) -3.14 2.85 1633
Community leadership experience 0.46 (0.49) 0 1 1583
Farming Primary Occupation 0.56 (0.5) 0 1 1766
Village distance to District Capital 29.18 (18.01) 0 96.60 1705
Village Distance to Trading Center 1.09 (2.72) 0 28.98 1719
Village Distance to DC Crop Collection 2.49 (2.99) 0 19.32 1715
Table A.3: Representatives: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Sex (male) 0.8 (0.4) 0 1 1316
Age 46.83 (11.88) 20 86 1316
Ability with cognitive tests (std.) 0 (1) -3.69 1.9 1058
Ability without cognitive tests (std.) 0 (1) -2.66 1.69 1316
Seasonal Coffee Yield (units of 100) 5.38 (7.65) 0 100 1307
Years since Joining Group 4.1 (1.65) 1 8 1314
Associational-life (std.) 0 (1) -2.93 2.37 1140
Community leadership experience 0.74 (0.43) 0 1 1105
Wealth (std.) 0 (1) -2.39 9.15 1310
Good health 0.84 (0.37) 0 1 1305
Born in village 0.51 (0.5) 0 1 1316
Household Head 0.89 (0.32) 0 1 1316
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Table A.4: Farmer Associations: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Age of DC 2.84 (1) 1 5 50
No. of group members 211.92 (111.59) 61 536 50
Leader’s effort (std.) 0 (1) -2.66 2.5 50
Monitoring level (std.) 0 (1) -2.35 2.23 50
Leader’s ability (std.) 0 (1) -1.69 1.49 46
Leader’s ability (std.) 0 (1) -1.86 1.65 42
Mean seasonal yield (units of 100) 3.79 (1.8) 0.89 7.76 50
Ethnic fractionaliztion 0.23 (0.25) 0 0.8 50
Mean Associational-life 0 (1) -2.08 1.74 50
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A.7 Measurement of Key Variables
This section provides some supplementary information on the key variables used in the analysis.
Value of the Public Good
In the analysis, our primary measure of member’s marketing decisions was derived from PO
leader’s reports of member’s marketing decisions. This measure was used because the PO leader
has little incentive to provide misleading information about how actively members sell through
the associations. In contrast, members may feel uncomfortable mentioning that they generally
do not sell through the association, since this is generally a violation of association rules. The
two basic measures of the member’s marketing decisions are, 1) an indicator variable capturing
whether a member sold his crops via the association at least once in the past season, and 2) the
share of a member’s total seasonal coffee yield that was sold via the farmer group in the past
season. Figures A.3 and A.4 show that these marketing decisions vary significantly across groups.
Measures of member’s marketing decisions based on member’s self-reports showed similar
results. We also check our results against alternative measures of collective marketing, gathered
from interviews with group leaders and the associations’ books and records. These measures also
deliver similar results.
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Figure A.3: Proportion of respondents reporting to sell coffee via their farmer group, at least once, in the
past season, by type of member and region. No. of observations in parenthesis. Caps represent 95% CI.
Figure A.4: Mean of the proportion of a member’s total seasonal yield sold via her group, by type of
member and region. No. of observations in parenthesis. Caps represent 95% CI.
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Leader’s Ability
To construct individual’s ability measure we used information on respondent’s ability to read
and write, a 7-scale variable that measures the respondent’s educational attainment, and English
proficiency1. Respondents also completed two types of cognitive tests: solving a simple maze in
less than two minutes and solving a raven test comprised of 12 questions in two minutes2. Several
checks give us confidence in the ability measure. In Figure A.5 Panels A-C, we see that group
members who hold high-skilled off-farm jobs have significantly higher ability than those that do
not . In Figure A.5 Panel D, we observe that the representatives elected by the village-level groups
have higher ability on average than ordinary members . Finally, we find that ability is highly
correlated with wealth, as shown in Figure A.6.
Figure A.5: Relationship between the composite measure of ability and a binary indicator of employment
status, by position in the association (ordinary members and board directors). In each panel, point estimates
represent the mean ability score for survey respondents who report having any steady source of off-farm
income (panel A), work part-time in an NGO or a local government (panel B) or own a store (panel C),
against the mean ability score for those who do not have such jobs. Caps represent 95% confidence intervals.
1Because no local language is spoken by more than 20% of Ugandans, English is the lingua franca of the business
and political class. English proficiency allows individuals to communicate with potential trading partners outside their
small geographic areas.
2The cognitive tests can be shared with readers upon request.
209 APPENDIX A. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA
Figure A.6: Relationship between wealth (deciles) and ability (std), for the entire sample (N=3092).
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Monitoring
The tables below provide some additional information on the variables used to measure group
monitoring institutions. Table A.5 identifies the variables used to construct the monitoring mea-
sures. Table A.6 shows that these veriables tend to be positivively correlated, often significantly.
This suggests that groups that implement one type of monitoring institution are also likely to have
implemented others.
Table A.5: Variables used to measure group monitoring
Variable Behavioral Measures Type From
irsf15 Whether there is a rule regarding the leader’s time commitment dummy Reps
irsf20b The extent to which external auditors are used categorical Reps
irsf21 Whether respondents have asked to review the DC’s books dummy Reps
sf222 Whether someone is responsible for monitoring the DC manager dummy Reps
Attitudinal Measures
irsf24b Whether the manager is transparent dummy Reps
imsf28c The extent to which the manager is accountable categorical Members
imsf32 Whether the manager is monitored dummy Members
imsf33 The extent to which the manager is transparent categorical Members
Table A.6: Correlation matrix of the variables used to measure group monitoring
(1)
irsf15 irsf20b irsf21 sf222 irsf24b imsf28c imsf33 imsf32
irsf15 1
irsf20b 0.577∗∗∗ 1
irsf21 0.318∗ 0.449∗∗ 1
sf222 0.672∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.306∗ 1
irsf24b -0.0679 -0.0762 0.110 -0.141 1
imsf28c 0.0334 0.0100 0.250 -0.0409 0.468∗∗∗ 1
imsf33 0.281∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.187 0.169 0.629∗∗∗ 1
imsf32 0.199 0.487∗∗∗ 0.325∗ 0.252 0.0679 0.186 0.495∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Welfare effect
Figure A.7 provides information on the distribution of welfare changes, for the entire sample.
Figure A.7: Distribution of Self-Reported Welfare Effect Since Joining the Farmer Group
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Appendix B
Chapter 2: Public Goods Games Manual
and Scripts
B.1 Interviewer Manual
[These are instructions given to the interviewers during training in addition to the script of the behavioral
game.]
Framework:
This game will be played with about 36 Producer Organization (PO) members per Farmer As-
sociation. The 36 PO members will be split up into three even groups, with 8-12 PO members
in each (Note that the instructions are for situations with 12 players). We will mix PO members
to maximize the heterogeneity of the group. Each group will go to a different location, and two
interviewers will be responsible for each group. Each group will play one of three variants: The
first group will play a baseline public goods game (with no monitor), the second will play a public
goods game with a randomly selected monitor, and the third group will play a public goods game
with an elected monitor. The baseline public goods game will have six rounds. The variants will
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each have two “traditional” preliminary rounds with no monitors, followed by four rounds with
monitors. Given our focus on the effects of monitor selection, players are assigned to the same
group for all six rounds.
Games Summary:
In Public Good Games, players must decide how much of their endowment to keep in their private
pocket and how much to put in the group pot. Each player, for each round of the game, receives
an endowment of ten 100USH coins totaling to 1000USH. The total amount donated to the group
pot is then doubled and redistributed evenly among the players. Payoffs will be rounded up to
the nearest 50USH. The contributions will be made public to all the players, but the identity of
the contributor will not. The total donation, as well as the average donation, and some exemplary
individual payoffs will also be made known to the players.
In the monitor variant there will be a monitor who will be able to spend 100USH to reduce
another players’ payout by 300USH. The monitor will choose which contributions he wants to
reduce. The players will remain anonymous to everyone but the interviewer. In the randomly-
selected monitor variant, the monitor will be chosen at random. In the elected variant, the monitor
will be elected by the group.
Player i’s payoff in round t is calculated as piit = (10 − xit) + 2
PN
i=1 xit
N − 3Pit, where xit is i’s
contribution to the public account in round t, and Pi ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether i was punished in
round t, and N is the number of players.
Logic:
On an individual level, it is more profitable for a person to “free-ride”, and have everyone else
contribute to the collective fund. In contrast, the most profitable outcome for the group is if all
players contribute all their tokens to the public fund. This game examines how players will bal-
ance their own self-interest and the well-being of the collective.
We will be looking at two factors: the effect of monitoring, and the effect of election. We expect
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that the potential reduction of payoff by the monitor will increase the total contributions to the col-
lective fund by the group. We expect that the election of the monitor will have an even larger effect
on players, since players may be more responsive to monitoring by someone they have elected.
We are also interesting in observing monitors’ willingness or sense of duty to sacrifice money to
sanction someone who donated little or nothing to the collective.
Materials (Per Group):
– 2 large sheets of paper and tape
– 12 3-sided cardboard screens
– 12 sets of ten 100USH
– 12 “Personal Pocket/Collective Pot” boards
– 2 markers
– cards (1-12) for Group 2 only
– calculators
– voting materials for Group 3 only
Setup:
For each Group, there will be two interviewers. The two interviewers will be assigned to be
“interviewer 1” and “interviewer 2”, as the script will have the interviewers doing different things.
Interviewer 1 will talk more, while interviewer 2 will be more focused on data collection and
presentation during the game. Interviewer 2 should be prepared to do more math.
Each room/area should have 12 cardboard privacy screens set up with a “Personal Pocket/
Collective Pot” board and ten 100USH coins on the “Personal Pocket” side. There also should be a
demonstration set at the front of the room and two large sheets of paper (to serve as a chalkboard).
The ideal set up is a circle (Figure C.1);
if this is not possible, have the participants sit in rows, as shown in Figure B.2.
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Figure B.1: Setting of the Game.
	   enumerator	  
Figure B.2: Alternative setting of the game.
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Basic Explanation of the Procedures of the Game:
There are some examples to run through before the start of the first round. These are thorough
and each demonstrate one full round. The format of data presentation on the large sheet of paper
at the front of the room will be the same for each example and each round.
Here is Example 1: The first series of digits represent how much each individual in the group
has donated to the group pot. This has to be reported in increasing order. This data will be
recorded by interviewer 2 walking around the room to each player’s screen. This list of numbers
is very important because it allows players to all see how much everyone in the room donated to
the collective, but also allows everyone to remain anonymous.
Average Total Double Payback
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 100 1200 2400 200 USH
It will be important to go through the math of all of them. The “Average” is the sum of the list
of numbers and divided by the number of players (12 in rounds without a monitor, 11 in rounds
with a monitor). This allows players to see how much each player in the room contributed on
average.
The “Total” is the sum of the list of numbers and the “Double” is that sum doubled. “Payback”
is the “Double” divided by the number of players in the room (12 in rounds without a monitor,
11 in rounds with a monitor). This ensures that the collective good is now redistributed evenly to
each player in the room.
The examples will make clear that: 1) people that donate more to the group pot will make
less than people who do not donate or donate fewer coins; 2) the group as a whole gets the most
money if everyone puts in all ten coins; 3) if a player puts a lot and everyone else puts in little or
nothing, the player can end up with less than the 1000 shillings s/he started out with.
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Rounds:
Group 1, playing the Baseline (no monitor) version, will simply repeat the rounds six times.
Groups 2 and 3 playing with monitors, will complete two rounds as Baseline, and then 4 rounds
according to the monitor variant. The players should not be told how many rounds they are going
to play, because there is a tendency to contribute very little when people know they are playing
the “final” round.
For Groups 2 and 3, after having played two traditional rounds, the interviewer will inform
the players that they will play the game again, but a little differently than in the previous rounds.
A monitor will be selected after the first round for the rest of the game. For Group 2, this will
be random. For Group 3, the monitor will be elected by the room through written ballots. In
both cases, one of the players will become a “monitor”. The monitor will not be participating as a
regular player. He would therefore not benefit from the decisions of the players and his decision
will be simply affected by whether he approves or not the behavior of the players.
The monitor will receive 1000 USH and given the option to give-up 100USH to take away
300USH from contributors whose donation s/he is dissatisfied with. The monitor may do this to
as many contributors as he would like, but every single contributor can be penalized only once.
The interviewer must also emphasize that the choice is up to the monitor; s/he does not have to
reduce anyone’s payoff. The interviewer will demonstrate two examples and will ask the monitor
a question to ensure comprehension.
After the round is played and all the contributions have been reported on the board, the mon-
itor will have to give the interviewer 100USH from his own endowment for each contributor he
wants to penalize and then walk up to the board and mark the numbers corresponding to the
contributions s/he wants to “reduce” by drawing an X below the numbers. The identity of the
contributors will remain anonymous, but all the players will know the amount of donations that
the monitor considers not satisfactory.
Payoff:
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At the end of the last round, the interviewer will ask the player sitting at the front right corner to
pick a card from a deck numbered 1-6. This determines which round the group will be paid for at
the end of the day.
B.2 Script of the Public Goods Game: Elected Monitor Condition
[Each treatment condition had a slightly different script. The baseline and random monitor conditions are
available upon request.]
Game introduction and instructions:
(Interviewer 1 begins instructions, interviewer 2 records everyone’s ID numbers on the record.)
Hello my name is [interviewer 1] and my colleague’s name is [interviewer 2]. Please take a seat at
one of the stations. We would like to thank you all for being cooperative and for participating in
the various activities.
For this activity, there must be absolute silence. You are not allowed to talk to each other.
While in the group, you cannot ask questions or talk. This is very important. Please be sure that
you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the activity for everyone. If one
person talks about the activity while sitting in the group or with other people later, we will not
be able to continue the activity. Do not worry if you do not completely understand everything
as we go through the examples here in the group. We will take questions when we are finished
explaining.
This activity will have a few rounds of decisions. However, only one round will count for
payment, which will be chosen randomly once the activity is completed. For the round that is
chosen, the money will be yours to take home and use as you please. Since we do not know which
round will count, you should decide in each round as if you were deciding on real money.
In front of you there is a board. One side represents your Personal Pocket, the other side
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represents a Group Pot. There are now 1,000USH in your personal pocket. In this activity, you
will have to decide how many Shillings you would like to keep for yourself in your personal
pocket, and how many you would like to contribute to the group pot.
You must understand something very important about the group pot. The group pot will
include only the contributions from all the people participating in this activity. Once everyone
has decided how much to give to the group pot, I will add up the total amount and the research
team will double the amount. The group pot will then have twice the amount of money people
contributed to it. I will then redistribute the total earnings equally among all twelve of the people
participating in the activity. Each person’s payoff will be rounded up to the nearest 50USH.
Everyone’s donations and decisions will be anonymous, and the screens are here to ensure
that. No one will know another’s contributions. Do not look at other people’s boards. Only
the interviewer will know how much each person has donated and the interviewer will never
tell anyone else. The number of coins contributed by each person will be reported once all the
contributions have been made, but I will not say who donated each number of coins. Names or
ID numbers of the people here will not be used throughout the activity.
Let’s go over a few examples.
Interviewer 1 explains and demonstrates the coins. Interviewer 2 writes results on the large sheet of paper.
Participants should be able to see all three examples at one time by the end of the explanations.
Interviewer 1: One way the activity might turn out is that six participants decide to give nothing
and the other six decide to give 200 USH to the group pot. Demonstrate by moving two coins
from Personal Pocket to Group Pot.
Interviewer 2 writes on large sheet of paper and explain each number:
“0,0,0,0,0,0,200,200,200,200,200,200”, total (1200), average (100), doubling (2400), and Payback (200).
Average Total Double Payback
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200 100 1200 2400 200 USH
Interviewer 1: In this case, the results will look like this. We will have a total 1,200 USH in the
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group pot. The average donation is 100 USH. The research team double the total contribution, so
the group pot now has 2,400 USH which will be divided equally amongst all the participants. In
this case, everyone will get 200 USH.
The participants that donated 0 to the group pot will get 1000 shillings from their personal
pocket and 200 from the group pot, making 1,200 USH. The participants that donated 200 USH
will get 800 USH from their personal pocket and 200 USH from the group pot making 1,000 USH.
Interviewer 2: As interviewer 1 explains the individual payoffs, demonstrate on board like the following:
Average Total Double Payback
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200, 200 100 1200 2400 200 USH
1000 + 800 +
200 = 200 =
1200 total 1000 total
Figure B.3: Interviewers at work.
Let’s try another example.
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In this case, everyone gives all 1000 shillings to the group pot.
Interviewer 2 write and explain each number: “1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000,
1000, 1000, 1000,” total (12000), average (1000), double (24000), payoff (2000)
Interviewer 1 explain: The total contribution was 12,000 USH. In this case, the average contribution
was 1,000 USH. Now the research team will double this amount. The group pot now has 24,000
USH. Everyone will get 2,000 USH. Since everyone donated everything, everyone has 0 in their
private pocket, and everyone gets 2,000 USH from the group pot. Everyone has made 2,000 USH.
Let’s try a final example, in this case 7 people don’t give anything to the group pot, 4 people
give 100 USH, and 1 person gives 800 USH. The results will look like this:
Interviewer 2 write: “0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100, 800,” total (1200), average (100), double (2400),
payoff (200). Also write out the three different contributions and their total pay off during explanation.
Interviewer 1: The total donation is 1200 USH. The average donation is 100 USH, The research team
will then double this number so that the group pot has twice the money, or 2400 USH. The payoff
is 200 shillings for each person.
The participants that donated nothing will get 1000 USH from their personal pocket, as well
as 200 USH from the group pot. This makes 1,200 USH. While the participants that donated 100
will get 900 from their personal pocket, as well as 200 from the group pot. This makes 1100 USH.
The participants that donated 800 USH will have 200 USH from their personal pocket, as well as
200 USH from the group. This makes 400 USH.
Here are some things to remember:
People that donate coins will make less than people who do not donate or donate fewer coins. In
the first case, 6 people donated 200 USH and 6 people donated 0. The people that donated 200
made 1000 USH, but the people that donated 0 made 1,200 USH.
The group as a whole gets the most money if everyone puts in all 1000 USH. Remember the
second example. Everyone donated everything, and everyone made 2,000 USH.
Also keep in mind that if you put a lot and everyone else puts in little or nothing, you can end
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up with less than the 1000 USH you started out with. Remember the third example. Some made
1,200 USH, while the person who donated the most made only 400 USH.
Before we begin the activity, does anyone have any questions?
[Interviewers should answer questions, but they should stick to the script as much as possible. Also, they
do not have to invite too many questions. They have to keep it short!]
Rounds 1 and 2
Interviewer 1: Now please use the screen we have provided and decide how much you would like
to contribute to the group pot. We will go around and record your decisions. Place the amount of
coins you would like to contribute to the group pot on the right side of the board, with the picture
of the group of people. Remember you do not have to contribute if you do not want to. The coins
in the group pot will benefit everyone in the room.
Interviewer 2 goes around and records decision on data sheet. Individual contributions are recorded next to
the ID of the contributor. Calculate average, total, double, payoff.
Interviewer 2 writes the results of the donations on the large sheet of paper at the front of the room by writing
all contribution amounts in increasing order.
Interviewer 1: Thank you. Please move all your coins back to your personal pocket. Here are the
results of all the donations in the room.
Explain each number. Just to clarify, let’s go over how much two participants are going to get.
Pick the third and eight donated amount and go over their payments:
The person that donated X will have Y in his personal pocket, and will get Z from the group pot,
totaling Y+Z. The person that donated A to the pot will have B in his personal pocket, and get C
from the group pot, making B+C.
[Repeat for round 2]
Interviewer 1: Now we will repeat the activity again.
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Interviewer 2 walks around to make sure the setup has been followed.
(. . . )
[After round 2]
Monitor Election:
Interviewer 1: We will now repeat the activity again, but a little differently than the previous round.
In this round one of the participants will become a “monitor”. The monitor will be elected by all
of the participants in this activity.
The monitor will not be participating in this activity like everyone else. He will not donate
anything to the group pot, and he will not receive any payment from the group pot. He will
be given 1000 USH and he can spend 100USH to take away 300USH from the private pocket of
contributors he is dissatisfied with. He may do this to as many participants as he would like but
he may only use 100USH for each participant. The monitor does not have to reduce from anyone
and may keep all 1000 USH.
The monitor will not know the names of the contributors, only how much they donated. He
will see the same results as everyone else. The monitor will only choose who to reduce money
from by writing an “X” under the number indicating the size of the contribution. Now, we will
elect the monitor.
Each of you has a piece of paper and a pen at your stations. Please write the ID number of the
person that you would like to elect to be your monitor. An interviewer will walk around to collect
your ballots and will tally the results. Please take a moment to look around at the ID tags on the
other participants, so you know who you can vote for.
[Interviewer 2 collects ballots, and tallies results, and tells interviewer 1]
Interviewer 1 to elected monitor: You have been elected by the group as the monitor. Please
step to the front of the room, and stand beside the large paper. Starting from the next round of
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activity, you will be able to reduce 300 USH from any contributor, by giving up 100 USH. If you
would like to reduce, you will give 100 USH to [interviewer 2], walk up to the board, and mark
an X beneath the contributions you would like to reduce shillings from. So if you would like to
reduce 300 USH from a person who contributed (point to the second from the left), place an X
below it. If you would like to reduce 300 USH from a person who contributed (point to second
from the right), place an X beneath it. Give one coin for each X to [interviewer 2].
Rounds 3-6
Interviewer 1: Now please use the screen we have provided and decide how much you would like
to contribute to the group pot. We will go around and record your decisions. Place the amount of
coins you would like to contribute to the group pot on the symbol. Remember you do not have to
contribute if you do not want to, and the coins in the group pot will benefit everyone in the room.
Interviewer 2 goes around and record decision on data sheet. Individual contributions are recorded next to
the ID of the contributor. Calculate average, total, double, payoff.
Interviewer 1 writes the results of the donations on the large sheet of paper at the front of the room by writing
all contribution amounts in increasing order.
Interviewer 1: Please move all your coins back to your personal pocket. This is the result of all the
donations in the room.
Let’s go over how much two participants are going to get.
Pick the third and eight donated amount and go over their payments:
The person that donated X will have Y in his personal pocket, and will get Z from the group pot,
totaling Y+Z. The person that donated A to the pot will have B in his personal pocket, and get C
from the group pot, making B+C. Now, the monitor can decide if he would like to reduce 300 USH
from a contributor.
Interviewer 1 to monitor: Would you like to reduce the 300 USH from any contributor? If yes, please
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mark an X by the ones you want to reduce from and give 100 USH to [interviewer 2] for each X
you mark. If not, let us know now.
Explain results to the room The Xs mean that 300 USH have been reduced from the person that
donated the amount indicated to the group pot. So for example, one person that donated X has
just had 300 USH reduced from their payoff. Instead of earning X, they will now earn Y.
Announce repetition Now, we will repeat the activity again. After you’ve made a decision the
elected monitor will again be given the possibility to take some money away from you. Please
move your coins back to their original position so that there are ten coins in your private pot.
(. . . )
[This process should be repeated for a total of 4 rounds.]
Payoff (end of 6 rounds):
The cards are numbered from one to six. We will ask one of you to pick a card. The number that
will be picked will determine which round you will be paid for at the end of the day. For example,
if you pick card number one you will be paid for round 1 (point to round 1 results). If you pick
card number three you will be paid for round 3 (point to round 3 results). Remember, you will get
both what you kept in your private pocket, and the payoff from the group pot.
Interviewer 1 asks the front right participant: Please pick a card from this shuffled deck.
Interviewer 2 records accordingly.
Thank you for your time. You may now leave.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3: Dictator and Third-Party
Punishment Games’ Scripts
C.1 Dictator Game (Executives): Interviewer Manual
Materials (Per Group):
– 1 large cardboard privacy screen
– 30 × 100USH coins (20 for enumerator, 10 for demonstration set)
– 1 Generic Demonstration set
– 1 Demonstration set (large Stranger, DC member boards and 20 coins)
– 1 board symbolizing Stranger/Personal Pocket
– 1 board symbolizing DC member/Personal Pocket – 1 set of Payment cards (each deck 2 cards:
Stranger, DC member) for choosing payment
– Activity 1 Activity 1 Executive Record sheet
Setup:
The group will sit together while instructions for the activity and examples are introduced. Enu-
merator will designate a private area/booth close by, which should be set up as follows:
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Figure C.1: Game Setting: Dictator Game (Executives)
Introduction to activities
Thank you all for participating to this activity. My name is [enumerator 1].
In this activity we will be playing with real money. You should know that whatever money you
win in this and the other activities will be yours to keep and take home. This money is for your
individual use, goes to your private pocket, and you can spend it as you wish. You will receive
the money from this activity, as well as your compensation, at the end of the day. The money
comes from two American Universities, Princeton and Columbia. You should understand that
this money does not come from our own (private) pocket. It is money given to the research team
by the University to use for research.
Before we begin, I want to tell you the rules that we must follow. I am about to explain the
first activity and it is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who
understand the activity will actually be able to participate. We will run through some examples
here while we are all together. While in the group, you cannot ask questions or talk. This is very
important. Please be sure that you obey this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil
the activity for everyone. If one person talks about the activity while sitting in the group or with
other people later, this person will not be allowed to participate in todays activities and will be
sent home. Do not worry if you do not completely understand the activity as we go through the
examples here in the group. Each of you will have a chance to ask questions in private to be sure
that you understand.
Finally, you will be playing in groups of two individuals, but you would not be told the name
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of the person and you would not be able to see the person you are playing with. Similarly, we
would not reveal your name to the person you are playing with or to anybody else. Only us,
the research team, will know about your decisions, and well register them using an identification
code, and not your name.
This first activity involves pairs of individuals. Each pair will be given a total of ten 100USH
coins, totaling 1,000USH. The First participant, the Decider, has to decide how to allocate the
money between her/himself and the Second participant, the Receiver. The Decider will take home
whatever he has decided to allocate to himself, and the Receiver will take home whatever he has
been allocated by the Decider.
All of you have been chosen to participate as Deciders. As a Decider, you have to decide how
to split the 1,000 USH between you and a Receiver. Here are 4 examples of how you could split
the money:
Demonstrate on the “Generic” Board:
• if you give 1,000 USH (10 coins) to the Receiver, the Receiver will receive 1,000 USH and you
will walk away with nothing at the end of the day.
• if you give the Receiver 200USH (2 coins), s/he will receive 200 USH and you will walk
away with 800USH (8 coins).
• if you give the Receiver 700 USH (7 coins), s/he will receive 700 USH and you will walk
away with 300 USH, (3 coins).
• if you give the Receiver 0 coins, s/he will receive nothing and you will walk away with 1,000
USH (10 coins).
We will ask you to make a decision of how to allocate 1,000 USH two times for two different
receivers. In the first case youll be asked to be the Decider and allocate money between you and
a Stranger. You will use this board [pull out stranger board and set up 10 coins.]After you make
your decision, a stranger will receive a box with the money. The Receiver will not be told your
name or given any information about you. This stranger is a person who you do not know. We
have chosen this person in the following way: from the list of all the people in the sub-county, we
have randomly selected a few people. The person that will be receiving is one of them.
The second time, you will be asked, again, to allocate 1000USH between yourself and a second
person. But this time the Receiver will be a regular member of the DC. Will use this board [pull
out a PO leader board and set up 10 coins.] After you make your decision, a regular member of the
DC will receive a box with the money. The Receiver will not be told your name or given any
information about you. He will only be told only that the money comes from a DC executive. This
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person might be here today or not. The only thing you know is that he is a regular member of the
DC.
You will meet with the enumerators one-on-one. After you have decided how to allocate the
money in each situation, we will determine which activity you will be paid for. Youll have to pick
between two cards. One card has the symbol of the Stranger on it, while the other has the symbol
of the DC member on it [show cards]. You will pick one of the cards, and you will take home the
money you have made in the activity that you have randomly select. Be careful, since you do not
know in advance for which activity you are going to be paid for, you have always to decide as if
you were dividing real money.
Before making your decision, the enumerator will explain the activity again, and let you ask
any question you might have. While waiting during the one-on-one meetings with enumerators,
no one should talk about the activity or their decisions. If you have a question, please ask the
enumerator, not another participant. Also, you are not allowed to speak about the activity with
anybody during the day. You can talk about it only on your way home, after all the activities are
over.
Now we are going to call each of you one-by-one to meet with an enumerator.
One-on-one meeting
Each booth should be set up before the participant comes for their one-on-one interview. The boards with
the two symbols should be placed in front of the participant with ten 100USH coins on each board on the
Personal Pocket side. Make sure to record the participants ID number in the “ID” Column.
You have been selected to be a Decider. You have been given a total of ten 100USH coins,
totaling 1,000USH, and have to decide how to allocate the money between you and a Receiver.
You will make both decisions when I have finished explaining the activity. Here you are dividing
the money between yourself and a Stranger [Point to the corresponding board]. The Stranger is
someone from your sub-county who has been selected at random from a complete list of all the
members of the sub-county. This person will NOT be told your name or given any information
about you.
Here you are dividing the money between yourself and a regular member of the DC [Point to
the corresponding board]. This person will NOT be told your name or given any information about
you. He will be told only that the money comes from one of the DC executives. This person might
be here today or not. The only thing you know is that he is a regular member of your DC.
In both cases, you will take home whatever you have decided to allocate to yourself, while the
Receiver will take home whatever you have decided to give him/her at the end of the day. You
do not have to give any of these people any money if you do not want to. Remember that you are
dividing real money, and you will be paid for one of these decisions.
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Lets start with an example. If you decide to give a person 300USH (3 coins), then you will have
700USH (7 coins) for yourself.
Do you have any question for me?
Let me now ask you a question: If you give 600USH (6 coins) to a person, how many do you keep
to yourself?
If the participant responds correctly, go ahead with the Game.
If not, give the answer, and ask another question:
If you give 200 USH (2 coins), how much are you keeping for yourself?
If the participant responds correctly, go ahead with the Game.
If not, provide the answer and explain, but put an ? next to the participants decision.
You now have a few minutes to make their decisions for both situations. When you are finished,
please let me know.
Record the number of coins the participant has given to the Stranger in the Offer - Stranger Column, and
the number of coins the participant has given to the DC member in the “Offer DC member” Column. Show
the participant the 2 payment option cards.
C.2 Third Party Punishment Game: Interviewer Manual
Materials (Per Group):
– 2 large private screens (1 per enumerator)
– 45 ×100 USH coins (15 for each enumerator, 15 for demonstration)
– 1 Demonstration TPP board
– 2 boards: 1 Decider and 1 Monitor board
– Record/pens
Each enumerator should have – A large privacy screen
– 10 × 100USH coins
– 1 board (Enum 1: Decider board; Enum 2: Monitor board)
– Record/pens
Setup:
Enumerators should decide who is Enumerator 1 and who is Enumerator 2. Enumerator 1 will be speaking
more. Group 1 should have all odd-numbered PO members. First, the group will sit together to listen to
instructions. Each enumerator should designate an area set up.
231 APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 3: GAMES’ SCRIPTS
Group instructions:
Enumerator 1: This activity involves three individuals. All of them are members of a PO. Two
players will be given a total of ten 100USH coins, totaling 1,000USH. The First player, the Decider,
has to decide how to allocate the money between her/himself and the Second player, the Receiver.
The Receiver takes home whatever he has been allocated by the Decider. The Decider might take
home whatever he has decided to keep for himself. But the Decider has to wait for the decision of
the third player, the Monitor. The Monitor is allocated 500 USH and, in case he is dissatisfied with
the Decider decision, he may spend one 100USH coin to take away three coins (300USH) from
the Decider. In such case the monitor will remain with 400USH. The monitor may also leave the
decision as is. In such case the monitor gets to keep all the 500USH for himself.
The identity of each player will remain unknown to everyone except for us. Nobody will be
told the name or any other information about the other players. The only think you know is that
all the players are PO members. Half of you will be randomly assigned to be Deciders, the other
half is randomly assigned to be Monitors. After all the participants have made their decision, we
will pair up Deciders and Monitors at random.
Here are two examples: [Use demonstration board and 15 coins]. If the Decider gives the Receiver
300 USH and keeps 700 USH for him/herself, the Receiver will go home with 300 USH, while the
Decider is left with 700 USH. However, how much the Decider will keep in the end depends on
the decision of the Monitor. If the Monitor is dissatisfied with the allocation of money between the
Decider and Receiver, he can decide to spend 100 USH to take away 300 USH from the Decider
private pocket. In this case the Decider will remain with 400 USH in his pocket and the Monitor
will have 400 USH. If instead the Monitor is satisfied with the allocation of money, the Decider
will have 700 USH and the Monitor will keep 500 USH.
Lets take another example. If the Decider gives the Receiver zero USH and keeps 1,000 USH
for him/herself, the Receiver will go home with nothing, while the Decider is left with 1,000 USH.
If the Monitor is dissatisfied with the allocation of money between the Decider and Receiver, he
can decide to spend 100 USH to take away 300 USH from the Decider private pocket. In this case
the Decider will remain with 700 USH in his pocket and the Monitor will have 400 USH. If instead
the Monitor is satisfied with the allocation of money, the Decider will keep all 1,000 USH and the
Monitor will keep 500 USH.
Again, the transaction will be completely anonymous, and no one will know the names of who
is giving, receiving, or monitoring. Now, you will each meet with the enumerators one-on-one to
make your decision. Some of you have been randomly assigned to play as Deciders, others as
Monitors. The enumerator will tell you your role. While waiting, no one should talk about the
game and their decisions.
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One-on-one interview
Enumerator 1 will take the 9 players with numbers from 1 to 17. They will be Deciders.
Enumerator 2 will take the 9 players with number 19 and higher. They will be Monitors.
Enumerator 1 (Instructions for ‘Deciders’):
Record respondent’s ID number
Make sure you have the appropriate board
You have been selected to be a Decider. A PO member will play as a Receiver, and another PO
member will be the Monitor. You now have 1,000 USH (10x100USH coins) in front of you, and
have to decide how to allocate the money between you and the Receiver. After you decide, the
Monitor will be informed about your decision. If s/he is not satisfied with your decision, s/he
will be able to take away 300 USH, three coins, from your private pocket.
Do you have any question? [Answer questions if any, but keep it short] Now you can make your
decision. Please let me know when you have finished.
Record number of coins they have given to the other PO member. Rearrange coins back to original set
up arrangement.
We will determine how much you have made in this activity once the Monitor has decided
whether to take away 300 USH from your private pocket or not. We will give you the money at
the end of the day. Thank you. You may now sit down.
Enumerator 2 (Instructions for ‘Monitors’):
Record respondent’s ID number
Make sure you have the appropriate board
You have been selected to be a Monitor, and have to oversee a transaction between two PO
members. One PO member, the Decider, will be asked to divide 1,000 USH between him/herself
and another PO member. You are given 500 USH. If you are unsatisfied with the Deciders choice,
you are allowed to spend 100 USH to take away 300 USH form the Decider. If you spend a coin,
you will get 400 USH. If not, you will get 500USH. I am now going to ask you what youd decide
to do in different situations.
Do you have any question? [Answer questions if any, but keep it short]
Enumerator, place the coins to demonstrate each question and record after each answer: “1” if Player decides
to spend 1 coin to monitor; “” if player decides not to spend any coins to monitor
1. The first PO member keeps 10 coins and gives the second PO member 0 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 7 coins instead of 10 and the second still gets
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0 coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to reduce the Deciders private pocket, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin
from their personal pocket and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm
this, replace coins back and set up the scenario in the next question.
2. The first PO member keeps 9 coins and gives the second PO member 1 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 6 coins instead of 9 and the second still gets 1
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
3. The first PO member keeps 8 coins and gives the second PO member 2 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 5 coins instead of 8 and the second still gets 2
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
4. The first PO member keeps 7 coins and gives the second PO member 3 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 4 coins instead of 7 and the second still gets 3
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
5. The first PO member keeps 6 coins and gives the second PO member 4 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 3 coins instead of 4 and the second still gets 4
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
6. The first PO member keeps 5 coins and gives the second PO member 5 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 2 coins instead of 5 and the second still gets 5
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
7. The first PO member keeps 4 coins and gives the second PO member 6 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 1 coin instead of 4 and the second still gets 6
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
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• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
8. The first PO member keeps 3 coins and gives the second PO member 7 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 0 coins instead of 3 and the second still gets 7
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
9. The first PO member keeps 2 coins and gives the second PO member 8 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 0 coins instead of 2 and the second still gets 8
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
10. The first PO member keeps 1 coins and gives the second PO member 9 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 0 coins instead of 1 and the second still gets 0
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take three away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back and
set up the scenario in the next question.
11. The first PO member keeps 0 coins and gives the second PO member 10 coins, will you spend
1 coin so that the first PO member will receive 0 coins instead of 0 and the second still gets 0
coins? Or will you leave things as they are?
• If they decide to punish, visually demonstrate the effect: take one coin from their personal pocket
and take the rest away from the first PO member. After they confirm this, replace coins back to
original set up arrangement.
We will pair up your decisions with the allocation that two PO members have made. We will
determine the amount that you will make after everyone in your group has played and will give
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